JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J.:— This is a suit for pre-emption and the appeal is on behalf of the defendant, the vendee, on the ground that the plaintiff has no right to pre-empt. So far as the present appeal is concerned, the facts are admitted. The plaintiff and the defendants vendees, are descended from a common ancestor in the ordinary sense, but the plaintiff so traces his descent through his mother. The defendant is a complete stranger. The custom according to the wajib-ul-arz is given as follows:— “Every co-sharer has a right to transfer his zamindari property by sale, firstly, to bhai hakiki, then to karibi ekjaddi, at a proper price. If the transferee fixes a fictitious price to deprive hissa-daran karibi, then it will be decided by arbitration and if the property is not purchased at the price fixed by the arbitrators the owner will be entitled to sell to a stranger.” 2. Both parties have admitted that these are the terms of the wajib-ul-arz. In my opinion this gives no right of pre-emption to any person other than bhai hakiki and karibi ekjaddi. The plaintiff is clearly not bhai hakiki and the only question is whether or not he is karibi ekjaddi. In F.A.F.O. 80 of 1892, Lala Baldeo Sahai v. Nawal Singh and Kalyan, it was decided by TYRRELL and BLAIR, JJ., that the jadd of a plaintiff (who claimed by virtue of his descent through the female line) mast be found in his own father's stock and not in the stock of his mother. In the case of Chattar Singh v. Kalyan Singh, [1900] 20 A.W.N., 188., BURKITT and HENDERSON, JJ., followed the case to which I have just referred. The only evidence of the custom is the record in the wajib-ul-arz, in construing which the lower Courts have not taken into consideration the words “ekjaddi.” The decisions mentioned are binding upon me, and accordingly I must allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of both the Courts below, and order that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. Inasmuch as my decision is based on the above ridings to which the attention of the lower Courts do not appear to have been called, I direct that the parties do abide their own costs of this appeal. The defendant will have his costs in the lower Courts.