JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— A preliminary objection is raised to the hearing of this appeal under the following circumstances:— The suit was brought to have it declared that a certain bond was a forgery. The defendants set up the defence that it was a genuine document. The question then was referred to arbitrators through the Court and an award was passed declaring that the bond was a forgery. An objection to this finding was preferred under section 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Munsif, and his finding was that the objection was well founded; and accordingly he set aside the award and went into the question between the parties on the merits, ultimately holding that the bond was genuine, On appeal, the lower appellate Court going behind the order of the Court of first instance passed under section 521, entertained the question of the alleged misconduct of the arbitrators, held that no misconduct was proved and that the award was a binding award, and accordingly it passed a decree in conformity with the award. Against this decision the present second appeal has been preferred. 2. The preliminary objection raised to the hearing of the appeal is that no appeal lies. The answer to this is that no appeal against the order of the Munsif setting aside the award lay to the District Judge, and that consequently the decree of the District Judge passed upon the award was without jurisdiction. Section 521 of the Code provides that no award shall be set aside except on certain grounds therein mentioned, and amongst others the corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator or umpire. The succeeding section provides that if the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration and if no application has been made to set aside the award or if the Court has refused the application, the Court shall give judgment according to the award; the last paragraph of that section provides” that “no appeal shall lie from such decree, except in so far as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award.” 3. Now it is admitted that section 521 is not mentioned in section 588 which gives a right of appeal in the case of orders, therefore prima facie there is no appeal from an order setting aside an award. Now it is admitted that section 521 is not mentioned in section 588 which gives a right of appeal in the case of orders, therefore prima facie there is no appeal from an order setting aside an award. Section 522 only enables the Court to pass a decree upon an award if no application has been made to set it aside, or if the Court has refused such application. That section does not apply to the facts of the present case, for here not merely was an application made to the Court to set aside the award, but an order was passed under section 521 setting it aside. Under these circumstances we think that upon the language of these sections of the Code no appeal lay from the order of the Munsif. 4. We are, however, met with the decision of a learned Judge of this Court in the case of Naurang Singh v. Sadapal Singh, [1887] I.L.R., 10 All, 8.. In that case, MAHMOOD, J., held that where a Court of first instance wrongly set aside an arbitration award and passed a decree against the terms thereof, and a Court of first appeal holding that the award was not open to objection upon the grounds mentioned in section 521, passed a decree strictly in accordance with the award, such appellate decree is entitled to the same finality as the first Court's decree would have been under the last paragraph of section 522, and cannot be made the subject-matter of second appeal. In arriving at this decision the learned Judge dissented from the decision in Paresh Nath Dey v. Nabin Chandra Dutt, [1869] 12 W.R., 93. and Raghubar Dayal v. Maina Koer, [1883] 12 C.L.R., 564.. We have carefully considered his judgment and are unable to concur in it. We think the view which was taken of the sections in question by the Calcutta High Court in the appeal of Shyama Charan Pramanik v. Prolhad Durwan, [1904] 8 C.W.N., 390. is the correct view, for the reasons given by the learned Judge before whom that appeal came. The facts of that case are in all fours with those of the present, and in it Mr. Justice BANERJEE, after reference to the authorities, in a long and well considered judgment, came to the conclusion that no appeal lay from an order passed under section 521, setting aside an award. The facts of that case are in all fours with those of the present, and in it Mr. Justice BANERJEE, after reference to the authorities, in a long and well considered judgment, came to the conclusion that no appeal lay from an order passed under section 521, setting aside an award. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the reasons which he has given distinctly and clearly in his judgment. We therefore overrule the preliminary objection, and, as we hold that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the order passed under section 521, we allow the appeal and we remand the appeal to the lower appellate Court under the provisions of section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with directions that it be re-admitted on the file of pending appeals and be disposed of on the merits. The costs here and hitherto, including fees in this Court on the higher scale, will follow the event.