JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. The facts which have given rise to this appeal are these. The appellant, Chhannu Tiwari, brought a suit against one Jhinak Kuar, his sons and another person on three usufructuary mortgages executed in his favour by Jhinak Kuar. In the suit he prayed that he should be put into possession of the mortgaged property of which the defendants had dispossessed him, in the alternative he asked for a decree for the amount of the mortgage. The Court held that the mortgagee had been dispossessed and made a decree for the mortgage money apparently under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act. At the conclusion of the judgment, however, the Court said that the sons should be exempted and made a decree accordingly. In execution of that decree Chhannu Tiwari attached certain joint ancestral property in which the sons of Jhinak Kuar are interested. The present suit was thereupon brought by the three sons of Jhinak Kuar for a declaration that the family property was not liable to sale in execution of the decree and that in any event their interests in the property were not saleable in as much as they had been exempted from liability in the suit brought by Chhan-nu Tiwari. In the body of the plaint they also stated that the amount claimed by Chhannu Tiwari, who was the first defendant to the suit, was improper and wrong and that the family property could not be held to be liable for it. The Courts below have decreed the claim being of opinion that as the present plaintiffs were exempted in the suit of the appellant their interest in the family property could not be attached and sold, and they have accordingly made a decree exempting their shares from liability under the decree. I am unable to distinguish this case from the recent ruling in Shiam Lal v. Ganeshi Lal, reported at page 10 of volume III of the Allahabad Law Journal, [1905] 3 A.L.J.R. 10. That is a case parallel to the present, with this difference only that in that case although the son had been exempted from liability under the decree the family property was sold by auction and the son's suit was to recover his share in the property sold, whereas in the present case the property has not yet been sold. That is a case parallel to the present, with this difference only that in that case although the son had been exempted from liability under the decree the family property was sold by auction and the son's suit was to recover his share in the property sold, whereas in the present case the property has not yet been sold. In that case it was held that the fact of exemption of the son did not relieve him from liability as a Hindu son “to pay any debts of his father not shown to be tainted with immorality.” The fact that in the present case the sons were exempted in the suit did not according to that ruling exempt them from their pious obligation to pay their father's debt, unless they could show that the debt was tainted with immorality. I feel myself bound, sitting singly, by the ruling of the Division Bench to which I have referred, and whether I agree with it or not, I must, following that ruling, hold that the plaintiffs could not succeed in their suit unless they could show that the debt incurred by their father was tainted with immorality. It is true that they stated in their plaint that the debt was improper and that the family property was not liable for it. On this point an issue was framed by the Court of first instance, namely, the second issue which was as follows: “Whether the joint family property can be legally sold in execution of the decree of the defendant No. 1 as against defendant No. 2, and if so, to what extent.” The issue was somewhat vague, but it was comprehensive. It appears, however, that in a statement made by the pleaders for the plaintiff on the 14th of December, 1903, they stated that the plaintiffs would not adduce any oral evidence and that they relied on documentary evidence only. The documentary evidence filed did not refer to the question of the nature of the debt. The plaintiffs therefore did not support their allegation that the debt was of such a nature that it was not binding on the family property. Consequently it must be held that the debt being a debt incurred by the father and it being the pious liability of the sons to pay it, their interests in the joint ancestral property were liable for it. Consequently it must be held that the debt being a debt incurred by the father and it being the pious liability of the sons to pay it, their interests in the joint ancestral property were liable for it. The present case seems to be a stronger one than the case to which I have referred, in as much as in this case the Court, in exempting the sons from the suit, gave no reason for doing so. I accordingly hold that the plaintiff's suit was bound to fail, and I allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the Courts below, and dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs with costs in all Courts.