JUDGMENT : KNOX, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption. The circumstances are somewhat peculiar. On the 13th of July, 1902, a document was executed by one Mohan Lal Brahman in favour of the appellants, Bansi Dhar and Jagan Lal, as security for a loan of Rs. 5,000. As the deed was originally drafted, it was a usufructuary mortgage for a term of seven years, and the interest entered in the deed was 8 annas per cent. 2. On the 14th of July this deed, however, was altered by striking out the term of seven years and enhancing the rate of interest to 10 annas per cent. At the same time, on the 14th of July, a lease was executed in favour of the brother and nephew of the mortgagees abovenamed for a term of seven years, for a consideration of Rs. 300, which, it will be noted, is equivalent to the amount of the interest of 8 annas per cent, secured by the mortgage. Both the deeds were executed on the same date and were written by the same scribe. The witnesses were the same and the registration of both was effected on the same day. The lower Court has found that the two documents represent one and the same transaction of usufructuary mortgage; that this mortgage was the real intention of the parties, and that the transaction assumed the form it did in order to defeat the right of pre-emption given by the wajib-ul-arz to co-sharers in the village. We have been taken through the whole of the evidence and we see no reason to differ from the conclusion arrived at by the lower Court. The evidence of Kanhaia Lal, a pleader, shows that he was consulted by the parties to the deed and that he advised them that according to the wajib-ul-arz pre-emption could be claimed if the transaction was a usufructuary mortgage. He states that nothing was said to him about a simple mortgage. The evidence of Kanhaia Lal, a pleader, shows that he was consulted by the parties to the deed and that he advised them that according to the wajib-ul-arz pre-emption could be claimed if the transaction was a usufructuary mortgage. He states that nothing was said to him about a simple mortgage. When we consider this evidence in the light of the very significant alterations in the mortgage deed and of the evidence of Gumani Lal, one of the marginal witnesses, and of Kedar Nath, the scribe of the documents, we have no hesitation in finding that the real transaction between the parties was one of usufructuary mortgage and that in order to conceal the true character of the transaction a lease was executed in favour of the relations of the mortgagees, who are really benamidars of the mortgagees. 3. This finding relieves us from the necessity of considering whether in this village a deed of simple mortgage would give rise to a right of pre-emption. The learned Vakil for the appellants contended that the use of the word kimat in the wajib-ul-arz indicated that this provision related only to the case of an out-and-out sale. Having regard to the object which underlies the provisions as to pre-emption in a village administration paper, namely, the prevention thereby of intrusion of strangers into the village com-munity, we cannot put so narrow an interpretation on the word kimat. We consider that it is wide enough to include the consideration given for a usufructuary mortgage with possession as well as for a sale. This disposes of the pleas raised in appeal. 4. There remain the objections filed by the respondents, which relate to that portion of the lower Court's decree which deals with interest. The amount of the interest, viz., Rs. 354-2-8, is not disputed, but it is contended by the learned Vakil, and we think with reason that the lower Court was in error in giving this amount to the mortgagees, Bansi Dhar and Jagan Lal. Out of the Rs. 5,000 all that they were entitled to was Rs. 1,500. The balance was due to a prior mortgagee, Bansi Dhar (not the appellant). The usufruct of the property was a sufficient return to the mortgagees for what they were out of the pocket. Out of the Rs. 5,000 all that they were entitled to was Rs. 1,500. The balance was due to a prior mortgagee, Bansi Dhar (not the appellant). The usufruct of the property was a sufficient return to the mortgagees for what they were out of the pocket. Without altering the total amount to be paid by the plaintiff we vary the decree of the Court below by directing that out of the amount paid into Court, Rs. 1,500 be payable “to the appellants, Bansi Dhar and Jagan Lal, and the balance, viz., Rs. 3,854-2-8, to the prior mortgagee, Bansi Dhar, of Moradabad. We dismiss the appeal with costs, which will in this Court include fees on the higher scale.