Judgement Appeal from five decrees of the High Court (June 16, 1908), whereby a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Nuddea (November 28, 1898) was reversed so far as it granted any relief to the appellants, and their suit was dismissed with costs. The questions decided in this appeal were whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge found that under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment there was no necessity for the widow granting the ijara in question, and held that the suit was governed by Act XV. of 1877, Sched, II., arts. 140 and 141, which provide twelve years limitation, and not by art. 91, which provides three years for a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument of the description in suit, calculated from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiff thereto became known to him. The High Court held that, whether there was necessity for the ijara or not, it was at best only voidable, and that a suit to avoid it was, under the circumstances, barred by not having been brought within three years from the widows death. Its judgment on this point was as follows— “In the present case it may be remembered that the defences of legal necessity and of election to treat the lease as valid, if substantiated, would shew that the lease could not be treated as ipso facto void. The plaintiffs evidently treat the lease as one that must be avoided by being set aside; and the question before us appears to resolve itself into this, whether they could obtain khas possession without having the lease set aside. If they could not, art. 91, and not art. 141, would seem to govern the case." After holding that the lease must be set aside before the plaintiffs could recover possession, the judgment proceeded — "It is contended, however, for the plaintiffs that art. 91 cannot apply, because the time from which the period begins to run is, when the facts entitling the plaintiffs to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to them. It has not been disputed that these facts were known to them on the death of the widow and probably long before, for the father (Annoda) of five of the reversioners, was himself one of the ijaradars, and his ijara interest passed under his will. It has not been disputed that these facts were known to them on the death of the widow and probably long before, for the father (Annoda) of five of the reversioners, was himself one of the ijaradars, and his ijara interest passed under his will. But it is said that these facts might have become known to them during the life of the widow, in which case they would have had to bring their suit during her lifetime. If well founded, I scarcely see how this argument would assist the plaintiffs it would only mean that they were not necessarily entitled to three years from the death of the widow; but the argument does not appear to me to be sound, because the lease was perfectly good during the widows life, and the reversioners did not become entitled to have the instrument set aside until after her death, and her death is one of the elements which entitle them to have it set aside. In the case suggested, the plaintiffs might have proceeded under art. 125, which does not appear to clash, as has been suggested, with the view we take as to the applicability of art. 91. If a reversioner desire to set aside a deed executed by a Hindu widow, which is voidable as against him, the Legislature may well have thought that it was desirable that such suits should be brought within a much shorter period than that prescribed for the recovery of immovable property in ordinary cases." De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that art. 91 only applied where it was necessary to set aside some instrument before the property to which it related could .be recovered. It was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to set aside this ijara. It came to an end and ceased to be operative at the death of the widow, at which date the appellants became entitled as next heirs to the last full owner. Art, 141 was the applicable provision to a suit for possession such as this. Reference was made to Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh v. Rameshar Baksh Singh (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 156.); Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 148.) ; Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke. (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. Art, 141 was the applicable provision to a suit for possession such as this. Reference was made to Thakur Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh v. Rameshar Baksh Singh (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 156.); Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 148.) ; Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke. (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 164.) Levett, K.C., and W. Saunderson, for some of the respondents, contended that on the death of the widow the ijara was only voidable, and not void. To avoid it the appellants were bound to sue for that purpose and to obtain a decree to set it aside. To that suit, which was an indispensable preliminary to the present suit, art. 91 applied, and the present suit was barred by the same provision. The appellants had to shew7, not merely that the lease was voidable, but that they had a right to avoid it, which could not be established without adjudication upon the points whether there was legal necessity for the ijara, whether it had been assented to by the nearest reversioners for the time being, whether it had bean subsequently ratified and confirmed by themselves. Reference was made to Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 164.); Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik (( 1901) I. L. R. 28 Calc. 532.) ; Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah(( 1861) 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529, 550.) ; Indar Kuar v. Lalta Prasad Singh (( 1882) I. L. R. 4 Allah. 532.); Nobokishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy (( 1884) I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1102.); Hem Chunder Sanyal v. Sarnamoyi Debi. (( 1894) I. L. R. 22 Calc. 354.) Counsel for appellant was not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DAVEY. The only question on this appeal is whether the suit out of which it arises is barred by limitation. The appellants (plaintiffs in the suit) are four of the reversionary heirs of one Chandra Bhusan Mukerji, who died childless so long ago as the year 1832. He was succeeded by his widow, Soyamoni Debi, who died on October 21, 1893. The only question on this appeal is whether the suit out of which it arises is barred by limitation. The appellants (plaintiffs in the suit) are four of the reversionary heirs of one Chandra Bhusan Mukerji, who died childless so long ago as the year 1832. He was succeeded by his widow, Soyamoni Debi, who died on October 21, 1893. The principal defendants to the suit, or their successors in title, being respondents 1 to 68, are in possession of the property in suit, and claim to be entitled thereto either directly or by derivative titles under an ijara, or lease, of the whole of Chandra Bhusans property for a term of sixty years, executed by Soyamoni on September 7, 1863. The other defendants, or their successors in title, being the last three respondents, are the other reversionary heirs, who have not joined the appellants as plaintiffs. By their plaint the appellants prayed a declaration that the ijara in question, and all the rights subordinate thereto mentioned in the plaint, have become inoperative as against the appellants since Soyamonis death, and for khas possession of the disputed properties with mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge, on the trial of certain preliminary issues, held, on the authority of Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri (( 1896) I. L. R. 24 Calc. 77.), that art. 91 of Sched. II. to the Indian Limitation Act had no application to the present suit, and that it was governed by the twelve years limitation prescribed by arts. 140 and 141. No limitation therefore applied to the suit, and he found the issue as to limitation in the appellants favour. At the subsequent trial of the other issues on their merits, the Subordinate Judges judgment was in favour of the appellants, except as to certain defendants, and he made a decree, dated November 28, 1898, in accordance with his findings. No less than six appeals against the decree of the Subordinate Judge were presented to the High Court of Calcutta, and on the hearing of the appeals the Court reversed the finding of the Subordinate Judge on the preliminary point as to limitation, holding that art. 91 was applicable to the case, and that consequently the suit was barred, and must be dismissed with costs. By art. 91 of Sched. II. 91 was applicable to the case, and that consequently the suit was barred, and must be dismissed with costs. By art. 91 of Sched. II. to the Limitation Act the period of limitation for a suit " to cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for" is " three years from the time when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside become known to him." By art. 141 it is prescribed that, in a suit for possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu female, the period of limitation is twelve years from the females death. The learned Chief Justice in his judgment observes that the Court had first to consider whether the lease in question was void or voidable, and that this was set at rest by this Board in the case of Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke. (L. R 24 Ind. App. 164.) The learned judge quoted from the judgment delivered by Sir Richard Couch the following words "In considering their effect it must be observed that the putni was not void, it was only voidable; the raja might elect to assent to it and treat it as valid. Its validity depended on the circumstances in which it was made. The learned judges of the High Court appear to have fallen into the error of treating the putni as if it absolutely came to an end at the death of the widow." The Chief Justice subsequently observes (not with perfect accuracy) that in the case before the Court the plaintiffs expressly asked to have the ijara lease set aside, and cannot recover possession unless it is set aside. From the authorities which had been cited by him, he says, it would appear that if the plaintiffs can recover possession without setting aside the lease, then art. 141 would apply and not art. 91, but if they cannot so succeed without getting rid of the lease, then the case would fall within art. 91. Their Lordships think that the learned Chief Justice correctly stated the question in the words last quoted. But they differ from the learned judge as to the answer to be given to the question so put, and they think that it is not answered by merely saying that the ijara was voidable only and not void. 91. Their Lordships think that the learned Chief Justice correctly stated the question in the words last quoted. But they differ from the learned judge as to the answer to be given to the question so put, and they think that it is not answered by merely saying that the ijara was voidable only and not void. In the case before this Board cited by the learned judge the question was whether the acceptance of rent payable under the putni and other circumstances afforded evidence of an election by the raja to confirm the putni and treat it as valid. If it was ipso facto void it could not of course be confirmed, and the acceptance of rent would be evidence only of the creation of a new tenancy. A Hindu widow is not a tenant for life, but is owner of her husbands property subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving upon her husbands heirs upon her death. But she may alienate it subject to certain conditions being complied with. Her alienation is not, therefore, absolutely void, but it is prima facie voidable at the election of the reversionary heir. He may think fit to affirm it, or he may at his pleasure treat it as a nullity without the intervention of any Court, and he shews his election to do the latter by commencing an action to recover possession of the property. There is, in fact, nothing for the Court either to set aside or cancel as a condition precedent to the right of action of the reversionary heir. It is true that the appellants prayed by their plaint a declaration that the ijara was inoperative as against them, as leading up to their prayer for delivery to them of khas possession. But it was not necessary for them to do so, and they might have merely claimed possession, leaving it to the defendants to plead and (if they could) prove the circumstances which they relied on for shewing that the ijara or any derivative dealings with the property were not in fact voidable, but were binding on the reversionary heirs. Their Lordships are of opinion that the article in the schedule to the Limitation Act applicable to this case is art. Their Lordships are of opinion that the article in the schedule to the Limitation Act applicable to this case is art. 141, and the suit is not therefore barred, and that it should therefore be sent back to the High Court to inquire into and decide the other points mentioned by counsel for the respondents. The High Court made altogether five decrees, all dated June 16, 1903, on the appeals before it. In appeal No. 71 of 1899, by the present appellants, the appeal was dismissed with costs except as to defendants respondents Nos. 18 to 24, both inclusive, who had entered into a compromise and had obtained a decree to that effect on June 2, 1903. By the other four decrees the suit was dismissed with costs. The sixth appeal, No. 175, by defendant No, 5, is also stated to have been compromised. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court, dated June 16, 1903, in appeal No. 71 of 1899, be reversed except as to defendants respondents Nos. 18 to 24, both inclusive, therein mentioned, and that the four other decrees of the High Court of the same date also be reversed, and the finding of the Subordinate Judge on the third issue as to limitation be affirmed, and with this direction the cause be remitted to the High Court to proceed with the consideration of the appeals to that Court from the decree of the Subordinate Judge dated November 28, 1898, other than such as have been compromised. The respondents other than those with whom compromises have been made as aforesaid, and respondent No. 59, who is dead, and whose representative is not a party to the record, and except such as are pro forma defendants only, will pay the costs of this appeal. Their Lordships must again express their regret at the bulk of the papers included in the record, which are for the most part absolutely irrelevant to the only question raised by the appeal. As, however, there is nothing in the record to shew that the respondents objected to the inclusion of any of these papers, their Lordships cannot deprive the appellants of any part of their costs.