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1906 DIGILAW 28 (ALL)

Netrapal Singh v. Kalyan Das

1906-01-30

AIKMAN, KNOX

body1906
JUDGMENT : KNOX, J.:— The suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, was brought by the appellant with the object of recovering possession over Nagla Chalaseni, a hamlet in taluka Amargarh. The property was, in 1848, granted in perpetual lease by the predecessors of the present appellant to a younger brother of his, by name Sheobaran Singh, to be held in perpetuity by him and his heirs on payment of an annual sum of Rs. 900. The lease contains a covenant against alienation by sale or mortgage. It is an old document, and towards the end of it a portion is wanting. Che plaintiff's case was and is, that this portion, which is non-existent, contained a further stipulation that in the event of a transfer the lease would be forfeited and the lessor would have a right of re-entry. The plaintiff came into Court on the allegation that there had been a breach of the stipulations contained in the lease, and he sued both the representatives of Sheobaran Singh and certain transferees for possession. The suit has been dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, and the plaintiff comes here in appeal, raising again the contentions which he put forward in the Court below. The oral evidence called to prove that the lease contained a proviso for re-entry by the lessor on breach of the covenant against alienation is in our opinion worthless. We have inspected the original lease, and we are of opinion that it is in the highest degree improbable that it contained any such provision. The learned Vakil for the appellant admits that if the lease had no such provision, the case relied on by the learned Subordinate Judge, viz., Nil Madhab Sikdar v. Narottam Sikdar, [1890] I.L.R., 17 Cal., 826. is against him. There is a later case, viz., Parmeshri v. Vittappa Shanhaga, [1902] I.L.R., 26 Mad., 157., in which all the authorities are reviewed, and which also is clearly against the appellant. In the absence of any provision for re-entry, the appellant is not entitled to the possession of the property in suit. We dismiss the appeal with costs, which will in this Court include fees on the higher scale.