JUDGMENT : Stanley, J. The suit, which has given rise to this appeal, was brought by Sheo Narain and Ajudhia, the two infant sons of the defendant, Sukh Lal, for the recovery of joint possession of two-thirds of property alleged by them to be ancestral. The defendants to the suit are Sukh Lal and Ram Dayal who purchased the property in question from Sukh Lal. The Court of first instance decreed the plaintiff's claim relying upon the authority of Man-bahal v. Gopal Misra, [1901] A.W.N., 57. It appears from the judgment of the Munsif that it was admitted before him that the property in question was ancestral property, having been purchased by Puran, the father of Sukh Lal. An appeal was preferred from this decision, the grounds of appeal being, first, that it was not proved on evidence that the plaintiff was aware of the existence of the respondents 1 and 2, that is, the two appellants in the present appeal; secondly, on the ground of the existence of antecedent debts of the respondent, Sukh Lal, and their payment out of the purchase money of the house sold alleged to be proved by the evidence on the record; and thirdly, that there being no antecedent debts, the respondents were not entitled to succeed without refunding the price paid by the purchasers and the costs of improvements made by appellants. 2. There was no question thus raised as to the nature of the property in dispute, which was admitted in the Court of First Instance to have been ancestral property. Notwithstanding this the learned Subordinate Judge, in a judgment not altogether intelligible and carelessly prepared, begins by referring to a case, as governing the case, namely, the case of Debi Prasad v. Jaikaran Singhi, [1902] I.L.R., 24 All., 479. This case has absolutely no applicability to the case which was before the Court. We are told, however, that the case the Subordinate Judge intended to refer to, is the case of Debi Singh v. Jiaram, [1903] I.L.R, 25 All., 214. If this be the case, he intended to refer to, we may observe that it, also, has no application in as much as in it property which belonged to a joint Hindu family was sold in execution of a decree obtained upon a mortgage. If this be the case, he intended to refer to, we may observe that it, also, has no application in as much as in it property which belonged to a joint Hindu family was sold in execution of a decree obtained upon a mortgage. In that case the Court considered the liability of sons to pay their father's debts and came to the conclusion that unless the debt for which the mortgage was given was tainted with immorality, the sons could not defeat a sale had in execution of a decree obtained on foot of the mortgage. We then find this statement in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge “The house in suit was purchased by the vendor. The title deed was in his name. So the vendee has done nothing wrong in purchasing the property from him.” This is absolutely incorrect. It is in conflict with the admission of the parties before the Court of first instance, and we find from a recital in the sale deed itself that the property was purchased by Puran, the father of Sukh Lal. Then the Subordinate Judge determines the question in the following language:— “Following the principle of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Justices in the case quoted above, I was bound to uphold the sale. For these reasons I find as follows:— No. 1 in favour of the appellant.” Now, as we have pointed out, the case to which he refers, has no bearing whatever upon the case before the Court, and the statement of the learned Subordinate Judge that the house in dispute purchased by the vendor, is contrary to the admitted facts, as appears from the judgment of the learned Munsif, and from the sale-deed itself. We cannot but express very great surprise at the want of care exhibited in the preparation of this judgment, and that a judgment reversing a decision of the Court below. On the facts as established beyond reasonable doubt, the case is governed by the decision in the case of Manbahal Rai v. Gopal Misra to which we have already referred. We cannot in any way distinguish the two cases. Therefore we think that the decision of the learned Judge of this Court was perfectly right, and that this appeal ought to be rejected except in reference to a matter to which we shall presently refer. 3. We cannot in any way distinguish the two cases. Therefore we think that the decision of the learned Judge of this Court was perfectly right, and that this appeal ought to be rejected except in reference to a matter to which we shall presently refer. 3. A point, however, has been raised by the learned Vakil for the appellants, namely, that during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Judge of this Court, one of the appellants died before the decision of the case, as did also the guardian of both the appellants, so that there was no guardian to represent the surviving appellant when the decree was passed in that appeal. This was, no doubt, an irregularity, but in no way is the appellant prejudiced thereby. A guardian was subsequently appointed and now represents the surviving plaintiff-respondent. The decree, however, of the learned Judge of this Court must be varied by reason of the death of Sheonarain. Upon his death his share of the property devolved upon his surviving brother and his father. Consequently the surviving brother, Ajudhia, is only entitled to a decree for over-half and not two-thirds of the property. We accordingly modify the decree of the learned Judge of this Court to that extent, awarding to Ajudhia only one-half share of the property in dispute. In other respects we uphold the decree of the learned Judge of this Court. The appellant must pay the costs of this appeal, including fees on the higher scale.