Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (May 26, 1903), modifying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad (June 28, 1901). The main question decided in the appeal was as to the validity and effect of two decrees made by the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad on March 12, 1896, giving effect to compromises of even date. The circumstances which led to those decrees were shortly as follows— One Dalthamman Singh was the owner of an estate known as J Bhandsari, which comprised several villages. On his death he left behind him a widow and two illegitimate sons. The widow had possession of the estate, and on December 17, 1888, executed a deed of gift for consideration of the whole of the estate to five donees (one of them being the respondent Jadu Nath Singh, a minor). All the donees were descended from the same common ancestor as Dalthamman Singh, and represented different branches of the family. Each of the donees was placed in possession of his share. Jadu Nath Singh was a minor, and lived with his father, Surat Singh. Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 128 ( 1905- 1906) Manohar Lal V. Jadu Nath Singh 51 The two illegitimate sons of Dalthamman Singh claimed to be entitled to a reversion of the whole estate subject to the life interest of the widow, basing their title on a will alleged to have been executed by Dalthamman Singh on February 22, 1876. They sold their reversion in one of the villages, namely, Jamnipur, to one Inderjit Singh for Rs.4000 by deed executed on October 19, 1888. This led to a claim to pre-empt advanced by Bishu Nath Singh and Mehpal Singh, who were co-sharers in the village. After litigation, a decree granting the right claimed was passed in their favour on September 22, 1890, conditional on payment by them of the sum of Rs.8000 on or before December 22, 1890. On that date the appellant Manohar Lal lent Rs.6000 to the preemptors, who executed a mortgage in his favour of the village of Jamnipur. After litigation, a decree granting the right claimed was passed in their favour on September 22, 1890, conditional on payment by them of the sum of Rs.8000 on or before December 22, 1890. On that date the appellant Manohar Lal lent Rs.6000 to the preemptors, who executed a mortgage in his favour of the village of Jamnipur. The object for which the money was borrowed was stated in the deed to be "for the purpose of paying the purchase-money of 13 annas 6 pie, odd share in village Jamnipur in respect of which a decree for pre-emption has been passed." As further security for the repayment of the said sum with interest at the rate of 24 percent, per annum, another mortgage of the villages of Bhandsari and Gangapur was executed by all the donees of Dalthamman Singhs share. In executing the mortgage Surat Singh purported to act as guardian and next friend of his minor son. On the same day a third mortgage was executed by the same donees, Surat Singh again acting for Jadu Nath Singh. A sum of Rs.5000 was advanced at 24 per cent, per annum interest, "for the purpose of payment to Bishu Nath Singh and Mehpal Singh in satisfaction of their preemption decree obtained in respect of 18 annas 6 pie odd share in village Jamnipur and for other necessities." The properties mortgaged were the villages of Balrampur and Gonwan Makrand. On November 19, 1895, Manohar Lal instituted two suits to foreclose the mortgages in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad. The first suit was based on the mortgage of Jamnipur, Bhandsari and Gangapur, and the second suit on the mortgage of Balrampur and Gonwan Makrand. Both suits were settled by compromises. The defendants confessed judgment for the amount claimed and costs, and agreed to pay the whole amount with compound interest, calculated at the rate of 10 per cent, per annum, by instalments, with power to the mortgagee to foreclose on failure by the mortgagors to pay any instalment. In pursuance of these compromises decrees were made on March 12, 1896; and on January 28, 1899, on default by the mortgagors, decrees absolute for foreclosure were made. In pursuance of these compromises decrees were made on March 12, 1896; and on January 28, 1899, on default by the mortgagors, decrees absolute for foreclosure were made. On March 9, 1899, Jadu Nath, by his mother as next friend, sued for a cancellation of the said compromises and decrees, on the ground .that they were made without the sanction of the Court, and under circumstances in which the minors rights ought not to be prejudiced. Both Courts held that the compromises, not having been made with the sanction of the Court were not binding on the minor, nor were the decrees binding which were passed in pursuance thereof; the final decree being that they " be set aside in their entirety, the result of which will be that those suits will have to be decided afresh." W. C. Bonnerjee, for the appellant, contended that the compromises and decrees were binding on the minor. Though no formal order of leave was drawn up, yet the Subordinate Judge accepted the compromises with the full knowledge that the respondent was a party to the suits and to the preceding transactions, all of which had been before him in evidence and that he was a minor. They should accordingly be taken to have been made with the leave of the Court within the meaning of s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code; for such leave was implied in his acceptance of the compromises as the bases; of his decrees. The .1 whole decrees ought not to have been set aside Sect 544 says there must be common ground against all the defendants before that can be done. The Law. Rep. 33 Ind. App. 128 ( 1905- 1906) Manohar Lal V. Jadu Nath Singh 52 respondent was only entitled to relief as regards his own interest. De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the com promises and decrees were not binding on him, for that leave had been assumed by the guardian rather than judicially granted by the Court. He agreed that the result would be that he should be remitted to his original rights. Bonnerjee replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. He agreed that the result would be that he should be remitted to his original rights. Bonnerjee replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. The Code of Civil Procedure, s. 462, provides that " No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian." It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the exigencies of that provision had been complied with in this case, inasmuch as it appeared that the minor (the first respondent), who was a party to the compromises in question, was described in the title of the suit as a minor suing "under the guardianship of his mother," and the terms of the compromises were, of course, before the Court. In the opinion of their Lordships that is not sufficient. There ought to be evidence that the attention of the Court was directly Called to the fact that a minor was a party to the compromises, and it ought to be shewn, by an order on petition, or in some way not open to doubt, that the leave of the Court was obtained. This was the principal question argued before their Lordships, and on it the appellant fails. The other question had reference to the terms of the decree pronounced by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner on the minors appeal to that Court. It appears to their Lordships that the terms of that decree are far too wide. The decree orders that the compromises and decrees in the foreclosure suit (which were in question in this suit) be set aside "in their entirety," and goes on to declare that the result would be that those suits would "have to be decided afresh." Their Lordships think (and indeed the learned counsel on both sides agree) that it will be quite sufficient if there is a declaration that the compromises and decrees are not binding upon the minor, and that he is remitted to his original rights. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree in the minors appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner should be varied in this respect, but otherwise affirmed, and that the decree in the present appellants appeal to that Court should be affirmed. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree in the minors appeal to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner should be varied in this respect, but otherwise affirmed, and that the decree in the present appellants appeal to that Court should be affirmed. With regard to the costs of the appeal, their Lordships think that the appellant must bear them.