JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J.:— This appeal arises in a suit which was brought under the following circumstances: Sumer Singh, the predecessor in title of the defendants No. 2 and 3, mortgaged certain property; by way of conditional sale to the plaintiff on the 18th of January, 1892. On the 10th of March of that year he executed a similar mortgage of the same property in favour of the plaintiff and the first defendant, Lakhpat Rai. It was found by the Court of first instance that this mortgage of the 10th of March, 1892, took priority over the mortgage of the 18th of January, 1892, as a mortgage of a date prior to that of the mortgage last mentioned had been discharged with the amount of this mortgage. This finding of the Court was submitted to by the plaintiff and was never disputed in appeal. The plaintiff and Lakhpat Rai brought a suit for foreclosure under the mortgage of the 10th of March, 1892, and obtained a decree on the 13th of December, 1894. That decree was made absolute under section 87 of the Transfer of Property Act on the 8th of August, 1895, and possession was taken under it both by the plaintiff and by Lakhpat Rai. The plaintiff has now brought a suit for foreclosure under his mortgage of the 18th of January, 1892, and prays that a decree for foreclosure be made in respect of one-half of the property which was the subject-matter of the decree for foreclosure referred to above. He offers to pay to Lakhpat Rai one-half of the amount of that decree. 2. The Court of first instance dismissed the plaintiff's suit, and the decree has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court. The plaintiff now comes in second appeal. In my judgment the plaintiff could not succeed in his suit. As I have already said, he has submitted to the finding of the Court of first instance that the mortgage of the 10th of March, 1892, upon which a decree for foreclosure has already been passed, took priority over the mortgage which is the basis of the present suit. Therefore, upon a foreclosure of that prior mortgage, the plaintiff's right to redeem that mortgage as subsequent mortgagee was extinguished. Therefore, upon a foreclosure of that prior mortgage, the plaintiff's right to redeem that mortgage as subsequent mortgagee was extinguished. He was a party to that suit, and as such party, he should have, before an order absolute was made, redeemed Lakhpat Rai's share of the mortgage in respect of which the decree for foreclosure was passed. As he did not do so, and allowed an order absolute to be made, he has been foreclosed of his right of redemption, and it is too late now for him to ask the Court to allow him to redeem the prior mortgage. Of course, if the mortgage jointly held by him and Lakhpat Rai did not take priority over the mortgage held by the plaintiff alone, the case would have been different; but since that mortgage took priority over the plaintiff's mortgage, and the plaintiff allowed a decree for foreclosure to be made absolute in respect of the prior mortgage, he cannot now seek to redeem that mortgage. His suit has been rightly dismissed, and I dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.