JUDGMENT : KNOX, J. The property which is the subject-matter of this second appeal is property situate in muhalla Pitambarpur in the city of Benares. 2. The claim brought by the plaintiff, who is now respondent, was a claim to pre-empt this property upon custom prevalent in the city of Benares. The lower appellate Court held that the custom of pre-emption existed throughout Benares city and must therefore be held to exist in muhalla Pitambarpur. Further, as the claim was not made under the Muhammadan Law of preemption, there was no necessity for the plaintiff-respondent for observing the preliminary conditions the Muhammadan Law requires the pre-emptor should observe. Lastly, it held that the plaintiff-respondent had done all in the way of demand that was necessary. It dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the Court of first instance, which was a decree granting the plaintiff-respondent's claim upon certain conditions. In appeal before me it is contended, inter alia, that the preliminaries of talab-i-ishtishhad and talab-v-mawasabat were essential preliminaries, and unless it was shown that they had been performed, the suit should have been dismissed. In support of this I was referred to various precedents, especially to the case of Jagdam Sahai v. Mahabir Prasad, [1905] 2 A.L.J.R., 482 and to a Full Bench decision of this High Court to be found in Vol. I of Full Bench rulings, p. 128, i.e., the case of Chaudhri Brij Lall v. Baja Goor Sahai. In this last named case a number of cases bearing upon the question of pre-emption as prevalent in these Provinces were considered with this result formulated therefrom, “the true rule should be as laid down by the Calcutta Full Bench to administer among Hindoos a modification of that law and to insist that the assertion of the right by suit should be preceded by an observance of the preliminary forms prescribed in the Muhammadan Law.” This case was one in which the pre-emptive claim in suit was founded upon the wajib-al-arz of the village. In the case before me there is no wajib-ul-arz, and the rule laid down by the Full Bench would be entitled to greater weight. I was asked on the other hand to follow the procedure of the Court in Jai Kuar v. Heera Lal,[1875] N.W.P.H.C. Rep., p. 1.. In the case before me there is no wajib-ul-arz, and the rule laid down by the Full Bench would be entitled to greater weight. I was asked on the other hand to follow the procedure of the Court in Jai Kuar v. Heera Lal,[1875] N.W.P.H.C. Rep., p. 1.. There the learned Judge remanded an issue as to “whether, under the custom of pre-emption found to prevail amongst Hindus in muhalla Alapura it was incumbent on the pre-emptor to fulfil all the conditions of the Muhammadan Law of Pre-emption, and if so, whether he had fulfilled them or not.” I find, however, on referring to the plaint that the plaintiff expressly alleged that he had fulfilled the preliminary conditions. This allegation of hers was challenged in the written reply. It fomed the subject of the second issue in the Court of first instance. The matter was also raised in appeal. In view of the Full Bench ruling already quoted and the recent case of Jagdam Sahai v. Mahabir Prasad,[1905] 2 A.L.J.R., 482 I hold that although the parties are Hindus and the right of pre-emption is one claimed over property situate in the eminently Hindu city of Benares, still in the absence of any allegation or proof as to any custom different from or not co-extensive with the Muhammadan Law of Pre-emption, that law must be applied to the case. 3. Before determining the question of fact, which thus arises, it is essential for me to have a finding on the following issue, i.e:— (1) Whether or not the plaintiff-respondent observed the conditions prescribed by the Muhammadan Law when she claimed her right of pre-emption? 4. I refer this issue for trial to the lower appellate Court, which will take the additional evidence required, and after recording a finding, return it with the evidence to this Court. 5. Ten days will be allowed to either side for objections. 6. On return of the finding the following judgment was delivered by KNOX, J. The lower appellate Court has found that the formalities prescribed by the Muhammadan Law were fully complied with. 5. Ten days will be allowed to either side for objections. 6. On return of the finding the following judgment was delivered by KNOX, J. The lower appellate Court has found that the formalities prescribed by the Muhammadan Law were fully complied with. An objection was taken to this finding under section 567 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I am asked to hold that the words used by the lady, Musammat Sri Sundari Devi, when she heard of the sale are not sufficient to assert a claim for pre-emption when viewed from the standpoint of Muhammadan Law. The words used by the lady are thus given:— “I have a claim for pre-emption on this house. If any one else purchases it, I shall be put to inconvenience. Go at this very moment and take the money from Shoshi Bhushan Sircar and tell Ram Charan and Chakauri Devi to return the house by taking the money.” According to the Hidaya it is the meaning and not the style of the statement which is to be considered. If the words used by the lady had been a mere statement of the fact that she had a claim for pre-emption, they would not have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Muhammadan Law. But the concluding portion of the statement of the lady, in my opinion, evinces a desire on her part to avail herself of that right. I agree with the learned Judge that the lady did make the demand known as talab-i-mawasabat. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs, which in this Court will include fees on the higher scale.