JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. On the question of notice raised in the memorandum of appeal this appeal must succeed. The ground of objection is that no proper notice within the meaning of section 77 of the Indian Railways Act is proved to have been served on the appellant Company, and therefore the suit was not maintainable. Section 77 precludes any person from maintaining a suit for a refund of an over-charge in respect of animals or goods carried over a railway unless the claim for a refund has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the Railway administration within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by Railway. Section 140 prescribes modes of service of notice, directing that the notice may be served in the case of a railway administered by a Railway Company, (a) by delivering the notice or other document to the Manager or Agent; (6) by leaving it at his office; (c) by forwarding it by post in a prepaid letter addressed to the Manager or Agent at his office and registered under Part III of the Indian Post Office Act of 1866. The notification of a claim prescribed by “section 77 may, therefore, be given either to the Railway Administration as defined in section 3, sub-section 6, or in any of the ways mentioned in section 140. In this case, therefore, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove service of notice of the claim upon the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company at their office in London or else in any of the three ways prescribed in section 140. There is no proof of any such service, and the time for serving such notice has long since expired. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, and the contention indeed found favour with both the lower Courts that service upon the General Traffic Manager of the Company was sufficient service, but in view of the express and distinct provisions of the Act we are of opinion that this service is not a good service. We are supported in this view by a number of authorities and amongst others the cases of Periannan Chetti v. South Indian Railway Company, [1898] I.L.R., 22 Mad. We are supported in this view by a number of authorities and amongst others the cases of Periannan Chetti v. South Indian Railway Company, [1898] I.L.R., 22 Mad. 137; The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Dipchand Poddar,[1896] I.L.R., 24 Cal., 306; East Indian Railway Company v. Jethmull Ramanand, [1902] I.L.R., 26 Bom., 669, and Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company v. Sante Lal,[1903] I.L.R., 26 All., 207. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts.