JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— The facts of this case are shortly as follows: Four of the five sons of Jaswant, namely, Rora, Nourang, Shibba, and Manga, executed a sale-deed on the 7th of November, 1891, of certain property in favour of the plaintiff, Harjas Rai, which contained a covenant to which we shall presently refer. Before the execution of this deed, Nourang and Rora had executed a mortgage of their shares in favour of one Ghisa. A decree was obtained on foot of this mortgage. The defendants (8) and (9), Thakurdas and Nannu, purchased the rights of Ghisa and now stand in his place. It does not appear that the property has as yet been sold under the decree. Now the deed of sale executed in favour of the plaintiff contains the following covenants:— “If in the future any person appear as a claimant of the property sold and make a claim in consequence of which there is any injury to the property sold, or if we do not effect mutation of names or do not give possession, then the purchaser may recover his money with interest at Rs. 2 per month from our persons or the property sold or any other property, and we shall raise no objection.” The plaintiff instituted the present suit in consequence of his failure to obtain possession of the property comprised in the sale-deed and prayed that a decree might be passed in his favour for recovery of the principal money paid by him, namely, Rs. 500, and a considerable sum for interest, and he also asked that it might be held that the property which was sold as also other property of the vendors were liable for the amount claimed. The Court of first instance held that as regards the property which was comprised in the earlier mortgages, the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed in his claim, but it passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants in respect of a two-fifth share in five plots comprising 10 bighas, being the property of the vendors Manga and Shibba, From this decree the plaintiff appealed, with the result that the decree below was affirmed. The present second appeal has therefore been preferred. 2. The present second appeal has therefore been preferred. 2. We are disposed to think that the plaintiff has obtained under the decree against which he appeals, more than he was entitled to,—that, in fact, the covenant which was relied upon by him as giving him a charge on the property of the two vendors, Manga and Shibba, does not create any charge upon any specific property. If that covenant did create a charge, undoubtedly the plaintiff would be entitled not merely to a decree in the terms of the decree of the Court of first instance, but he would also be entitled as having a charge on the property to redeem the prior mortgages, if so advised. In our opinion the covenant in question is not such as to create a specific charge in his favour. In the first place it only provides for a future contingency. The opening words are:— “If in the future any person appear as a claimant of the pro perty and injury results thereby.” A document which creates a charge must be a document which creates a charge at the time and not merely the possibility of a charge. Here all that, we have is a declaration that if at some future time a contingency happens, the purchaser may recover his purchase money with interest from the vendors or their property generally. No doubt, the words used are “from our persons or the sold property or any other property.” But these, we think, merely imply that the purchase money may in certain events be recovered generally from the persons or the property of the vendors. They do not create a charge within the meaning of that expression in the Transfer of Property Act. We therefore hold that the appellant has failed to satisfy us that he is entitled to any further relief than that which has been granted to him. We dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees in this Court on the higher scale.