JUDGMENT : STANLEY, C.J.:— If the lower Court was right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation this appeal must fail. The suit is one for the redemption of an alleged usufructuary mortgage executed on the 14th of August, 1781, that is, 125 years ago, for a term of 70 years, to secure a principal sum of Rs. 1,500. The defendants do not admit the execution or the terms of the alleged mortgage, but they contend that even if there was any such mortgage, the mortgagees or their transferees have been in possession of the mortgaged property since the date of the mortgage, and the suit is therefore barred. We do not know of the existence of any rule of limitation under the Moghul Empire in 1781 applicable to the case. The first enactment of which we are aware, dealing with limitation in the locality in which the lands, the subject-matter of this litigation, are situate, is Act XIV of 1859. Section 1, clause 15 of that Act, prescribes a period of 60 years for the institution of suits against mortgagees, to commence in the words of the enactment from the time of the mortgage. Clause 18, however, suspended for two years the operation of the Act. It runs in the following terms:— “All suits that may be now pending or that shall be instituted within a period of two years from the date of the passing of this Act, shall be tried and determined as if this Act had not been passed; but all suits to which the provisions of this Act are applicable, that shall be instituted after the expiration of the said period shall be governed by this Act and no other law of limitation, any Statute, Act or Regulation now in force notwithstanding.” The 70 years' term said to have been limited in the mortgage deed expired in 1851. Therefore, if the mortgagors were not in a position to redeem the property during that term, they were in a position to do so when the Act to which we have referred, was passed. It has been held that this Act is applicable to usufructuary mortgages (Luehmee Buksh Roy v. Bunjeet Bam Panday, [1873] 13 B.L.R., 177 and Fatimat-un-nissa Begam v. Sunder Das, [1900] L.R., 27 I.A., 103.. It has been held that this Act is applicable to usufructuary mortgages (Luehmee Buksh Roy v. Bunjeet Bam Panday, [1873] 13 B.L.R., 177 and Fatimat-un-nissa Begam v. Sunder Das, [1900] L.R., 27 I.A., 103.. But it is contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that in these cases there was no term mentioned in the mortgage deed, and therefore the rule which was applied to the cases to which we have referred did not apply to the present case in which a term of 70 years was fixed by the mortgage. Mr. Motilal asks us to say that the rule laid down in Act XIV of 1859 should not be strictly applied; that the Legislature in passing that enactment could not have had in contemplation mortgages for terms exceeding 60 years, and that an equitable construction should be put upon the Statute, and the case treated as one which fell outside the purview of the Act. In the first case which we have cited, we find that their Lordships of the Privy Council dealt with the Statute in question, and an argument very similar to the argument presented to us in this case. It was there contended that an equitable construction should be put upon the Statute and that the Statute, should not be strictly construed. Their Lordships observe as follows:— “It has been said that this case ought to be decided upon an equitable construction and not upon the strict words of the Statute, but their Lordships think that Statutes of Limitation, like all others, ought to receive such a construction as the language in its plain meaning imports. Statutes of Limitation are in their nature strict and inflexible enactments. The object of the Legislature in passing them is to quiet long possession and to extinguish stale demands. Such Legislation has been advisedly adopted in India as it has been in this country, and their Lordships think that in construing these Statutes the ordinary rules of interpretation must prevail.” We find then in the Statute under consideration, that it is prescribed that in suits against mortgagees the suit must be instituted within 60 years from the “time”, that is, from the date of the mortgage. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in the language of the Statute. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in the language of the Statute. We further find that to prevent any hardship which might result from the interference of the Legislature in limiting the right to sue two years were given during which the Statute was to remain in abeyance, so that during that period any party who might be entitled to institute a suit in respect of a mortgage might do so. Of this right as we have pointed out the appellant and his predecessors in title failed to avail themselves within the two years allowed by the Statute; they in fact took no steps in regard to their mortgage until the 7th of June, 1899, more than a century after the date of the alleged mortgage. We may observe that later legislation in no way helps the appellant's case. Article 148 of Act IX of 1871 prescribes the same period of limitation for suits against mortgagees, as did the earlier Act, using substantially the same language. A section in that Act, namely section 29, prescribes that the determination of the period limited for the institution of any person a suit for possession of any land, the right of such person to the land shall be extin guished. Before this the right to sue only was barred, the right to the land not being extinguished. Under this Act both the remedy and the right are barred. The next enactment, Act XV of 1877, introduced a material change in the law as regards limitation. According to it the right to institute a suit for redemption commenced to run from the time when the cause of action accrued, but at this time when this Act was passed, the right of the appellant was already barred, and there is a provi sion in it that nothing therein contained shall be deemed to affect any title acquired, or to revive any right to sue already barred (see section 2). Under these circumstances it appears to us clear that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge in so far as he held that the suit was barred by the provisions of the enactment to which we have referred, is correct. There is no other question before the Court. We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs, including fees in this Court on the higher scale.