JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— This appeal arises out of a refusal by a learned Judge of this Court to admit an appeal on the ground that the application was beyond time. The appeal sought to be preferred is against an order of the learned District Judge of Mirzapur directing that the plaint in the suit be returned to the plaintiff for presentation in the proper Court. The appellant, instead of presenting an appeal, acting under the advice of his counsel, made an application in revision to this Court. On the hearing of this application, a Full Bench decision of the Court was brought to the notice of the counsel for the applicants which laid down that the proper course for the applicant was not to apply in revision but to file an appeal. Thereupon the learned Judge, who heard the application, was asked to allow the revision matter to stand to enable the applicant to file an appeal, and this request was acceded to. Accordingly an appeal was forthwith filed, but when it came before a learned Judge of this Court, he rejected it on the ground that the appeal was 72 days beyond time. No reason is assigned for the refusal of the application, save and except the delay in instituting the appeal. With the memorandum of appeal was filed an affidavit of the applicant in which he stated that in filing the application in revision, the applicant acted under the advice of his counsel and under the bond fide belief that he was adopting the proper course and on that ground he asked that the appeal should be admitted under the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Counsel, who advised the petitioner, has signified to the Court that he was of opinion that the proper course was to apply in revision and not by way of appeal, and that his client had acted on his advice, and also that our learned brother refused to entertain the reasons assigned for the delay. We are disposed to think that if our learned brother had understood the reasons which were assigned for the delay, he would not have rejected the application, seeing that he was one of the Judges who determined the case of Wazir Ali Khan v. Zainab, [1903] 23 A.W.N., 32.. We are disposed to think that if our learned brother had understood the reasons which were assigned for the delay, he would not have rejected the application, seeing that he was one of the Judges who determined the case of Wazir Ali Khan v. Zainab, [1903] 23 A.W.N., 32.. That was a case in which intending appellants were erroneously advised that an appeal lay to the District Judge and not to the High Court, and in reliance on that advice presented their appeal to the District Judge in consequence of which the appeal, when ultimately presented to the High Court, was beyond time, and it was held that the appellants having bond fide accepted the advice of their pleaders, there was sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1877 for not presenting the appeal within time. In the judgment there is a review of the authorities dealing with this question, and the true principle is stated which should guide the Courts in deciding questions of the kind. One of us was a party to that judgment. We have no hesitation in holding that when a client bond fide accepts the advice of Counsel as to the procedure to adopt in the course of litigation and misled by that advice fails to file an appeal in time, he is entitled to the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act and should not be visited with the serious penalty which is involved in the rejection of his appeal. We think that the views entertained by the Court in the case, to which we have referred, lay down the true principle upon which the Court should be governed in determining the question whether sufficient cause for not presenting an appeal within time has been shown. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Judge of this Court and direct that the appeal be admitted. We say nothing as to costs.