JUDGMENT : KNOX, J. Khassey and Bansi, plaintiffs-appellants, and Jugla and Mohan, defendants-respondents, are co-sharers in the village Paigaon. An application for partition of this village had been presented by co-sharers other than these four men and the proclamation required by section 110, clause (1) of Act No. III of 1901, had been issued, fixing the 28th of February, 1902, as the day on which the co-sharers were to appear before the Collector and state their objections, if any, to the application. Subsection (2) of the same section provides that any recorded co-sharer not joining in the application may within any time before the day fixed apply for partition, in which case the co-sharer so applying shall be deemed to have joined in the original application. There had been a dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants mentioned above, with regard to the right to a ten biswansi share, which had belonged to certain co-sharers, who had long left the village. On the date fixed by the proclamation, the defendants, Jugla and Mohan, put in an application that their share might be made to constitute a separate mahal and include this disputed ten biswansi share. This application was entertained by the Assistant Collector. It is clear that it was not presented within the time allowed by sub-section 2 of section 110, and it ought, therefore, to have been treated as a fresh application for partition, and a fresh proclamation should have been issued. This was not done. It was impossible, therefore, for the plaintiffs to have preferred objections under sub-section 2 of section 110, and no objection put forward by them could have been entertained under section 111. That section refers to objections raising questions of title made on or before the date fixed in the proclamation. The plaintiffs applied to the Assistant Collector to stay the partition proceedings so that they might institute a suit in the Civil Court. Their application was refused. They then instituted the suit, out of which this second appeal has arisen, and they did so before the completion of the partition proceedings. They obtained a decree in the Court of first instance, declaring their rights in the disputed property. On appeal the learned District Judge of Agra held that the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court, having regard to the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act No. III of 1901. They obtained a decree in the Court of first instance, declaring their rights in the disputed property. On appeal the learned District Judge of Agra held that the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court, having regard to the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act No. III of 1901. This enacts that no person shall institute any suit in the Civil Court with respect to the partition of mahals, except as provided in sections 111 and 112. In our opinion, this prohibition cannot apply to the present case. We think it is clear that it applies only to suits with respect to partitions in which the plaintiff has had an opportunity of having his objections considered under section 111 and has not availed himself of it. In the present case the plaintiffs, as we have shown, had no such opportunity. We are fully alive to the grave objections to interference by the Civil Court in partition proceedings in the Revenue Court, and where a party has had the opportunity of representing his case in the Revenue Court and has not availed himself of it, we should have no hesitation in holding that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is barred by section 233. In the present case we have no alternative but to allow the appeal. We set aside the decree of the lower Court and remand the case to that Court under the provisions of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure with directions to re-admit the appeal under its original number in the register of pending appeals and proceed to dispose of it on the merits. Costs here and hitherto will abide the event, and costs in this Court will include fees on the higher scale.