JUDGMENT : BURKITT, J.:— This is an appeal in a pre-emption suit which was dismissed by the Court of first instance and the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of first appeal. The question to be decided here depends entirely upon certain provisions of the Court Fees Act. The property, the subject-matter of the preemption suit, being land not assessed to Government revenue, its value for the purposes of Court-fees had to be ascertained under section 7, sub-sections VI and V, paragraph (c). The value to be put on the pre-emptive property according to section 7, sub-section V (c), was 15 times the net profits which had arisen from the land during the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. The plaintiff entered a certain amount in his plaint alleging it to be 15 times the profits as prescribed by the clause I have just cited. The defendants pleaded that the court-fee paid by the plaintiff was insufficient, and after some delay in fixing the issue, the Court of first instance fixed the year 1308 Fasli as being the year the profits of which form the proper basis for estimating the value of the subject-matter of the suit. Now the plaint was presented on the 16th of July, 1902. The Fasli year 1308, which the Court of first instance held to be the year the profits of which it would consider, commenced on the 10th of September, 1900, and ended on the 28th of September, 1901, which is the last Fasli year before the date of presenting the plaint. Calculating on the evidence before it, the profits which accrued during that year, the Court of first instance found that the valuation of the suit as shown by the plaintiffs was much below its true valuation and that a much larger court-fee should have been paid. The first Court, no doubt, does not actually mention the year 1308, but from its tenor and from its remarks it is clear that that was the year the profits of which it considered. Now for the appellant it is contended not that the Court of first instance made a wrong valuation of the profits of 1308. Such a contention as that could not be supported in view of section 12 of the Court Fees Act. The decision”of the first Court on that point in such a case would be final. Now for the appellant it is contended not that the Court of first instance made a wrong valuation of the profits of 1308. Such a contention as that could not be supported in view of section 12 of the Court Fees Act. The decision”of the first Court on that point in such a case would be final. But what the appellant contends is that the decision of the first Court as to the profits of 1308 is absolutely immaterial, and it does not concern him whether that decision is right or wrong. His contention is that the Courts have taken the profits of a wrong year into calculation. The contention, as presented by the learned Vakil at the hearing of this appeal, was that the words “the year next before the date of presenting the plaint” in clause V (c) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act must be construed to mean what they say, and that they cannot mean anything other than the year, 365 days next before the 16th of July, 1902. The learned Vakil referred to the definition of the word “year” in section 3, clause (59) of the General Clauses Act, No. X of 1897, in which it is said that “year” shall mean a year reckoned according to the British calendar. Now the year reckoned according to the British calendar next before the date of presenting the plaint would be a period of 365 days, the last of which would be 15th July, 1902, and cannot, I think, in any way be interpreted to mean a year commenceing in September, 1900, and ending in September, 1901. In my opinion the contentions of the appellant are correct and must be allowed. I cannot put any meaning upon the word “year” cited above other than the ordinary and natural meaning, that is to say, a period of 365 days, and I cannot construe the words “year next before the date of presenting the plaint” as meaning a year which ended many months before that date. In this view of the case it seems to me that the question of the finality of valuation under section 12 of the Court Fees Act does not arise. In this view of the case it seems to me that the question of the finality of valuation under section 12 of the Court Fees Act does not arise. The plaintiff admits that if the year 1308 were the year, the profits of which were to be considered, the valuation put by the Court upon those profits would be final and not open to appeal. But his argument is that, that valuation was made in respect of a year other than the year mentioned in clause V (c) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act, and therefore that valuation is absolutely immaterial and does not concern him. In this view I concur, and I think, therefore, that both the Courts below have erred on the point of law as to the year the profits of which were to be taken into consideration. Being now of opinion that the profits have been improperly calculated, I must send down an issue upon that point to the lower appellate Court. The issue which I refer is this : what nett profits have arisen from the pre-empted property during the year next before the date of the presentation of the plaint in this suit, that is to say, during 365 days next before the 16th of July, 1902? The Court will take all admissible evidence which either party may tender upon this point, and return its finding with the least possible delay. Upon return of the finding ten days will be allowed for objections.