JUDGMENT Ghosh, J. - The Plaintiff is or at any rate was, at one time, the under-raiyat of the Defendant. He fell into arrears, and the Defendant brought a suit against him for rent, and in that suit, in accordance with, as I take it, the terms of sec. 66, cl. (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a decree was pronounced against the Plaintiff for ejectment in the event of his failing to pay the rent decreed within four months. It would seem that the Plaintiff appeared in the suit, and the decree was pronounced in the presence of his pleader. Thereafter, he presented an application for review of judgment upon the very grounds upon which he now seeks to set aside the previous decree, but this application was refused. Subsequently, the present suit was instituted by the Plaintiff on the ground that the said decree for rent and ejectment was obtained by fraud or, at any rate, that there was a mistake in the decree itself, because the Defendant, the Plaintiff in the previous suit, did not claim ejectment but only claimed for rent. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit but on appeal, the lower Appellate Court, differing from the Court of first instance, has held that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed, namely, that the previous decree should be set aside. The Subordinate Judge, however, holds that there was no fraud in the matter of that decree, but that, because there was a mistake in the decree itself as regards the order for ejectment, the landlord, the Defendant, not having claimed a decree for ejectment, the decree is liable to be set aside. I am, however, unable to agree with the Subordinate Judge in the conclusion at which he has arrived. It may be, that there was no specific prayer made in the plaint in the previous suit for ejectment in terms of sec. 66, cl. (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but that relief was evidently asked for in the course of the trial, as the judgment passed In the suit Indicates, and the Munsif accordingly granted such relief as undoubtedly he was competent to grant it. This decree was not appealed against to the higher Court, and the application that the Plaintiff made for review was rejected. This decree was not appealed against to the higher Court, and the application that the Plaintiff made for review was rejected. And I do not understand how such a decree which was made in the presence of both the parties and which apparently is conclusive between them, and is not tainted by fraud, can be set aside by a separate suit. As an authority for this, I may refer to the case of Sadho Misser v. Golab Singh 3 C. W. N. 375 (1897) where it has been held that "the only ways in which a decree may be set aside by a party thereto are by appeal, by proceedings under sec. 108, C. C. P., and similar sections and by application for review; if the decree is not tainted by fraud, no suit lies to set it aside." In that case, it would appear that the Defendant who was the Plaintiff in the previous suit did not claim in his plaint the whole taluk but claimed only a portion of it. The claim was afterwards amended, but the amendment was obtained without notice to the other side, and a decree was made in respect of the whole taluk. The Plaintiff subsequently brought a suit to set aside the decree in question; and it was held that the suit could not be maintained. In the present case, the only defect, if defect it may be called, in the proceeding in the previous suit was that the relief for ejectment was not specifically claimed in the plaint. But, as I have already noticed, the claim was evidently made in the course of the trial as the judgment itself indicates; for, it declared that the Plaintiff was entitled to obtain ejectment in the event of the under-raiyat, the Plaintiff in the present suit, failing to pay the arrears claimed within a given time, and decree was accordingly drawn up in those terms. I do not think it can be so broadly laid down, as has been contended for by the learned vakil for the Respondent, that any error in a decree made by a Court may be challenged by a separate suit; for, in that event, there would be no finality in a judgment or a decree. I do not think it can be so broadly laid down, as has been contended for by the learned vakil for the Respondent, that any error in a decree made by a Court may be challenged by a separate suit; for, in that event, there would be no finality in a judgment or a decree. Our attention, however, has been called to the case of Jogesivir Atha v. Ganga Bishnu Ghattach 8 C. W. N. 473 (1903) as laying down an opposite view of the matter; but upon examination of the facts of that case, it will be found that they are quite distinguishable from the facts of the case with which we are now concerned. There, property No. 3 was not claimed by the Plaintiff in the previous suit and by some mistake or other, that property was entered in the decree in the place of property No. 4, which had been claimed, and when a suit was brought for the purpose of rectifying the decree en the ground of mistake, it was held that such a suit would lie, having regard to the provisions of sec. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It would appear that-, in the previous suit, the Court had no authority to make a decree, as it did, in regard to property No. 3, for, that was not the subject-matter of the suit. But, in the present case, as I have already pointed out, the Court had authority to make an order for ejectment in the event of the rent not being paid. We observe that the Court of Appeal below in its judgment, refers to Art. 96 of the Indian Limitation Act. That article runs as follows :-" For relief on the ground of mistake-three years from the date when the mistake becomes known to the Plaintiff." That article is so general in its character that it can hardly be said that it affords any authority for holding that a suit like the one with which we are concerned is maintainable. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the decree of the Court below cannot be sustained, and that the suit must be dismissed. In the circumstances, each party will bear his own costs. Pargiter, J. 2. I agree in the judgment of my learned brother.