JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit to recover certain moneys due upon two notes of hand. As to one of them, no question arises and judgment has been given in favour of the Plaintiff. The note of hand in respect of which the difficulty arises is one, dated the 19th June 1902, given by the executor of a certain Mr. Thomas and it is found that the debt was incurred for the benefit of his estate. In 1904, the precise date has not been furnished, a suit was instituted by a creditor of the deceased Mr. Thomas to administer his estate, and in that suit a Receiver was appointed, Mr. O'Reilly. He very properly looked into the condition of the estate, and made a return to the Court of its assets and liabilities. On the 30th November 1904, the present Plaintiff applied in the administration suit to rank as a creditor against the estate, in respect of the notes. On the 31st of January 1905, the Receiver submitted a statement to the Court, which it must be taken was made in the presence of the executor of Mr. Thomas, in which he admitted this debt due to the Plaintiff on the note of hand. Again, on the 3rd of March 1905, the Receiver wrote to the Plaintiff admitting the liability. On some date previous to the 29th of April 1905, the Subordinate Judge, in whose Court the administration suit was pending, for some reason which is not disclosed, directed the Plaintiff to bring a suit on the notes in question. On the 29th of April 1905, the Plaintiff applied to have the notes returned. We are told they were returned on the same date, and on the 7th of August the Plaintiff brought the present suit. It is contended by the executor that the suit is barred by limitation, that the three years allowed from the 19th of June 1902 expired on the 18th of June 1905, and the suit was not brought within the prescribed period. The Plaintiff contends that the suit is not barred, inasmuch as the admission of liability by the Receiver in the suit to which the executor was a party is an acknowledgment of the debt within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Limitation Act; and that the statute can only run from the date of that acknowledgment. 2. The Plaintiff contends that the suit is not barred, inasmuch as the admission of liability by the Receiver in the suit to which the executor was a party is an acknowledgment of the debt within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Limitation Act; and that the statute can only run from the date of that acknowledgment. 2. I am not prepared to say that the Receiver in a case of this nature is the agent of the judgment-debtor; he is the agent and an officer of the Court. It is however not necessary, in the circumstances of the present case, to go further into that. In the face of the admissions made in the presence of the executor, and made by the Receiver who was the officer of the Court appointed to enquire into the assets and liabilities of the estate, an admission that the debt was then justly due from the estate to the Plaintiff, the Defendant cannot now resile from that, and set up the statute of limitation as a bar to the claim. The Receiver of the Court, in the presence of the executor who was a party to the suit, led the Plaintiff to believe that the debt had been admitted, and would in the ordinary course be payable out of the assets of the deceased as one of its liabilities. That admission having been once made, I do not think the executor can now turn round and say that the debt is barred by limitation. If it had not been for the proceedings in the administration suit, which lasted some 5 or 6 months, from November 1904 to April 1905, and if the Plaintiff had been told at once that the liability on the note was challenged, he could and probably would then and there have brought a suit to recover the money. He was put off from doing by the action of the officer of the Court, and in the presence of the executor. Pending the administration suit, and the proceedings therein relative to his admitted claim, the Plaintiff would not have been justified in bringing a separate suit. But even if this view be unsound, it is difficult to see why the Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. Pending the administration suit, and the proceedings therein relative to his admitted claim, the Plaintiff would not have been justified in bringing a separate suit. But even if this view be unsound, it is difficult to see why the Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the Plaintiff was bond file prosecuting his claim in the administration suit ought properly to be excluded j and if excluded, his suit is well within time. For some reason or other the Court administering the estate found itself unable to entertain the claim. 3. For these reasons the rule must be made absolute with costs, and judgment must be entered for the Plaintiff for the whole amount claimed instead of for the amount decreed by the Judge of the Small Cause Court. We assess the hearing fee at four gold mohurs. Geidt, J. I agree.