JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Rungpore. The decree in question modified the Plaintiff's claim to a considerable extent. It appears that there are two estates in Pergunnah Bhitarband, estate No. 205 containing a 7 anna 5 gunda share, and estate No. 204 comprising an 8 anna 15 gunda share of the said Pergunnah. The first mentioned estate belongs to the Plaintiff, and the other estate, namely, estate No. 204 belongs to the Defendant. In this latter estate, also, the Plaintiff has acquired a certain share by purchase or otherwise. The claim was for recovery of possession of various parcels of land as appertaining to estate No. 205 as, also, to estate No. 204. In the course of the suit, the parties came to a certain agreement, and they asked the Court below to decide for them the question of title to Chak No. 21 in Mouzah Kalikapur. They agreed that the decision of the Court below should be upon the basis of the thakbust map, and that map only; and the Plaintiff said that he would abide by the decision which the Court might come to upon that question on the basis of the thakbust map. The Subordinate Judge decided the question in accordance with the request of both the parties, and particularly of the Plaintiff, to the effect to which we have just referred; and the observations which he made upon the matter were as follows :-" The Plaintiff contends that, as the thak map puts down the Chak against his predecessor's name and merely notes that there was dispute about it between the proprietors of the two shares which had been previously partitioned, he is entitled to it according to the thak map, as the proprietor of the 8 anna 10 gunda share did not get it rectified by a suit for the purpose and he relies on Nobo Coomar v. Gobind Chunder 9 C.L.U. 305 (1881). But the value of a thak map varies according to circumstances (see the case quoted). Here, the thak map itself shows that the Plaintiff's predecessor and his co-sharer were disputing about the land and the survey map shows that it was a newly formed chur land at the time. But the value of a thak map varies according to circumstances (see the case quoted). Here, the thak map itself shows that the Plaintiff's predecessor and his co-sharer were disputing about the land and the survey map shows that it was a newly formed chur land at the time. The thak map could not, therefore, be held sufficient evidence of Plaintiff's title to it as proprietor of 7 anna 5 gunda share. The cases of Mohesh Chunder v. Juggut Chunder ILR 5 Cal. 212 (1879), Joytara Dassee v. Mahomed Mobaruck ILR 3 Cal. 975 (1882), Satcowrl Ghose v. Secretary of State ILR 22 Cal. 252 (1894) discuss the value of thak maps and support me in the above view. I hold, therefore, that Plaintiff's title in Chak No. 21 as proprietor of 7 anna 5 gunda share (Touzi No. 205) has not been established. But as it is the Defendant's case that it appertains to 8 anna 15 gunda share (Touzi No. 204) and as Plaintiff has purchased 1 anna 12 gunda share of the Collectorate Touzi, the Plaintiff will have jama 12 gunda share in the Chak." Now, this was, as we understand it, a decision by the Court below in accordance with the request of the parties, namely, a decision based upon the thakbust map. The Court being of opinion that the thakbust map does not prove the title claimed by the Plaintiff has held that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover upon the basis of that map. If this is a correct view to take, it is quite clear, having regard to the agreement of the parties, that the Court, as an arbitrator between them, determined the question which they placed in its hands for decision, and necessarily there can be no appeal to this Court so far as this matter is concerned. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff Appellant, that in determining the question referred to the Court below did not base its decision upon the thakbust map alone, but upon the survey map as well, and that, in this respect, the Court went beyond the scope of the reference, so to say, that was made by the parties. We are however, not prepared to take the same view. The survey map was referred to simply by way of explanation of the that map. We are however, not prepared to take the same view. The survey map was referred to simply by way of explanation of the that map. We have, however, looked into the thakbust map, and the learned gentlemen on both sides have been allowed an opportunity of discussing the entries in the said map; and we may say that we are in no way prepared to hold that the Subordinate Judge was not right in the view that he took of the entries as made in that map, and the value to be attached to such entries so far as the question of title is concerned. It will be observed that the thakbust map was prepared in the year 1856, that is many years ago, and though it may be said, reading the entries in that map from the point of view in which the learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed the matter before us, that it is evidence of possession at the time, still it was left to the Court by the parties whether, upon such entries, it could be held that the title really was with the Plaintiff; and the Subordinate Judge has held that, upon the entries in the map, such a title could not be found. So far, therefore, as this particular matter is concerned, we are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed. 2. There are however, one or two small matters that have been raised before us in the course of the argument and to which we think it necessary to refer. The first matter is in regard to the decree made by the Court below as to mesne profits for the period from the date of the institution of the suit till delivery of possession. The first matter is in regard to the decree made by the Court below as to mesne profits for the period from the date of the institution of the suit till delivery of possession. According to the judgment pronounced by the Subordinate Judge, the Plaintiff would be entitled to recover mesne profits " for three years prior to the institution of the suit and until recovery of possession or until the expiration of three years from the date of the decree (whichever event first occurs) with interest thereon at six percent, per annum and such mesne profits shall be ascertained in execution." The decree as drawn up and signed by the Subordinate Judge is however, somewhat different from the judgment so far as the mesne profits for the period intervening between the date of suit and the date of recovery of possession are concerned j for, it runs thus :-" That the Plaintiff do get from the Defendants the wasilut of the land decreed for the period from three years before the filing of the plaint and from the date of the decree until the date of possession or up to three years from the date when this decree shall be absolute (whichever event occurs first); and interest shall run on the said amount at the rate of six per cent, per annum and that this wasilut shall be ascertained at the time of execution of the decree." There is evidently a slip in this decree. We have, however, no doubt in our minds that the Subordinate Judge meant to make a decree in the same terms as the judgment was worded and that he intended to allow to the Plaintiff mesne profits for the period from the date of the institution of the suit to the date of recovery of possession. If there was any difficulty in this matter, an application might have been made to the Court below, to have the decree rectified and we may do the same thing that the Court below ought to have done. "We, therefore, direct under sec. 206, C.C.P., that the decree of the Subordinate Judge be so far amended as to make it in accord with the judgment pronounced, so far as the question of mesne profits between the date of the institution of the suit and the date of the delivery of possession is concerned. "We, therefore, direct under sec. 206, C.C.P., that the decree of the Subordinate Judge be so far amended as to make it in accord with the judgment pronounced, so far as the question of mesne profits between the date of the institution of the suit and the date of the delivery of possession is concerned. The other matter is as regards the amount of costs allowed to the Plaintiff. What the Subordinate Judge allowed him was the entire costs incurred in connection with the investigation made by the Amin and the moiety of the other costs. According to the schedule annexed to the decree, the entire costs other than the Amin's costs are put down at Rs. 533-9 as., whereas it ought to be Rs. 713-9 as. The Plaintiff being entitled to one moiety of this amount, he would get Rs. 356-12-6. To this being added the Amin's expenses which were Rs. 240-14 as, the total amount which the Plaintiff would be entitled to receive would be Rs. 597-10-6. To this extent the decree of the Court below will be modified. In other respects, the decree of that Court will stand. The Respondent, however, will be entitled to his costs of this appeal. We assess the hearing fee at one hundred rupees.