JUDGMENT : KNOX, J. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by five plaintiffs-respondents who are nephews and nieces of one Mansab Ali Khan, to recover their shares in certain property which at one time belonged to Mansab Ali Khan. The defendants, as will be seen in the genealogical table printed at page 13 of the paper book, are the sons and daughters of Wilayat, brother of Mansab Ali Khan. The plaintiffs have obtained a decree from the Court below, and against that decree the present appeal has been filed by three of the defendants. The other defendants who have not appealed were made respondents. On the 18th of June, 1878, Mansab Ali Khan executed a will which is printed at page. 4 of the appellant's book in the connected appeal No. 46 of 1904. By this will he created a wakf of the greater portion of his property for certain religious and charitable objects. In paragraph 3 of the will he declares that he has set aside certain other property for the maintenance of his wife, Musammat Mohib-un-nissa. The will provides that she would remain in possession of the property during her life, for her maintenance, but is not to have any power to alienate the property by sale or mortgage, and that after her death the income of the property is to be applied to the purposes of the endowment, according to the conditions set forth in paragraph 1 of the will. It is of this latter property that the plaintiffs claim a share in the present suit. There are eight grounds set out in the memorandum of appeal but all of them are not supported. The three pleas which were urged by the learned advocate for the appellants were—first, that by the will of Mansab Ali a valid wakf was created of the property left to Musammat Mohib-un-nissa for her maintenance and that the decision of the lower Court to the contrary is erroneous; secondly, that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the property as the heirs of Mansab Ali Khan; thirdly, that the suit is barred by limitation. 2. The plea as to limitation was very faintly urged, and we are of opinion that there is nothing in it. We proceed to consider the first plea. Mansab Ali Khan was a Mahomedan belonging to the Shia sect. 2. The plea as to limitation was very faintly urged, and we are of opinion that there is nothing in it. We proceed to consider the first plea. Mansab Ali Khan was a Mahomedan belonging to the Shia sect. It has now been settled in the decision of their lordships of the Privy Council in Baqar Ali Khan v. Anjuman Ara Begam,[1902] I.L.R., 25 All, 236, overruling the Full Bench decision of this Court in Agha Ali Khan v. Altaf Hasan Khan[1892] I.L.R., 14 All., 429, that Shias can create a valid wakf by will. For the plaintiffs it is contended that admitting that a Shia can create a valid wakf by will, no valid wakf was created by the instrument under consideration with regard to the property in suit. In support of this contention reference is made to paragraphs 8 and 12 of the will. The first of these paragraphs provides that if any child is born to the testator during his lifetime, the conditions laid down in the will shall cease to remain in force. By paragraph 12 the testator reserves to himself the power during his life of cancelling or modifying any of the conditions of the will. It is argued that, as under Mahomedan Law a wakf must be absolute and unconditional, the insertion of the above conditions in the will renders nugatory the wakf of the property in suit. We are unable to sustain this contention. It having been held by the Privy Council that a valid testamentary wakf can be created, the reservation by the testator of a right to alter the will is nothing more than the setting out of a right every testator possesses. In our judgment this will does not render the wakf invalid. The fact remains that the testator died without issue and without having in any way altered his will. The mere insertion of a provision as to what would happen if a child should be born to the testator or the reservation of a right to change his mind will not, in our opinion, having regard to the principles laid down in the Privy Council judgment cited above, affect the validity of the wakf. 3. The mere insertion of a provision as to what would happen if a child should be born to the testator or the reservation of a right to change his mind will not, in our opinion, having regard to the principles laid down in the Privy Council judgment cited above, affect the validity of the wakf. 3. The next ground, on which it is contended that the wakf is invalid, is that the testator directs that after his wife's death the income of the property is to be applied to the purposes of the endowment. Reliance is placed on certain texts cited in Shama Charan Sircar's Tagore Law Lectures, 1874, page 465, and particularly on a sentence in the Mufatah, viz., “the wakf of a profit is not also valid by reason of non-stability.” In our opinion this contention also fails. As we read the texts, they are directed against endowments of incorporeal rights or of things which perish in the using. Here the testator, although he only mentions the income of the property as the endowment, does not assign the corpus to any one else; and it is clear from the reference to the provisions of paragraph 1 of the will, that he intended that the property in suit was to be treated exactly as the property mentioned in paragraph 1, with regard to which it is admitted a valid wakf has been created. 4. The third ground on which the validity of the wakf is assailed, is that the property in suit did not at once, on the testator's death, pass to the trustees of the endowment, their enjoyment of it being postponed until the death of the widow to whom the property was assigned during her lifetime for the purpose of maintenance. In our opinion this plea also fails. It is true that the passing of the property to the endowment was made to depend on the occurrence of a future event, viz., the widow's death, but that event was not a problematical event; it was one which was sure to happen sooner or later. The bequest does not turn upon a mere contingency. Supposing the testator had assigned all the property to the trustees with a direction to them to make over the income or a portion of it to the widow during her lifetime, that would, in our opinion, be a perfectly valid wakf. The bequest does not turn upon a mere contingency. Supposing the testator had assigned all the property to the trustees with a direction to them to make over the income or a portion of it to the widow during her lifetime, that would, in our opinion, be a perfectly valid wakf. In support of this view we may refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Mahomed Ahsanulla Chowdhry v. Amarchand Kundu[1889] I.L.R., 17 Cal., 498, where it was held by their lordships of the Privy Council that the making of a provision for the grantor's family, out of the property dedicated to religious or charitable objects may be consistent with a property being constituted wakf. It is true that the parties to that case were Sunnis, but we see no reason why the same principle should not be applied in the case of Shias. For the respondents reliance was placed on a passage to be found at page 253 in the judgment in the case of Baqar Ali Khan v. Anjuman Ara Begam,[1902] I.L.R., 25 All., 236. “If a wakf may be made by a will speaking from the death, there is no condition and no reservation in a case like the present.” We cannot put upon this isolated expression “speaking from the death” the meaning contended for and hold that because the widow's life estate was interposed the wakf was for that reason invalid. As pointed out by the learned advocate for the appellant in his able argument, “Tanjiz,” i.e., the immediate operation of the transaction, absolute and unconditional, which is indispensable in the case of a wakf made by a man in his life, has and can have no application to a testamentary wakf. It is on the grounds set forth above that the validity of the wakf has been assailed and in our opinion none of those grounds is good. We therefore hold that the Court below was wrong in deciding that the property claimed by the plaintiff was not the subject of a valid wakf. It is admitted that our decision on this point is fatal to the plaintiff's case and is sufficient for the disposal of the appeal. But in view of the possiblity of the case going further we may shortly express our opinion on the second plea urged. 5. It is admitted that our decision on this point is fatal to the plaintiff's case and is sufficient for the disposal of the appeal. But in view of the possiblity of the case going further we may shortly express our opinion on the second plea urged. 5. The fathers of the plaintiffs, it is admitted, predeceased Mohib-un-nissa, while the father of the defendants survived her. Consequently if there was no wakf and if the inheritance opened upon the death of Mohib-un-nissa, Wilayat, who survived her, would succeed to it to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, his brother's children. 6. If, on the other hand, the fathers of the plaintiffs had a vested interest in the property which passed to the plaintiffs on the death of their fathers during Mohib-un-nissa's lifetime, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a share in the property. In our opinion, having regard to what was said by their lordships of the Privy Council in Musammat Hamida v. Musammat Budhin and the Government, [1872] W.R., 525, and Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi[1885] I.L.R., 11 Cal., 597 the latter position cannot be maintained. 7. For the reasons set forth above, we allow the appeal and setting aside the decree of the lower Court, dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs in both Courts. The costs of this Court will include fees on the higher scale.