JUDGMENT 1. We have no doubt as to the facts of the case and the rights of the parties. They are practically admitted. Mehals Jhakra and Ahera in Touzi No. 50 of the Burdwan Collectorate are the debutter properties of Thakurs Lukshmi Janardan and the first and second parties are the shebaits. The lands of the mehals are in the occupation of raiyats and they pay rent on receipts bearing the names of the first and second parties as shebaits. They are thus joint shebaits in possession. But for the sake of convenience, the actual management of the worship of the Thakurs and of their debutter mehals has for years been with the first party, Chandi Charan Singh. He is the eldest male member of the family of the shebaits and he was with the consent of his co-shebaits entrusted with the duty which was in law the duty of all of them. 2. Shortly before the institution of the proceedings under sec. 145, Cr. P.C., which were commenced on 17th October 1904, disputes arose between the co-she-baits, Chandi Charan Singh claiming to have the sole management, the other shebaits claiming to have management jointly with him. 3. On the 21st January 1906, one of the Deputy Magistrates at Burdwan made the following order in the proceeding under sec. 145, Cr. P.C. "The right" (to collect rent) "will remain vested as heretofore in Babu Chandi Charan Singh until a competent Court orders otherwise." The contention before us turns on the jurisdiction of the Deputy Magistrate under sec. 145, Cr. P.C., in a case like this and on the legality of the order made by him. 4. That the co-shebaits were entitled to joint possession and were in one sense in such possession cannot be denied; it cannot also be denied that Chandi Charan Singh was acting with the permission of the other shebaits and was their agent as regards their shebaiti right. The agency could be withdrawn and was withdrawn by some, if not all, of the second party. Was his antecedent possession, partly as an agent and partly as a shebait, such possession, so far as the agency is concerned, as can be pleaded, and given effect to, in a proceeding under sec. 145 of the Code ? 5. Possession that can be pleaded in a proceeding under sec. Was his antecedent possession, partly as an agent and partly as a shebait, such possession, so far as the agency is concerned, as can be pleaded, and given effect to, in a proceeding under sec. 145 of the Code ? 5. Possession that can be pleaded in a proceeding under sec. 145 must, we think, be possession based on a claim of right to possession. The possession of an agent or servant which is permissive cannot give a party to a proceeding a locus standi as against his principal or master. Chandi Charan Singh was receiving the rents from the raiyats in actual occupation through the tehsildars by using the names of all the co-shebaits and he cannot be heard to say that so far as the other shebaits are concerned his agency entitled him to continue in possession against their will. If he could claim a right to possession irrespective of his agency, the case would be different, but he cannot do so on the facts admitted and found. The parties must be taken to have been in law in joint possession as co-shebaits, notwithstanding the exclusive management for a time by Chandi Charan Singh. 6. Thus the case being one of joint possession by the parties, the operation of sec. 145 is excluded. The properties are incapable of partition. Being debutter they are impartible and inalienable. The possession of the shebaits must always be necessarily joint and it would be unreasonable to make the lands or the right to collect rents subject of an order under sec. 145. The case is governed by the principle underlying Ramrunginee Dassee v. Gooroo Das Roy (1872)18 W.R. Cr. 36, Beni Narain v. Archarj Nath ILR (1883) All. 607, Surb Narayan Singh v. Brij Mohun Thakur ILR (1895) Cal. 80, Tarujan v. Asamuddi (1900) 4 C.W.N. 426 and Dharani Kanta Lahiry v. Girija Kanta Lahiry (1904) 8 C.W.N. 485. 7. In Sri Mohan Thakur v. Narsing Mohan Thakur ILR (1899) Cal. 259, the question argued before us was raised but was not distinctly answered and no reasons are given. The facts are also distinguishable. Radharaman Ghose v. Baliram Ram ILR (1904) Cal. 249 was a case between partners and each party claimed exclusive possession as managing partner. Pratt and Handley, JJ., held that sec. 259, the question argued before us was raised but was not distinctly answered and no reasons are given. The facts are also distinguishable. Radharaman Ghose v. Baliram Ram ILR (1904) Cal. 249 was a case between partners and each party claimed exclusive possession as managing partner. Pratt and Handley, JJ., held that sec. 145 was not applicable to the case and we think the principle on which the decision is based equally applies to the present case. We are, therefore, of opinion that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order it did under sec. 145 of the Code and we accordingly set it aside and make the rule absolute.