Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (February 18, 1903), reversing a decree of the District Court of Kistna (April 25, 1901). The suit, which was dismissed by the first Court and decreed by the High Court, was brought Dy the first respondent against the appellants and the second respondent for a declaration that the adoption of the second appellant by the first appellant was and is invalid. The case made in the plaint was that the adoption had not been authorized by the deceased, and—in paragraphs 6 and 7—that no gnatis other than the second respondent had been asked to give permission to the widow to make the adoption, and that his permission had been actuated by corrupt motives. The written statements of defence denied the corrupt motives alleged against the third defendant (i.e., the second respondent). That filed by the widow on behalf of herself and the second defendant stated that the plaintiff and other gnatis denied her husbands permission, that the witnesses thereto were dead, that she obtained permission anew from the third defendant and other gnatis, and on April 19, 1900, obtained from the third defendant a deed of authority for adoption; and that, according to the said permission, she had on April 20, 1900, adopted the minor second appellant of her free will and according to law, in order to perpetuate the line of her late husband Ramayya. The District Judge found to the effect that neither the corrupt motives attributed to the second respondent nor the express power to adopt, alleged to have been given by the deceased Ramayya, had Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 22 ( 1906- 1907) Jonnalagadda Venkamma V. Jonnalagadda Subrahmaniam been proved ; and, further, that it would have been useless for the widow to seek the authority of the plaintiff for the adoption of the second appellant, and that in the circumstances the authority of the senior reversioner was sufficient authority for the widow to make the adoption. App. 22 ( 1906- 1907) Jonnalagadda Venkamma V. Jonnalagadda Subrahmaniam been proved ; and, further, that it would have been useless for the widow to seek the authority of the plaintiff for the adoption of the second appellant, and that in the circumstances the authority of the senior reversioner was sufficient authority for the widow to make the adoption. As to " the deed of authority to adopt" of April 19, 1900, the District Judge held that it should be construed as an independent permission to adopt whether the husband had given permission or not; adding, " Except as an independent authority to adopt, the document seems to me to be meaningless, Venkamma wanted to put her right to adopt beyond question, and asked for and obtained the permission of a near gnati in addition to the authority of her husband which she asserted existed. It would not, in my opinion, be a reasonable construction to put on the document to construe it to mean that, because the husband gave permission, the third defendant gave permission. I think it should be construed to be an independent permission to adopt, whether the husband gave permission or not." The High Court concurred with the District Court in holding that the alleged authority to adopt from the husband was not proved, and that it was not established that the assent of the senior reversioner was procured for a pecuniary consideration. And although they differed from the District Judge on the con struction of the deed of April 19, 1900, they held, nevertheless, that the assent of the senior reversioner if otherwise sufficient was not invalidated by the widows allegation of her husbands authority. But they were of opinion that the seniority, of the assenting reversioner was immaterial, and that his assent was insufficient for the reason that his brothers, i.e., the plaintiffs, assent was not also sought. Also they put out of account the alleged assent of the remoter sapindas. Kenworthy Brown, for the appellants, contended that the adoption in this case was duly authorized and was valid. The widow was not, under the circumstances, bound to apply to the first respondent for his consent to the adoption. Also they put out of account the alleged assent of the remoter sapindas. Kenworthy Brown, for the appellants, contended that the adoption in this case was duly authorized and was valid. The widow was not, under the circumstances, bound to apply to the first respondent for his consent to the adoption. He also contended that the District Courts construction of the deed of April 19, 1900, was correct; and that the High Court had failed to give due weight to the assent of the remoter kindred of the deceased. He referred to Collector of Madura v. Srimatu Muttu Vijaya Ragunada Sethapati(( 1864) 2 Madr. H. C. R. 206, 221.), where it was held that a widows adoption is valid if with the assent of the majority of her husbands surviving kindred ; Collector of Madura v. Muttu Ramalinga Sethupathi (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 397, 442, 444.), which affirmed that decision and dealt with the question as to what constituted sufficient consent, having regard to the circumstances in which the widow is placed; and see also Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (( 1876) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154, 192, 193.) ; Karunabdhi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar (( 1880) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 173.); Venkatalaksmanna v. Narasayya. (( 1885) I. L. R. 8 Madr. 545, 548.) The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Robertson. The question in this appeal is of the validity of the adoption of the second appellant by the first appellant. That a form of adoption was gone through may be assumed; but the first respondent has obtained the decree appealed against, which declares the nullity of that adoption, on the ground that the first appellant, who is the widow, had not the requisite consent of her deceased husband or of his kinsmen. The suit was brought in the District Court of Kistna, and in that Court was dismissed with costs. This decree was reversed with costs by the High Court of Madras on February 18, 1903. The deceased Ramayya was a Brahmin and was separate in estate from his kinsmen. He died without issue in 1881, and his widow, the first appellant, succeeded to his property. The respondents, who are Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. This decree was reversed with costs by the High Court of Madras on February 18, 1903. The deceased Ramayya was a Brahmin and was separate in estate from his kinsmen. He died without issue in 1881, and his widow, the first appellant, succeeded to his property. The respondents, who are Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 22 ( 1906- 1907) Jonnalagadda Venkamma V. Jonnalagadda Subrahmaniam cousins of the deceased, are the nearest reversionary heirs to the estate. They are divided brothers, the second respondent being the elder, and they are the nearest kinsmen of the deceased. The second respondent, before the alleged adoption, executed a deed purporting to authorize it, and certain remoter kinsmen also signed this deed. The first respondent was not asked for his consent, and never gave it. The alleged adoption took place on April 20, 1900. One of the most important facts in the case is that the first appellant, the widow, at the time of the adoption and in her defence to this action asserted that her husband had before his death given her, orally, permission to take a boy in adoption. Both Courts have held that this has not been established in evidence. It is only as a second and corroborative authority that the first appellant obtained the deed of consent which has been mentioned. This failure of the appellants to prove the husbands authority enters deeply into the question about the kinsmens consent, for it cannot be disputed that the first appellant, in obtaining such consents as she did, represented herself to have received her husbands authority. Accordingly the respondents rely not merely on the absence of the consent of one of the two nearest kinsmen, but on the consents actually obtained having been given, not in the exercise of an indepen dent judgment on the expediency of the proposed adoption, but rather as the ratification of what must now be taken to be the non-existent authority of the deceased husband. This is the view taken in the judgment appealed against, and in their Lordships opinion it is sound. It is unnecessary to re-state the law as to the persons whose authority is required for adoption, for the appellants case fails in the quality of the consents actually obtained. This is the view taken in the judgment appealed against, and in their Lordships opinion it is sound. It is unnecessary to re-state the law as to the persons whose authority is required for adoption, for the appellants case fails in the quality of the consents actually obtained. But, in their Lordships judgment, the appellants have failed to justify the widow in omitting to ask for the authority of a person holding so important a position in the family as did the first respondent. She defends herself by saying that she knew he would refuse; but she is not entitled to say so, and to consult him was essential to her obtaining the mind of the kinsmen on this family question. In truth, however, her conduct in this particular goes to prove, along with the other facts, that the mind of the kinsmen was not what she was in search of. The consent which she asked and obtained was ratification of the authority already given by the husband, for this is expressly stated in the written consents on which the appellants found. It is impossible for the appellants now to set up this as an independent ground of defence. Even if the first respondent had been consulted and had con sented on the same footing as the others, there is absent from this adoption the independent approval of the natural advisers of the widow. But the failure to consult one of the two nearest kinsmen has not been justified. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed. The respondents not having appeared, there will be no order as to costs.