JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. This was a pre-emption suit. The right of pre-emption clearly exists. The defendant-vendee was stranger and made a purchase on the 11th of November, 1902. A preemption suit in respect of the subject-matter of this sale was instituted on the 3rd of November, 1903. In the meantime the defendant-vendee had made a second purchase on the 30th of June, 1903. A second pre-emption suit in respect of the subject-matter of the second sale was instituted on the 11th of November, 1903. It therefore appears that at the time of the institution of the first suit there was no suit to pre-empt the subject-matter of the second sale. The defendant-vendee, contends that by virtue of the second purchase he was on the date of the institution of the first suit a co-sharer and not a stranger and that therefore the suit to pre-empt the subject-matter of the sate, dated 11th November, 1902, must fail. In support of this contention he has cited Bhagwan Das v. Mohan Lal, [1903] I.L.R., 25 All., 421 in which it was held that where a stranger has purchased a share in the village, which was subject to the right of preemption and subsequently, and before any suit was brought, became a co-sharer by virtue of the second sale, a suit for pre emption could not be maintained. It clearly appears from the judgment in this case that it was decided entirely on the ground that the vendee had admittedly become a co-sharer by virtue of his second purchase. A perusal of the record of the case shows that the vendee expressly pleaded that he had become a co-sharer by purchase, and that no suit had been brought within the period of limitation in respect of the sale by virtue of which he claimed to be a co-sharer. The present suit is entirely different. A suit has been brought within limitation to preempt the subject-matter of the second sale. It seems to me, therefore, that the defendant, vendee, has never become a co-sharer, and that when he made the second purchase, the latter just as the first was liable to be set aside in a suit for pre-emption by a co-sharer having a right to pre-empt. It seems to me, therefore, that the defendant, vendee, has never become a co-sharer, and that when he made the second purchase, the latter just as the first was liable to be set aside in a suit for pre-emption by a co-sharer having a right to pre-empt. I allow the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of both the lower courts and remand the case to the court of first instance through the lower appellate court with directions to readmit the suit under its original number in the register and to proceed to determine the suit on the merits. Costs will abide the event which in this court will include fees on the higher scale so far the appellant is concerned.