JUDGMENT : STANLEY, J. This second appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption brought by the plaintiff, Ghulam Haidar, under the following circumstances:— One Ali Mazhar was owner of considerable property consisting of amongst others the ten villages in the district of Allahabad. He became embarrassed and at the ‘suit of one of his creditors, Musammat Srimati Benodi Debi, decrees were passed, and in execution of these decrees the ten villages were sold on the 20th of March, 1902, and purchased by the decree-holder for various sums, amounting in the aggregate to Rs. 29,280. Musammat Benodi Debi had no intention of retaining the property and allowed the information to be circulated that she was willing to dispose of the villages to purchasers at a reasonable profit on her purchase. The village of Chamarcba with which this appeal is concerned is one of the ten villages and was purchased by her for the sum of Rs. 4,000. Mr. O'Conor acting on behalf of one Hussain Ali Khan, offered to purchase the ten villages for a sum of Rs. 35,000, and this offer was accepted, and the terms of purchase were afterwards arranged. Although Rs. 35,000 was the aggregate price of the entire of the ten villages it was agreed that a separate conveyance should be executed in respect of each of the villages showing the consideration to be paid for each village. There is nothing, we may point out, to prevent a vendor and purchaser from modifying a contract entered into between them in any way they may please or indeed of rescinding a contract and entering into an entirely new contract. The parties here had an absolute right to arrange that the sale should be carried out by separate conveyances and to fix the price of each village at their pleasure. If the prices were fixed, as far as possible, to prevent pre-emption, we see no objection to this, provided the purchase money as set forth in each conveyance was in each case actually paid. Accordingly ten conveyances were prepared, executed and registered and Rs, 35,000 were paid to the vendor through the Bank of Bengal. The purchase money, which was paid for the village of Chamarcha, was Rs. 5,500. Accordingly ten conveyances were prepared, executed and registered and Rs, 35,000 were paid to the vendor through the Bank of Bengal. The purchase money, which was paid for the village of Chamarcha, was Rs. 5,500. This is the price for which, as is recited in the deed, the property was purchased and the sum which the vendor admitted at registration she had received in respect of that village. The plaintiff, Ghulam Haidar, instituted the suit out of which this second appeal has arisen, to pre-empt the sale of this village and is admittedly a person entitled to pre-empt. 2. In his plaint he alleged that the ten villages were purchased by Mr. O'Conor for a sum of Rs. 25,000, but that, in order to defeat the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff and other co-sharers of the villages, separate sale-deeds were executed in respect of each village and that the sale consideration stated in the sale-deed of the village Chamarcha is Rs. 5,500. He claimed a right to pre-empt this village on payment of a sum of Rs. 1,996-2-3, a sum arbitrarily fixed by him with reference to the profits of the village expressing his belief that the actual sale, consideration of the property did not exceed that amount. He asked for a decree for pre-emption on payment of that sum or any other sum which the Court might fix. The Court of first instance held that the plaintiff was entitled to pre-empt on payment of a sum of Rs. 3,350-12-8. 3. On appeal by Mr. O'Conor the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal but allowed an objection filed on behalf of the respondent, Ghulam Haidar, and varied the decree by reducing the amount payable by him for pre-emption to the sum of Rs. 2,025-13-6. This it will be observed is about half the price which was paid by Musammat Benodi Debi on the occasion of her purchase. The learned District Judge held “if it were necessary he should hold that the lower Court was justified in finding from a Civil Court point of view that the amounts entered in the sale-deed were fraudulent.” By this he means that the defendant-appellant here entered in the sale-deed of some of the villages higher prices than he otherwise would have done in order to defeat claims for pre-emption thereupon. Ignoring the contracts evidenced by the sale-deeds, he went into the question of the market value of the properties comprised therein and thereupon made new contracts for the parties finding that the market values so arrived at formed the price which the parties agreed to pay and to accept. In this we think the learned Judge was wholly wrong. There is not merely no allegation of fraud in the plaint, but there is not a title of evidence to support the finding of the District Judge that the amounts entered in the sale-deed were fraudulent. What the learned Judge means by the statement that the sale-deeds were “fraudulent from a Civil. Court point of view” we are at a loss to understand, but we observe that he subsequently states that the finding of fraud by a Civil Court “does not amount to saying that any criminal or even moral dishonesty is proved against the appellant.” There is no evidence to support the case which the learned Judge has set up for the plaintiff-respondent, Ghulam Haidar. Each individual sale-deed contains an admission by the vendor that the amount of consideration entered in that deed had been paid to and received by her. To the same effect is the registration endorsement. There is absolutely nothing on the record to show that these admissions were fraudulent or untrue. The sale-deed of village Chamarcha embodies the ultimate agreement come to by the parties and shows the receipt of consideration and is the evidence by which the rights of the parties ought to be determined. The evidence afforded by it has not been rebutted by any other evidence. There is no doubt on the record some evidence as to what would be the market value of this particular village if that value were to be ascertained by a consideration of the annual profits or of the amount of the Government revenue; but as long as we have before us the concluded agreement of the parties and the admission unrebutted by other evidence that the consideration mentioned in the sale-deed had been paid and received, there is no reason why we should look further and ascertain what the value of the property is in the manner adopted by the lower Courts. It should be borne in mind as an elementary fact in pre-emption law that if a vendee is willing to pay even a fancy price many times its value, for certain property and does pay it, the pre-emptor who wants to take over that property can do so only on payment of that fancy price. The plaintiff admittedly is entitled to pre-empt the sale, but he can do so only on payment of the actual price fixed between the parties and paid. It is admitted that the plaintiff-respondent, Ghulam Haidar, had an opportunity of pre-empting the property on payment of the price given for it by Mr. 0’Conor, that is, Its. 5,500. This offer he declined on the 27th of August, 1902. The litigation is altogether due to his action. We therefore allow the appeal, modify the decree of the two lower Courts and give the plaintiff-respondent a decree for possession on payment on or before the 12th of July, 1906, of the sum of Rs. 5,500, with interest, at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, from the 27th of August, 1902, up to the date of payment. If the plaintiff pays this amount within the time prescribed, he will obtain possession of the pre-emptive property in suit, but on failure to make this payment his suit will stand dismissed with costs in all Courts including fees in this Court on the higher scale. In any event the respondent, Ghulam Haidar, must pay the costs of the defendant-appellant in both the lower Courts and also the costs of this appeal including fees in this Court on the higher scale.