JUDGMENT 1. This appeal raises the constantly recurring question of the effect of a previous judgment in a rent suit between the same parties or their representatives. In suit No. 657 of 1899 the Plaintiffs asked for a decree for rent against the Defendant, on the ground of the latter holding certain pieces of land measuring 7 bighas at the rate of Rs 7 per annum. The Plaintiffs alleged in the plaint in the previous suit that the Defendant was in occupation of the lands in suit as a tenant paying a separate jama of Rs. 7 though he held another jama of other pieces of land at Rs. 33 and odd per annum, that the Defendant had relinquished the land and that he subsequently obtained a re-settlement. The Defendant, in answer, denied that the land for which the suit was brought had ever been held by him at a jama of Rs. 7. He also denied the surrender of the land and the allegation of re-settlement. The Munsif, who tried the suit, raised the following issues, first, whether the Defendant hold any jama of Rs. 7 as alleged in the plaint under the Plaintiff or his predecessor in respect of the lands in suit, and secondly, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover any rent from the Defendants. In the first part of his judgment the Munsif held that the allegation of the Plaintiff that the Defendant bad obtained a re-settlement was false and that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist. In this view of the facts it was unnecessary for him to try the second question. In a suit for rent the issue which ordinarily arises is does the relationship of landlord and tenant subsist. The suit is for rent of a year or a number of years and the issue relates to the existence of the relationship during the year or years in suit. The finding of the Munsif that there was no re-settlement with the Defendant was sufficient for the disposal of the case. The Munsif, however, after disposing of the real issue in the case against the Plaintiffs, tried incidentally or collaterally, the other issue raised by the defence, viz., whether the lands covered by the suit were included in the holding of 33 rupees and odd. The Munsif, however, after disposing of the real issue in the case against the Plaintiffs, tried incidentally or collaterally, the other issue raised by the defence, viz., whether the lands covered by the suit were included in the holding of 33 rupees and odd. The decision on this point was unnecessary having regard to the decision arrived at on the issue directly and substantially raised in the case. 2. Having lost the suit for rent the Plaintiffs instituted the suit now under appeal for recovery of possession of the land which they alleged had been held by the Defendant at the jama of Rs. 7. They based their cause of action on denial of tenancy by the Defendants and their title as landlords and surrender by the Defendant. The Defendant in his answer raised the same plea, i.e., that the lands in suit were parts of his holding of 33 rupees and odd. He also pleaded that the Court was incompetent on the principles of res judicata to try the question whether the lands were parts of the holding of 33 rupees and odd, or whether they constituted a separate holding of 7 rupees. 3. Both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that the plea of res judicata was not applicable to the case and that the lands covered by the suit were not parts of the Defendant's holding of Rs. 33. The Appellate Court sums up its findings in these words:-" Thus I do not hesitate to find upon the evidence coupled with all the surrounding circumstances that the disputed land is not included within the jama of Rs. 33-14-13/4 gundas as stated by the Defendants but that it formed a separate and distinct jama under the Ghana landlords to whom the Dhali Defendants relinquished, and the Plaintiff now stands in the shoes of the Ghana landlords." 4. This is a finding of fact with which we are unable to interfere. 5. The denial by the Defendant of the title of the Plaintiffs might or might not give the Plaintiffs a cause of action. It was unnecessary, having regard to the finding of fact arrived at, to go into the question of forfeiture by denial of tenancy. In fact the main question argued before us is,-Is the suit barred on the application of the principle of res judicata 6. It was unnecessary, having regard to the finding of fact arrived at, to go into the question of forfeiture by denial of tenancy. In fact the main question argued before us is,-Is the suit barred on the application of the principle of res judicata 6. The decisions of this Court on the question of res judicata when the previous suit was one for recovery of rent may be classed under two heads. The first class of cases is when the Defendant, the alleged tenant, sets up his own rights to the land and denies the relationship of landlord and tenant, denying the Plaintiff's title to the land and the substantial issue raised is-does the land covered by the suit belong to the plaintiff or the Defendant. Such a question was raised in the case of Raj Krissen Mukerjee v. Radhamadhab Haldar 21 W.R. 349 (1874). and in the subsequent case of Radhamadhah Haldar v. Monohur Mukerjee ILR 15 Cal. 756 (1888). the Judicial Committee applied the principle of res judicata. The facts of that case are these:-In the previous suit Radha Madhab who was also the Plaintiff in the subsequent suit bad asked for a decree for rent on the ground that the Defendant Raj Krissen Mookerjee was putnidar under him; Radha Madhab alleged that he had zamindari right and was entitled to rent. The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff's right as zemindar had passed to the Defendant himself under a decree obtained by him against the Plaintiffs predecessor. The question necessarily arose in the rent suit whether the zamindari right upon which the Plaintiff claimed rent had passed to the Defendant and whether the relationship of landlord and tenant was extinguished. This Court held that the Plaintiff's right had been extinguished and his title had passed to the Defendant. In the subsequent suit, Radha Madhab asked for a declaration of the identical right of redemption of the zamindari right. The Judicial Committee held that in the suit for rent the decision of the Court was one between the parties to the suit on an issue directly and substantially raised and the latter suit was not therefore maintainable on the application of the principle of res judicata. 7. Kasiswar Mukhopadhya v. Mohendra Nath Bhandari ILR 25 Cal. 136 (1897) is a case of similar kind. 7. Kasiswar Mukhopadhya v. Mohendra Nath Bhandari ILR 25 Cal. 136 (1897) is a case of similar kind. The Defendant in the rent suit raised the plea that the land occupied by him was not the mal land of the Plaintiff but was the lakhiraj land of the Defendant. The Defendant denied the Plaintiff's title and the relationship of landlord, and asserted that the title was in himself. No third person was alleged to have been interested in the land. The issue distinctly raised was whether land was mal or lakhiraj. In the subsequent case, this Court following the decision in Radhamadhab Haldar v. Monohur Mukerjee 1.L.R. 15 Cal. 756 (1888). came to the conclusion that the decision in the previous suit was a bar to the adjudication of the question of fact raised. 8. The second class of cases bearing on the question of res judicata is where the Defendant either sets up the title of a third person, and denies the relationship of landlord and tenant, or where the Defendant pleads that he is not either in occupation of the land, or that the tenancy which existed had expired. In this class of cases the only issue is:- Did the relationship of landlord and tenant exist between the parties during the years covered by the suit. We may refer to Srihari Banerjee v. Khitish Chandra Roy Bahadur ILR 24 Cal. 569 (1897) as a case of this kind. The learned Chief Justice and Banerjee, J., in their judgments discussed the previous cases on the subject and pointed out the distinction between this class of cases and the case of Radhamadhab Haldar v. Monohur Mukerjee 1.L.R. 15 Cal. 756 (1888). and they came to the conclusion that the adjudication of the issue raised in the previous suit for rent did not bar the subsequent suit. The dictum of the Judicial Committee in Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer (sic) applies to this class of cases. 756 (1888). and they came to the conclusion that the adjudication of the issue raised in the previous suit for rent did not bar the subsequent suit. The dictum of the Judicial Committee in Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer (sic) applies to this class of cases. Their Lordships, with reference to the previous suit for rent between the parties, say :-" Having regard to the subject-matter of the suit, to the form of the issue and to some expressions of the learned Judge their Lordships were further of opinion that the question of title was no more than subsidiary to the main question, viz., whether any and what rent was due from the tenant, and that on this ground also the judgment was not conclusive." 9. If the only question in a rent suit is whether any and what rent is due from the Defendant, and the Court finds that no rent was due on account of the absence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, and if the question of title which the Defendant raised was not necessary to be gone into by the Court though it might incidentally go into it in the rent suit the adjudication does not operate as res judicata. 10. We may also refer in this connection to the latest Full Bench judgment of this Court in Dwarka Nath Roy v. Ram Chand Aich (sic). There was a previous suit for rent and the Defendant denied in it the relationship of landlord and tenant and set up the right of a third party. The suit was dismissed on the finding that the relationship did not exist. The Plaintiff subsequently brought a suit for the identical land covered by the rent suit making at the same time the person whose title as land-lord the tenant Defendant had set up, a party to the suit. This third party did not appear and contest the suit. The contest in the subsequent suit was also between the Plaintiff and the original tenant. The Full Bench held that the decision in the former suit did not operate as res judicata. This third party did not appear and contest the suit. The contest in the subsequent suit was also between the Plaintiff and the original tenant. The Full Bench held that the decision in the former suit did not operate as res judicata. The learned Chief Justice says :-" The issue determined in the previous suit (a rent suit) was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed at the time when that suit was instituted between the present Plaintiff and the then Defendant, and whether the then Defendant was liable for the amount then claimed as rent for a certain period. That issue was decided against the present Plaintiff, and as it is conceded that nothing has occurred in the interval to change the position of the parties that question must be treated as res judicata as against the Plaintiff and in the Defendant's favour. But the relief sought in the present suit is absolutely different from the relief sought in the previous suit. The present issue is, whether the land in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff, and if so, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to compensation from the tenant Defendant for the use of the land. That is put dearly in the reference, and I agree with the view expressed by the referring Judges, that, having regard to the nature of the relief sought in the previous suit, and the relief sought in the present suit it is impossible to say that the Plaintiff is barred in this suit from establishing his title to the land both against the alleged tenaut and also against the person whose title as landlord the tenant Defendant had set up in the rent suit. 11. We are therefore of opinion that the plea of res judicata pressed before us cannot be successfully raised by the Defendant. 12. It is unnecssary for us to express any opinion on any of the other points discussed before us. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.