JUDGMENT Ghose, J. - The question raised in this appeal is one of limitation, and it arises upon the construction of Art. 179, cl.(5) of the Indian Limitation Act. That clause runs as follows :-- "(Where the notice next hereinafter mentioned has been issued) the date of issuing a notice under the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 248." And the question that we have to consider is, whether the legislature, when using the words "the date of issuing a notice" meant the date of the order of the Court to issue such notice, or the date when the notice is actually issued from the Court. In the present case, the order of the Court to issue the notice under sec. 248 was made on the 20th August 1901. On the 22nd August, the notice was actually prepared and signed by the Court, but it was not made over by the Nazir of the Court to the peon for service until the 26th August. The notice was served on the 28th August; and the present application for execution was made on the 24th August 1904. If the starting point be the 26th August 1901, when the notice was made over for service by the Nazir of the Court to the peon, the application would be in time; but not so, if limitation runs from either of the two earlier dates. The Court below has held that, because the actual issue of the notice was not an act of the Court, but merely a step towards carrying out the order to issue and serve the notice, the time does not run from the date of the issue, but from one or other of the two earlier dates; and, in support of this view, it relies upon the case of Gobind v. Dada ILR 28 Bom. 416 (1904), This case, as also the earlier cases referred to therein are, no doubt, in favour of the view adopted by the Court below; but I am not prepared to accept it. The words of the article, to my mind, are plain enough. It says:-- "Where the notice next Hereinafter mentioned has been issued, the date of issuing a notice." The legislature, I think, here contemplates the actual issue of the notice. It does not say the date of the order to issue the notice. The words of the article, to my mind, are plain enough. It says:-- "Where the notice next Hereinafter mentioned has been issued, the date of issuing a notice." The legislature, I think, here contemplates the actual issue of the notice. It does not say the date of the order to issue the notice. Looking at the earlier clauses of the same article, it would seem that, in every instance, where the legislature contemplates that time should run from the date of an order of decree, it says so in distinct terms, unlike the case falling within cl.(5), where, after saying "where the notice next hereinafter mentioned has been issued," it says "the date of issuing such notice." I cannot, therefore, persuade myself to hold that the legislature contemplated that he date of the order should be the starting point. It has, however, been said that the issue of the notice is not a judicial, but a ministerial act, and that the only judicial act being the order directing notice to issue, the legislature could not have contemplated that time should run, not from the time of the judicial act, but from the date of the ministerial act. The intention of the legislature is, however, to be gathered from the words used; and I am inclined to think that it did intend that the time should run from the date of the ministerial act, if the issue of the notice may be regarded as a ministerial act. The view that I have just expressed is supported by the ruling of Divisional Bench of this Court in the case of Kadaressur Sen v. Mohim Chandra 6 C.W.N. 656 (1902), and there is an earlier case, Koong Behari's case 22 W.R. 484 (1874), which is somewhat, to the same effect. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the time runs from the date of the issue of the notice, and not from the date of the order of the Court to issue such notice. And, in this view of the matter, I am of opinion that the order of the Court below should be set aside, and the case sent back to that Court in order to allow the decree-holder to go on with his execution. We make no order as to costs. And, in this view of the matter, I am of opinion that the order of the Court below should be set aside, and the case sent back to that Court in order to allow the decree-holder to go on with his execution. We make no order as to costs. Pargiter, J. The decision of this case turns upon the meaning of the words "the date of issuing notice under the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 248" in cl.(5) of sec. 179 of the Indian Limitation Act and the difficulty arises because there has been a conflict of decisions in the Courts. It was held in the case of Damodar v. Sonaji ILR 27 Bom. 622 (1903) that limitation runs from the date of the Court's order directing the notice to issue and that view was followed in another case, namely, Gobind v. Dada ILR 28 Bom. 416 (1904). On the other hand, it has been recently held in the case of Kadaressur v. Mohim Chandra 6 C.W.N. 656 (1902), that limitation is reckoned from the date on which the notice actually issues out of the Court. Of course if no notice issues, cl.(5) does not apply, as is expressly stated there. It has been pressed upon us that the Bombay rulings are right, because the act must be au act of the Court and the other clauses in Art. 179 refer either to some order of the Court or to some action by the parties themselves; and it has been contended that, in the eye of law, the ministerial act, that is, the handing over of the notice by the Nazir to the peon is not such an act as is contemplated by this article. An argument has been urged, on the other hand, against this view, namely, that the date of the ministerial act should be taken as the starting point, because, after the Court has passed its order, the decree-holder has to pay certain fees before the notice can actually issue. But this contention has no force, because, if the fees are not paid, no notice will issue, and cl.(5), as already stated, cannot apply. It appears to me that the view of the clause now under consideration which was taken in Bombay is one of much cogency. But this contention has no force, because, if the fees are not paid, no notice will issue, and cl.(5), as already stated, cannot apply. It appears to me that the view of the clause now under consideration which was taken in Bombay is one of much cogency. On the other hand, the case decided in this Court and reported in 6 C.W.N. 656 (2) is precisely similar to the present case, and that was decided by two Judges who agreed in holding that the words quoted mean the date on which the notice actually leaves the Court. As my learned brother also takes the same view, although I have considerable doubt, I am not prepared to dissent from it, and I, therefore, concur in the order passed.