JUDGMENT 1. The Appellant and the Respondent were litigating for the possession of land in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Khulna. They ultimately agreed that the dispute should be settled on certain terms, and on the 27th August 1904, they presented a petition to the Court which embodied the terms of compromise. The material portion of the petition is in these words-"The Defendant No. 1 agrees to pay to the Plaintiff Rs. 2,250 in all and the Plaintiff agrees to receive the amount and he relinquishes to the said Defendant a two annas share of the property in suit which has been in the possession of the said Defendant. The Defendant No. 1 will pay to the Plaintiff's pleader the said amount of Rs. 2,250 on the 8th day of October next or any day from this day up to that day or she will deposit the same in this Court, and on her paying or depositing the same in the manner aforesaid, the Plaintiff's claim to the said two annas share shall be dismissed and the Plaintiff shall cease to have any claim thereto, but if the Defendant does not pay to the Plaintiff's pleader or deposit in this Court the said sum of Rs. 2,250 within the said time fixed, i.e., on or before the 8th day of October next, the Plaintiff's claim to the said share will be decreed and he will be at liberty to take possession thereof by executing the decree, and no plea or objection thereto by the Defendant will be allowed. On the 2nd September 1904, the Defendant, the Respondent before us, paid to the Plaintiff's pleader Rs. 250, but the balance was not paid before the 8th October 1904. The amount was, however, deposited in the Court on the 10th November following. The Court was closed on the 8th October on account of the long vacation and re-opened on the 10th November. The amount was deposited on the first open day after the 8th October and it could not be deposited earlier. 2. A formal decree was drawn up by the Court on the 27th September 1904 It contains the terms of the petition of compromise, and we do not find any substantial difference between the petition and the decree. The amount was deposited on the first open day after the 8th October and it could not be deposited earlier. 2. A formal decree was drawn up by the Court on the 27th September 1904 It contains the terms of the petition of compromise, and we do not find any substantial difference between the petition and the decree. The only difference to which our attention has been drawn is that the word "Plaintiff" is inserted in the decree instead of the words "to the Plaintiff's pleader or into Court." The parties were sui juris and the Court could not vary the terms of compromise without their consent. The word "Plaintiff" in the decree must therefore be held to mean "his pleader or the Court." The contention raised on behalf of the Plaintiff that he and he alone was intended to be the direct recipient of the sum of Its. 2,000 payable by the Defendant does not seem to us to be sound. She had the option either of paying it to the Plaintiff's pleader or of depositing it into Court to the credit of the Plaintiff. She paid Rs. 250 to the pleader of the Plaintiff, but with regard to the balance, there was nothing to debar her from adopting the second alternative and paying that balance into Court. No question of election or waiver can arise on the admitted facts. If the question were raised as a question of fact the Defendant might have shown why she could not follow the course she had adopted in paying Rs 250 and was compelled to deposit Rs. 2,000 into Court. 3. The question then is--was the Defendant entitled to an extension of time, the Court having been closed on the 8th October 1904? This was practically the only question discussed in the lower Court. 4. It is now well settled that if the law or a Court directs a thing to be done within a period fixed by it and it is impossible of performance on the last day fixed for no fault of the party required or directed to do the act, it will be recognised as properly done, if it is done on the next day it is possible of performance. The rule when there is a direction by law is codified in India in the General Clauses Act (V of 1897). The rule when there is a direction by law is codified in India in the General Clauses Act (V of 1897). Sec. 10 enacts that if any act or proceeding, is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then if the Court or office be closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in time, if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open. 5. Dabee Rawoot v. Heraman Mahion 8 W.R. 223 (1867). is a case under Reg. XVII of 1806. The last day of the year of grace expired when the Judge's Court was closed. Peacock, C.J., held that it would be contrary to principles of justice, equity and good conscience to allow the mortgagee to take advantage of the mortgagor's inability to deposit the mortgage-money in Court, when it was impossible to do so. 6. In Aravamudu v. Sami Yappa ILR 21 Mad. 385 (1898), it was held that when an order had been made for the payment of money in a suit on a certain day and the Court was closed on that date, a payment made on the first day that the Court re-opened, would be a good payment. This rule was acted upon in Samba Siva v. Ram Sami ILR 22 Mad. 179 (1898), Shooshee Bhusan Rudro v. Gobind Chunder Roy ILR 18 Cal. 231 (1890) and Peary Mohan Aick v. Anunda Churn ILR 18 Cal. 631 (1891) lay down the same rule. It was laid down broadly in the latter case that when parties are prevented from doing a thing in Court on a particular day, not by any act of their own, but by the act of the Court itself, they are entitled to do it on the first subsequent opportunity. 7. We see no reason why the payment made on the 10th November should not be considered as good as sufficient. The rule of law stated above is fully applicable to the case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing-fee at five gold mohurs.