JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This is an appeal from the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Bareilly in one of the numerous suits which have arisen in the course of the litigation which followed the death of Chaudri Naubat Ram of Bareilly. The question we have to deal with concerns a 2 annas 8 pie share in mauza Maheshpur. That village formed part of the estate left by Chaudri Naubat Ram who died without issue in 1867. He was succeeded by his widow, Rani Ganesh Kunwar, who died in 1878. On her death possession of the estate was usurped by Rani Naraini Kunwar claiming to be widow of an alleged adopted son of Naubat Ram. On suit by reversioners the District Judge in 1881 held that Rani Naraini Kunwar had no title and gave a decree for possession of the estate to the reversioners. Mauza Maheshpur was one of the villages affected by that decree. The successful plaintiffs were Shib Lal and Piare Lal who were found by the Court to stand on the same level as reversioners, and one Lalji Mal who had advanced funds for the litigation. Among the plaintiffs claiming to be reversioners there had been arrayed one Narbada Parshad, but being found to be two degrees more distant than the others from Naubat Ram he withdrew, as also did one Bhairon Parshad for a similar reason. The latter, however, on the death of Piare Lal, succeeded to his interest tinder the decree. On appeal by Naraini Kunwar against the decree of the District Judge of June, 1881, a compromise was arrived at between the parties. A small portion of Naubat Ram's estate was left with the unsuccessful defendants. In all other respects the degree of the District Judge was affirmed. Maheshpur was not affected by the compromise. The appellate decree of the High Court in pursuance of the compromise was passed on July 8th, 1885. 2. Meanwhile Maheshpur had been the subject of litigation, Rani Naraini Kunwar having purported to sell it to one Ram Sarup. In execution of a decree against Ram Sarup the village was, on September 24th, 1885, (subsequent to the High Court decree of July, 1885) put up to auction and purchased by Har Charan Misr now deceased, but represented by the plaintiffs-respondents here who being minors sue under the guardianship of the Court of Wards. 3. In execution of a decree against Ram Sarup the village was, on September 24th, 1885, (subsequent to the High Court decree of July, 1885) put up to auction and purchased by Har Charan Misr now deceased, but represented by the plaintiffs-respondents here who being minors sue under the guardianship of the Court of Wards. 3. The present suit has arisen in the following manner:— In 1901, the Allahabad Bank, holder of a decree against Lalji Mal, attached in execution and applied for sale of 13 annas 4½ pies share in mauza Maheshpur as being property of its judgment-debtor Lalji Mal, and as such, liable to be taken in execution of the Bank's decree. Thereupon the present plaintiffs-respondents filed an objection under section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contesting the right of the representatives of Lalji Mal (then deceased), to be owners of the 13 annas 4½ pies of Maheshpur. That objection was rejected by the Subordinate Judge on September 16th, 1901 (Record No. 7C). 4. Then acting on the permission given by section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the present suit was preferred by the plaintiffs-respondents. They pray for a declaration that they possess an eight annas share in mauza Maheshpur, and that it is not saleable under the Bank's decree. But, as already mentioned, the only dispute in the suit is as to a 2 annas 8 pies share which the plaintiffs-respondents claim through Narbada Parshad abovementioned. We have no concern here with the remainder of 8 annas share claimed in the plaint. There were three sets of defendants to that suit, namely, (1) the Allahabad Bank, (2) the widow and son of Lalji Mal, and (3; the defendants, Annu Mal, Sundar and others, who claim title under a conveyance to them on February 13th, 1900, from Musammat Champa Dei, widow of Lalji Mal. The Bank having been paid off has not appeared, nor have the widow and other representatives of Lalji Mal. The only defendants who have appeared are the vendees under the conveyance of February, 1900. The learned Subordinate Judge gave the plaintiffs-respondents a declaration as to 5 annas 3½ pies in which the 2 annas 8 pies share is included. Hence this appeal. 5. We now proceed to recount the history of this share. 6. The only defendants who have appeared are the vendees under the conveyance of February, 1900. The learned Subordinate Judge gave the plaintiffs-respondents a declaration as to 5 annas 3½ pies in which the 2 annas 8 pies share is included. Hence this appeal. 5. We now proceed to recount the history of this share. 6. On September 15th, 1884, nearly a year before the decree of the High Court (July 8th, 1885), on the compromise in Rani Naraini Kunwar's suit had been pronounced, the two successful plaintiffs, Shib Lal and Bhairo Parshad (successors to Piare Lal), entered into an agreement which is the most important paper in this suit. In this document (Record No. 12) the two executants, after reciting the successful issue in their favor of the suit against Rani Naraini Kunwar and after setting out how Narbada Parshad had looked after that case for them, and had procured documentary evidence, to support their claim, and that he was like them descended from the common ancestor one Chaudri Hiraman, proceed to declare that therefore (clearly meaning in consideration of the foregoing) the executants would give to Narbada Parshad a 2 annas 8 pie share in the whole of the moveable and immoveable property which they might acquire under the decree or a compromise effected under it “when a decree is passed and possession is obtained or when a mutual compromise is made.” They set forth that this is done “in consideration for his favour in giving documentary evidence and of the efforts made by him in the prosecution of the suit,” and they covenant to get his name entered in the Khewats in the column of proprietors as zamindar and owner in all the villages in proportion to his share aforesaid. To this instrument the third successful plaintiff, Lalji Mal, was an attesting witness. The “right purchased” by him (Lalji Mal) and some villages which had been dedicated to religious purposes, were excepted. There can be no possible doubt that Lalji Mal, though not formally a party to this document, was well aware of its contents. To this instrument the third successful plaintiff, Lalji Mal, was an attesting witness. The “right purchased” by him (Lalji Mal) and some villages which had been dedicated to religious purposes, were excepted. There can be no possible doubt that Lalji Mal, though not formally a party to this document, was well aware of its contents. We may add that a perusal of the judgment of the District Judge of Bareilly of the 20th June, 1881, shows that the success of the plaintiffs in that suit was to a large extent due to the exertions of Narbada Parshad in searching for and producing old documents bearing on the pedigree of Naubat Ram's family. This instrument was engrossed on Rs. 5 stamp paper, but it does not appear to have been registered, nor is any formal conveyance of the 2 annas 8 pie share to Narbada Parshad shown to have been executed. The defence is chiefly founded on these two facts, namely, the absence of registration and of a formally executed and registered conveyance to Narbada Parshad. That the covenants to get the name of Narbada Parshad recorded in the Khewats as the owner of a 2 annas 8 pie share was carried out, appears from our appellate judgment of January 6th, 1902, (No. 18C. of the Record). That was a suit between Shib Lal on one side and Narbada Parshad on the other. The defendants-appellants claim title to the 2 annas 8 pies on the strength of a conveyance (No. 10 of the Record) by Shib Lal, on May 8th, 1896, to Lalji Mal of a 7 annas 2 pies share in Maheshpur which includes the 2 annas 8 pie share in dispute. The plaintiffs-respondents claim title to the same share by virtue of a “deed of relinquishment” (No. 6 of the Record), executed on October 10th, 1896, by Narbada Parshad in favour of Kunwar Har Charan Misr whose representatives in title are the plaintiffs-respondents. So both parties to the present suit derive title from the plaintiffs and defendants to that suit. The plaintiffs-respondents claim title to the same share by virtue of a “deed of relinquishment” (No. 6 of the Record), executed on October 10th, 1896, by Narbada Parshad in favour of Kunwar Har Charan Misr whose representatives in title are the plaintiffs-respondents. So both parties to the present suit derive title from the plaintiffs and defendants to that suit. The object of Shib Lal in instituting that suit was to obtain from the Court a declaration that neither he (Shib Lal) nor any other of the successful claimants to Naubat Rani's estate “had given or allotted or had agreed to give any portion of that estate to Narbada Parshad, and that an entry of the latter's name purporting to have been made by the plaintiff (Shib Lal) was colourable and fictitious.” The reason for the “colourable and fictitious” entry of Narbada Parshad's name was stated by Shib Lal to be that he might thereby save the properties from a law suit about to be instituted by one Lachmi Narayan by making it appear that they belonged to Narbada Parshad and not to Shib Lal. The suit was dismissed by the Court of First Instance. In our appellate judgment in that suit we came to the conclusion that Shib Lal's case was a false one, that he did not procure the entry of Narbada Parshad's name collusively with the fraudulent object (as he alleged) of defeating Lachmi Narayan, but, that on the contrary, he caused the entry to be made in pursuance of the agreement of September loth, 1884, an agreement which was affirmed by that of March, 9th, 1887, by the parties to the suit for possession of the estate of Naubat Ram. We further were of opinion that the consideration given by Narbada Parshad was a good consideration, and that the agreement was binding on the parties to it. We pointed out that the parties to the agreement acknowledged that such was the case by giving full effect to it in the case of Narbada Parshad. We further were of opinion that the consideration given by Narbada Parshad was a good consideration, and that the agreement was binding on the parties to it. We pointed out that the parties to the agreement acknowledged that such was the case by giving full effect to it in the case of Narbada Parshad. Finally we were of opinion that it was the duty of Shib Lal under the agreement to have had formal conveyances in respect of the 2 annas 8 pies share executed in favour of Narbada Parshad, and we did not consider that the fact that he had neglected that duty was any reason why we should give him a decree for possession of property to which he manifestly had no title in equity. We see no reason now for altering any of the opinions we expressed in that judgment. We cite it here for the purpose of showing that the covenant in the agreement of September 15th, 1884, to have the name of Parshadi Lal entered in the Khewat in proportion of his share was carried into execution by Shib Lal, and that that agreement was not (as contended for the appellants here) a mere unfulfilled promise. 7. The next document to which we would advert is Record No. 60C. of March 9th, 1887. It was executed by five persons, namely (1) Bhairo Parshad, (2) Shib Lal, (3) Narbada Parshad, (4) Lachmi Narayan, and (5) Lalji Mal. It commences by reciting the names of the parties to the suit for possession of Naubat Rai's estate and how the name of Narbada Parshad was removed from the array of plaintiffs in that suit “in compliance with the requirements of procedure” and how by “mutual agreement the shares of each of the four co-sharers in the disputed property were fixed as specified below, which are maintained up to the present by mutual consent.” Those shares being as follows:— Shib Lal, 4½ annas, Bhairo Parshad, 3½ annas, Narbada Parshad, 2 annas 8 pies, and Lalji Mal, 5 annas 4 pies. Having set forth the above as the interest of the “four co-sharers” in the property as the interest actually existing in and held by them the instrument proceeds to set forth that though no dispute exists between “the parties to the suit with regard to the aforesaid shares,” a dispute did exist between Shib Lal and one Lachmi Narayan, respecting the share of Lachmi Narayan. The document then proceeds to refer certain matters, and amongst others “what share Lachmi Narayan should have in Shib Lal's share, to the arbitration of Mr. Gasper, a Vakil. This Lachmi Narayan is the nephew of Shib Lal already mentioned whom Shib Lal in the former suit alleged he desired to defraud. This document was duly registered on the same day. In our judgment of January 6th, 1902, alluded to above, we fully considered the meaning and intention of this agreement of March, 1887, and came to the conclusion that it was executed in pursuance of the earlier agreement of September, 1884. We pointed out that in this agreement of March, 1887, two matters were especially noticeable—(1) that no reference was made to the arbitrator to decide what fractional share was to be allotted to any one of the parties to the suit, a matter which the four executants had settled for themselves, and (2) that Narbada Parshad is described in it as one of the “parties to the suit.” We also found that the names of the parties (and amongst them that of Narbada Parshad) had been duly entered in the village Khewats. It thus appears that full effect was given to the agreement. Shib Lal himself admitted that such was the case for (as stated in the judgment of January, 1902) Shib Lal, in a suit instituted by his nephew, Lachmi Narayan “pleaded that by an arbitration award a share of 2 annas 8 pies had been held to belong to Narbada Parshad.” It is manifest, therefore, that in every way Shib Lal acknowledged the title of Narbada Parshad as owner of the 2 annas 8 pie share and had his name so recorded in the village Khewats. 8. The next document we have to consider is a sale-deed bearing date of the 8th May, 1896 (No. 10 of the Record) by which in consideration of Rs. 8. The next document we have to consider is a sale-deed bearing date of the 8th May, 1896 (No. 10 of the Record) by which in consideration of Rs. 7,000, Shib Lal transfers to Lalji Mal a 7 annas 2 pies share in Maheshpur (including the 2 annas 8 pies share in dispute), totally ignoring Narbada Parshad's admitted claim to 2 annas 8 pies. Now it is hardly necessary to point out that both the vendor and the vendee under this conveyance had full knowledge and notice of Narbada Parshad's right to the 2 annas 8 pie share. They both were parties to the agreement of March, 1887, and, though Lalji Mal was not a party to the agreement of September, 1884, he was an attesting witness to its execution, and considering its contents and the careful manner in which it safeguarded his interests, we have no doubt that Lalji Mal was cognizant of its provisions. The position then is this:— Shib Lal, the vendor, knowing that he had no title to the 2 annas 8 pies share, and knowing that that share belonged to Narbada Parshad purported to sell it to Lalji Mal, who also knew that his vendor had no title to transfer it, and who knew that the true owner was Narbada Parshad. It is, we think, immaterial that in executing this conveyance Shib Lal purported to convey his interest under a decree passed by the High Court on December 16th, 1895 (No. 15 of the Record.). 9. The suit in which that decree was passed was instituted by Shib Lal, Bhairo Parshad and Lalji Mal, the successful plaintiffs in the suit for possession of Naubat Ram's estate, against Misr Har Charan Lal to recover possession of Maheshpur as part of that estate. Ignoring the agreements of 1884 and 1887 they did not make Narbada Parshad a party to that suit. He is therefore not adversely affected by the decree in it, and by virtue of the two agreements just mentioned he was equitably entitled to a 2 annas 8 pies share in the subject-matter of that decree. An appeal was entered to Her late Majesty in Council against the decree, but was not prosecuted. 10. The last paper to which it will be necessary to refer is No. 6 of the Record. An appeal was entered to Her late Majesty in Council against the decree, but was not prosecuted. 10. The last paper to which it will be necessary to refer is No. 6 of the Record. It is called a “deed of relinquishment” and was executed by Narbada Parshad on October 10th, 1896. In it the executant recites his title to a 2 annas 8 pies share in the whole of the estate of Naubat Ram, which, he sets forth, is supported by the arbitration proceedings and by the entry of his name in the village papers, and by other proceedings taken by the sharers in the estate, and alleges that he is in proprietary possession and enjoyment of his specified share in the estate, which includes Maheshpiir. The executant sets forth a history (mostly incorrect) of the previous litigation about Maheshpur, in which he says he incurred a debt which he considers himself bound to discharge. For that reason and for the sake of “good in both the worlds,” being desirous to pay off the valid debt due by his ancestor he relinquishes his right to the 2 annas 8 pies in Maheshpur, in which he declares he is a co-sharer (although his name does not appear in the High Court decree) to Misr Har Charan Lal, whom he describes as appellant in the appeal just mentioned to the Privy Council, and declares that he has severed his connection with Maheshpur. This deed is the title upon which the plaintiffs-respondents defend their title to the 2 annas 8 pies share in Maheshpur. 11. Now on the above state of facts it is contended for the appellants that the plaintiffs-respondents' title is defective. It is argued that under the two agreements commented on above, Narbada Parshad, through whom the plaintiffs claim title, had only an unregistered agreement, nothing more than a mere promise never carried into execution by any act of transfer. Now as to this it is perfectly certain that the covenant to have Narbada Parshad's name recorded in the Khewat as owner and proprietor of the 2 annas 8 pies share was fully carried out. Now as to this it is perfectly certain that the covenant to have Narbada Parshad's name recorded in the Khewat as owner and proprietor of the 2 annas 8 pies share was fully carried out. This is shown by the arbitration agreement of March, 1887, in which it is stated that the shares of the four co-sharers, as therein recorded were fixed by “mutual agreement” and “maintained up to the present by mutual consent.” Thus we have an acknowledgment under Shib Lal's hand that Narbada Parshad owned a 2 annas 8 pies share, and that he (Shib Lal) owned no more than 4 annas 6 pies. Yet, in spite of this acknowledgment we find Shib Lal nine years afterwards selling to Lalji Mal a 7 annas 2 pies share (4 annas 6 pies and 2 annas 8 pies = 7 annas 2 pies). 12. For the appellants stress is laid on the absence of any registered conveyance to Narbada, and it is contended that under the Registration Act this is a fatal flaw in their title. The appellants also claim priority on the ground that the sale-deed to Lalji Mal was executed by Shib Lal in May 1896, while the deed of relinquishment by Narbada Parshad bears date of October 10th, 1896. Now it has been frequently held that the Registration Statute should not be made an engine to work injustice, and that therefore the holder of a registered conveyance who took it with notice of the existence of a prior but unregistered conveyance will not, despite the provisions of the Registration Act, be given priority against the holder of the unregistered deed. This is now the generally accepted rule in these Provinces. To the same effect is the rule in England in the case of a registry county. In the case of Benham v. Keane, [1861] 1 Johnson and Hemming, 702. This is now the generally accepted rule in these Provinces. To the same effect is the rule in England in the case of a registry county. In the case of Benham v. Keane, [1861] 1 Johnson and Hemming, 702. the law was declared by Wood, V.C. to be that the “conscience of a purchaser is affected through the conscience of the person from whom he buys, if that person is precluded by his previous acts from honestly entering into the contract to sell; and therefore any one who purchases with the knowledge that his vendor is precluded from selling is subject to the same prohibition as the vendor himself.” We have already abundantly shown that the vendor, Shib Lal, was in equity precluded from selling the 3 annas 8 pies share as if it were his own property—he could not honestly enter into a contract to sell the 2 annas 8 pie; and we have also shown that Lalji Mal purchased with the knowledge that his vendor, Shib Lal, was equitably precluded from selling that which he, to his vendee's knowledge, had already parted with to Narbada Parshad. 13. To the same effect are the observations of the Lords Justices in the case of Greaves v. Tofteld, [1880] L.R., 14 Ch, D., 563. In that case which turned upon the Middlesex Registry Act, the provision of which as to the priority of registered over unregistered documents are the same as in the Indian Registration Act, JAMES, L.J., at page 571, cites with approval the conclusion of Lord HAKDWICKE in La-Neve v. La Neve, 3 Atkyns, 646 “that the protection which was meant to be afforded was a protection against secret incum-” brances, and that it never could have been the intention of the “Legislatures to put a man who had knowledge of a conveyance” in the position of a man who was liable to be defrauded or “injured by the existence of some secret dealings with the land.” Another extract from the judgment of Lord HABDWICKE is given by BAGGALLAY, L.J. (at page 575) to the effect that “the intent of the preamble of the Act was to secure subsequent purchasers” and mortgagees against prior secret conveyances and fraudulent “incumbrances, for the last of which there was no occasion to “provide. The first means that a subsequent purchaser, having “registered, should prevail against a prior secret conveyance “of which he had no notice, but if he had notice of a prior con-” veyance for valuable consideration which was vested property, “that is not a secret conveyance.” In the same case at page 571, BRAMWELL, L.J., held it to be established beyond dispute that “if a man having an estate agrees to sell it or to grant an “interest in it for a valuable consideration, and afterwards, dis-” regarding the bargain he has made, conveys to a third person, or so deals with it by bargain with a third person that he is incompetent to convey the estate or grant the interest to the “first which he had agreed to do, and the third person has all “along had notice of the first contract, the conscience of the “second purchaser is affected, and he cannot retain the estate without giving the person who entered into the first contract “that right in it for which he had stipulated.” And again, “the intention of the Legislature in such Acts (the Registry “Acts) as I have referred to, was to afford a protection to persons “whose consciences were affected and not to give the second purchaser whose conscience was affected an opportunity of “joining in the commission of that which was a breach of contract and a wrong to the first person who made the bargain.” 14. Applying to the appeal now before us the equitable principle laid down exhaustively in the extract above cited, we have come to the conclusion that as Lalji Mal had full notice all along of the dealings between” Shib Lal and Narbada Parshad (and indeed was himself a party to them) by which Narbada Parshad was recorded an owner of a 2 annas 8 pies interest in the whole estate of Naubat Ram, the appellants, being representatives in interest of Lalji Mal, cannot in equity be heard to allege that Narbada Parshad had not the 2 annas 8 pies interest in Mahesh-pur, and that it had vested in them. It is admitted that the plaintiffs-respondents are in actual possession of the 2 annas 8 pies share. It is admitted that the plaintiffs-respondents are in actual possession of the 2 annas 8 pies share. By his acts and admissions Shib Lal had precluded himself from honestly transferring the 2 annas 8 pies share to any other than Narbada, and Lalji Mal had all along full notice that Shib Lal had put it out of his power honestly to execute the conveyance of March 10th, 1896, in so far as it purported to affect the 2 annas 8 pies share of mauza Maheshpur. When Lalji Mal accepted that conveyance he was not a bona fide purchaser, but, on the contrary, both he and his vendor acted dishonestly. Clearly the object of Shib Lal throughout was to get rid of Narbada Parshad and to evade the effect of the agreements of September, 1884, and March, 1887, cited above. 15. For the above reasons we are of opinion that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is right and should be affirmed. We therefore dismiss this appeal with costs, including counsel's fees on the higher scale in this Court.