Judgement Consolidated appeals from two decrees of the High Court (March 17, 1902), reversing two decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Shahjehanpore (December 12, 1900). Rajah Sher Singh was the original owner of all the villages in suit. The respondents alleged that on his death his widow, Rani Chauhan Kunwar, succeeded to a Hindu widows estate of inheritance; while 20 Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 121 the appellants case was that Rajah Sher Singh had made a gift during his life-time to his wife. In the years 1854 and 1860 Rani Chauhan Kunwar made a gift of the said villages to her daughter, Iiwan Kunwar, since deceased, who in the year 1865 transferred all the said villages to her son Rajah Hemanchal Sah, who predeceased her and was succeeded by his widow the appellant. Rajah Makund Singh (from whom the other respondents derived title) claimed as next heir to Sher Singh, and that the succession opened on the death of Iiwan Kunwar (who had succeeded to a daughters estate) to his father Partab Singh, who was the son of Sher Singhs deceased daughter Pran Kunwar. The defence was that Makund Singh was not the son of Partab, and that Partab was not the son of Pran Kunwar. The Subordinate Judge found that Partab Singh was the son of Pran Kunwar, but that Makund Singh was not Partabs son, as he had become the adopted son of Rajah Kishun Singh. The consequence in law of this finding was that Partab Singhs heir was his widow, and not the plaintiff, and accordingly both suits were dismissed. The High Court ruled that the question of adoption was not properly in issue, and that, if it were, the adoption was not proved. The Court said " The evidence satisfies us beyond any reasonable doubt, and we find that Rajah Makund Singh was the natural son of Rajah Partab Singh, and that he was never in the legal sense of the term adopted by his uncle Rajah Kishun Singh. We also find that Raja Partab Singh was the son of Rani Pran Kunwar. We may add that the reflections cast by the learned Subordinate Judge upon the character of the plaintiffs witnesses were, in our opinion, wholly undeserved. We also find that Raja Partab Singh was the son of Rani Pran Kunwar. We may add that the reflections cast by the learned Subordinate Judge upon the character of the plaintiffs witnesses were, in our opinion, wholly undeserved. As we have pointed out, the evidence of a number of these witnesses was obtained by commission, and therefore we have had as good opportunity as had the learned Subordinate Judge of forming an estimate of its value and probative effect. As we have pointed out, there was no evidence worthy of the name to controvert it. We unhesitatingly, therefore, find that Rajah Makund Singh is the son and heir of Rajah Partab Singh. The question of adoption was never properly in issue between the parties, but assuming that it was, we hold that the defendant has wholly failed to satisfy the onus which lay upon her of proving the adoption. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower Court, and, inasmuch as only one issue has been tried, remand the case to the Court below under the provisions of s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and direct the Court to re-admit the suit under its original number in the register and proceed to determine it on the merits." De Gruyther, for the appellant, contended that, although the word "adoption" was not used in the issue relating to the sonship of Makund Singh, both parties knew that the decision turned upon that question, and both directed their evidence to this point, and there was no surprise. Two powers of attorney executed in 1887 and 1891 by Makund and Partab were proved and described the former as adopted son of Rajah Kishun Singh, and so also did a deed of gift proved to have been executed by Makund in 1892. It was admitted that on the death of Kishun Singh he was succeeded by Makund to the exclusion of Partab. No sufficient explanation was given of these statements. It was contended that the onus lay on the respondents to prove that they were untrue in fact, and that otherwise he was bound by the admissions. He referred to the Civil Procedure Code, ss. 138 and 147; Katchekaleyana Rungappa v. Kachivijaya (( 1869) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 495.) ; Mussumat Mitna v. Syud Fuzlrub. (( 1870) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. He referred to the Civil Procedure Code, ss. 138 and 147; Katchekaleyana Rungappa v. Kachivijaya (( 1869) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 495.) ; Mussumat Mitna v. Syud Fuzlrub. (( 1870) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 573.) Ross, for the respondents, contended that the High Courts view of the evidence was correct, and that it was established that Rajah Makund Singh was the son of Partab Singh, and that he was entitled to succeed as heir, inasmuch as the alleged adoption had not been satisfactorily tried or proved. If it had 20 Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 122 been intended to raise the issue of adoption, it should have been raised in the appellants written statement. The order of remand under s. 562 of the Code had been properly made; and a specific issue on the question of adoption should now be framed and included in the remand. He referred to ss. 562 and 566 of the Code. De Gruyther replied on the question as to remand. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ATKINSON. The two suits out of which these consolidated appeals arise were brought to recover from the appellant possession of certain zemindari property, consisting of villages and gardens situate in the district of Budaun. In one of these suits (No. 129 of 1899) Rajah Makund Singh was the sole plaintiff, while in the second (No. 128 of 1899) certain persons to whom it was alleged he had purported to sell and convey the property sought to be recovered in that suit were the plaintiffs, and Makund Singh was joined as a pro forma defendant. The evidence was taken in the second of these suits, but as the questions arising in both suits were practically identical, they were tried together, and the evidence taken in one was, by arrangement between the parties, treated as having been taken in both and used for the purposes of both. The property in dispute formerly belonged to Rajah Sher Singh, a rajah of the State of Jaipur, who died many years ago, and in the events which have happened came by descent to Rajah Partab Singh, his grandson, who died on July 26, 1898, leaving his widow him surviving. She is still alive. Rajah Partab Singh was the youngest of three brothers. Both his elder brothers predeceased him. She is still alive. Rajah Partab Singh was the youngest of three brothers. Both his elder brothers predeceased him. The eldest, Kishun Singh, the survivor of the two, died in 1873. At that date Partab Singh was forty-eight years old. The plaintiff Makund Singh claimed to be the lawfully begotten son of Partab Singh, and to have inherited from his father the property sought to be recovered in the two actions. This was the sole title on which he relied. His age was disputed, the defendants asserting that he was ten years old in 1873, and the plaintiffs that he was then thirteen years of age. Several defences were filed in both suits, in which it was alleged (amongst other things) that Partab Singh was not the father of Makund Singh. Upon these pleadings certain issues were framed, with the first of which their Lordships have alone to deal, since it is that on which the decisions appealed from were alone rested. This first issue ran as follows "Is Rajah Partab Singh a son of Pran Kunwar, and is Rajah Makund Singh a son of Rajah Partab Singh?" It was found, and is not now disputed, that Partab Singh was the son of Pran Kunwar, the eldest daughter of Rajah Sher Singh. It is upon the second branch of the issue that the controversy in the case arises. The judges of the High Court have found that Partab Singh was the natural father of Makund Singh, and their Lordships see no reason to disturb their finding on that point. Under the Hindu law, however, a man who has been adopted ceases by virtue of that adoption to be regarded as the son of his natural father, and becomes for the purpose of inheritance or succession the son of his adoptive father. And accordingly in the course of the litigation in the Court of the Subordinate Judge the defendant at an early stage, without pro test or objection on the part of the plaintiffs, made the cae that Makund Singh had been adopted by Kishun Singh. Deeds under the hands of Makund Singh and his father Partab Singh con taining express statements to that effect were given in evidence by the defendant. Questions directed more or less pointedly to the matter were addressed to the plaintiffs witnesses. Deeds under the hands of Makund Singh and his father Partab Singh con taining express statements to that effect were given in evidence by the defendant. Questions directed more or less pointedly to the matter were addressed to the plaintiffs witnesses. Evidence was given by and on behalf of Makund Singh to explain away the admissions contained in those instruments and to account, if possible, for the fact that on the death of Kishun Singh Makund Singh had been put forward as his successor. No suggestion was made on behalf of the plaintiffs that they were taken by surprise. No application was made that 20 Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 123 the pleadings should be amended, a new issue framed, or the hearing adjourned. In order that the plaintiffs should succeed in these cases it was essential that it should be found in their favour (1.) that Makund Singh was the natural son of Partab Singh, and (2.) that he had not been adopted by Kishun Singh. From a passage in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge it is quite clear that he considered that both these questions were before him for decision. His words were " The plaintiffs must then produce unimpeachable evidence to prove their allegation that Rajah Makund Singh is a son of Rajah Partab Singh, and, if so, he had not ceased to be so by having been adopted by Rajah Kishun Singh." He does not appear, however, to have come to a definite decision on either of these points, but merely to have arrived at the conclusion that the evidence before him did not amount to satisfactory proof that Makund Singh was the natural son of Partab Singh. The judges of the High Court, on the other hand, found, as has been already stated, that Makund Singh was the natural son of Partab Singh, and although they con sidered that " the question of adoption was never properly in issue between the parties, yet, on the assumption that it was, held " That the defendant had wholly failed to satisfy the onus which lay upon her of proving the adoption." It is to be regretted that a definite issue was not framed upon this point, and the matter thus put beyond all controversy. But that course never seems to have been suggested at any stage of the proceedings by any of the persons concerned. The suits were commenced on September 23, 1899. On November 80, 1899, and December 1, 1899, respectively the issues were framed. The cases came on for hearing on November 30, 1900. The arguments were concluded on December 1, 1900, and judgment was delivered and decrees pronounced by the Subordinate Judge on December 12. Evidence was taken by commission and the witnesses examined by interrogatories at Alwar on January 29, 1900, at Agra on November 5, 1900, and the plaintiff Makund Singh at Delhi on October 16, 1900. Other witnesses were examined in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at the hearing. On November 30, 1899, there was filed in Court on behalf of the defendant a list of documents, one of which is described as a copy of a deed of gift dated June 25, 1892, duly executed by Partab Singh and Makund Singh, in which the latter is stated to be the " adopted son of raja Kishun Singh, rais of Patan, in the Sewai Jaipur State." And on May 14, 1900, a second list of documents was in like manner filed on behalf of the defen dant. One of the documents in this second list is described as a copy of a power of attorney, dated June 10, 1891, duly executed by Partab Singh and Makund Singh, in which the latter is similarly described, and in the body of the deed specifically stated to be the ruler of Patan. One of the documents in this second list is described as a copy of a power of attorney, dated June 10, 1891, duly executed by Partab Singh and Makund Singh, in which the latter is similarly described, and in the body of the deed specifically stated to be the ruler of Patan. The object for which the first document was to be given in evidence was stated to be " To prove that Makund Singh is not the son of Partab Singh, and that he did not mention himself in this document to be the son of Partab Singh." And the object for which the second deed was proposed to be given in evidence was in like manner stated to be " to shew that Raja Makund Singh is the adopted son of Raja Kishun Singh, and that in this mukhtarnama (power of attorney) Raja Makund Singh has described himself as the adopted son of Kishan Singh." There can be no ground, therefore, for the suggestion that the plaintiffs were not fully informed that this question of adoption would be raised, and that one, if not both, of these documents would be relied upon to prove the admissions of Makund Singh upon this question of adoption contained in them. This, indeed, was the only purpose for which they could have been given in evidence in these suits. One witness examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, Gur Dhan Singhji, was on January 29, 1900, pointedly cross-examined as to this deed of gift. 20 Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 124 On October 16, 1900, many months afterwards, Makund Singh was himself examined by interrogatories. In the seventh interrogatory he is asked, " What relation do you bear to Rajah Kishun Singh, and how did you receive his property ? " Answer " Rajah Kishun Singh was my taya (fathers elder brother). On his death he left no descendant, and his property devolved on my father. As my father was an old man, he of his own accord installed me on the gaddi of the riyasat." And on cross-examination he deposed " Rajah Kishun Singh died in 30 Sambat. The title of Rajah held by him was received by me. This title has not been given by anyone. It is a hereditary one. As my father was an old man, he of his own accord installed me on the gaddi of the riyasat." And on cross-examination he deposed " Rajah Kishun Singh died in 30 Sambat. The title of Rajah held by him was received by me. This title has not been given by anyone. It is a hereditary one. After (the death of) Rajah Kishun Singh, I was installed on the gaddi with the consent of my father. Before this Jamna Lal, pleader, examined me by means of commission. I stated in that deposition that after the death of Kishun Singh I received his estate by right of inheritance, i.e., it came to my family. By this statement I meant that my father received it, and that I received it with his consent. I do not remember now whether I stated in that deposition that Rajah Partab Singh installed me." To the pleader for the plaintiff "I was not asked plainly whether that property was received by Partab Singh or by me." On December 5, 1900, after the arguments in the case had concluded and before judgment was delivered, the pleaders of the plaintiffs made an application to the Court of the Subordinate Judge that the reason given in the argument why Makund Singh described himself in the deed of gift and power of attorney as the adopted son of Kishun Singh should be reduced into writing and recorded, that reason being that " the Patan Raj was in the name of Rajah Kishun Singh, that Rajah Makund Singh was mentioned as his adopted son, so that he might be installed on the raj gaddi, and that at the time of installation, a nazrana (present) is paid to the Jaipur Raj as a token of mourning. After the death of Kishun Singh, Makund Singh was installed on the gaddi to make a saving in the payment of the nazrana ; for once it would have to be paid at the time of installation of Rajah Partab Singh after the death of Rajah Kishun Singh, and again at the time of installation of Makund Singh after the death of Rajah Partab Singh. As Makund Singh was proclaimed an adopted son at the time of installation, he was written as such in the documents." This was accordingly done, but no proof whatever was given that the custom of giving nazrana on the occasion of installations to a Raj Gaddi prevailed in the State of Jaipur, or that a nazrana had, in fact, been paid on the occasion of Makund Singhs installation. Moreover, this explanation put forward at the last moment was not alluded to, directly or indirectly, by any of the witnesses examined in the case, and is quite inconsistent with the evidence of Makund Singh himself above set forth. It is, in addition, the second explanation, not the first, and is in direct conflict with that which preceded it. The first explanation is deposed to by more than one of the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs, but is set forth more fully in the evidence of Pandit Earn Kunwar, who was examined at Agra on November 5, 1900, than in that of any others. In answer to the seventh interrogatory addressed to him, he deposed " Maharajah Partab Singh had a right of inheritance after the death of Rajah Kishun Singh. But he subsequently thought that as he was advanced in years he might perhaps also die. This led him to give the whole of the property to Makund Singh. Makund Singh was the managing member of the families of Rajah Kishun Singh and Partab Singh. There was no other managing member. It was for this reason that the property was given to him." As at the date of Kishun Singhs death Partab Singh was only forty-eight years of age and Makund Singh at most thirteen, and possibly only ten, years of age, this explanation was not only incredible, but 20 Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 125 absurd. It was therefore not unnaturally deemed advisable to suggest another. And accordingly the economical reason—the desire to escape a double tax, the giving of nazrana twice over—was at the last moment put forward in argument and subsequently solemnly recorded. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 125 absurd. It was therefore not unnaturally deemed advisable to suggest another. And accordingly the economical reason—the desire to escape a double tax, the giving of nazrana twice over—was at the last moment put forward in argument and subsequently solemnly recorded. On the materials before their Lordships the broad and undisputed facts of these cases appear to be (1.) That the plaintiff Makund Singh more than once under his hand and seal stated that he was the adopted son of Kishun Singh, which statement was in effect an admission that he had no title to the lands he sought to recover in these actions. (2.) That at the death of Kishun Singh Makund Singh was treated as the formers adopted son, and in that character, and by that right, installed in the Raj Gaddi. (3.) That according to the evidence of three at least of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, on the death of Kishun Singh, Makund Singh entered into the possession and enjoyment of the formers property. (4.) That two different and inconsistent explanations have been put forward by the plaintiffs to account for the admission contained in the deeds, as well as for the action taken by the parties concerned after the death of Kishun Singh, one of which explanations is absurd and the other, in its most important parts, unproven. The learned Chief Justice in his judgment points out that the burden of proving that the adoption relied upon took place rests on the defendant. That is undoubtedly so, but it is difficult to conceive how she could, as against Makund Singh—prima facie, at all events—discharge that burden more effectually than by proving his solemn statement under hand and seal that it did take place. That is undoubtedly so, but it is difficult to conceive how she could, as against Makund Singh—prima facie, at all events—discharge that burden more effectually than by proving his solemn statement under hand and seal that it did take place. The proof this admission shifts the burden, because, as against the party making it, as Parke B. says in Slatterie v. Pooley ((1340) 6 M. & W. 664, at p. 669.), " What a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so." No doubt, in a case such as this, where the defendant is not a party to the deeds, and there is therefore no estoppel, the party making the admission may give evidence to rebut this presumption, but unless and until that is satisfactorily done, the fact admitted must be taken to be established. The law upon the point is clear. In Heane v. Rogers ((1829) 9 B. & C. 577,at p. 586.) Bayley J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, lays it down that " There is no doubt but that the express admissions of a party to the suit, or admissions implied from his conduct, are evidence, and strong evidence against him; but we think he is at liberty to prove that such admissions were mistaken or were untrue, and is not estopped or concluded by them unless another person has been induced by them to alter his condition. In such a case the party is estopped from disputing their truth as against that person (and those claiming under him) and that transaction, but as to third parties he is not bound." In Newton v. Liddiard (( 1848) 12 Q. B. 926.) Lord Denman approved and adopted this statement of the law ; and Ex parte Morgan, In re Simpson (( 1876) 2 Ch. D. 72, at p. 89.) and Trinidad Asphalte Co. v. Cory at ([ 1896] A. C. 587.) in effect illustrate the same principle. There is here no suggestion of mistake. And the question for the decision of their Lordships in effect resolves itself into this Has Makund Singh proved satisfactorily that the admissions contained in the deeds to which he was a party are untrue in fact? In the opinion of their Lordships that question must be answered in the negative. There is here no suggestion of mistake. And the question for the decision of their Lordships in effect resolves itself into this Has Makund Singh proved satisfactorily that the admissions contained in the deeds to which he was a party are untrue in fact? In the opinion of their Lordships that question must be answered in the negative. Their Lordships must therefore hold that on the materials before them the title of the plaintiffs to recover has been disproved. Mr. Ross, on behalf of the plaintiffs, earnestly pressed that a specific issue on this question of adoption 20 Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 27 ( 1906- 1907) Rani C handra Kunwar V. C haudhri Narpat Singh 126 might now be framed, and submitted for trial to the Subordinate Judge. Their Lordships consider that, as matters now stand, this would be a most undesirable course, and they are unable to adapt it. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeals should be allowed, the decrees of the High Court set aside with costs, and the decrees of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the actions restored. The respondents must pay the costs of the appeals.