Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (May 23, 1904), affirming a decree of the District Judge of Bankura (January 3, 1902). The suit was brought in February, 1896, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Bankura. The plaintiff alleged title as the purchaser of a darputni interest in the property in suit in the name of his son-in-law Sarat Chandra Mandal. It appeared that Raghu Nath Panja, the ancestor of the appellants, as owner of the putni right, sued Sarat Chandra for arrears of rent, obtained a decree, and at a sale thereunder in 1891 bought his darputni interest. The plaint alleged that all Raghu Naths proceedings connected with this purchase and decree were collusive, illegal and fraudulent, and submitted that, Sarat Chandra being a benamidar, the plaintiffs right had not been affected thereby, and that he was entitled to recover possession. The defendants pleaded limitation, and that, Sarat Chandras name having been registered, the rent suit and decree were properly brought against him and that the plaintiff was bound thereby. The Subordinate Judge held that the sale was Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 138 ( 1906- 1907) Annada Pershasd Panjar V. Prasannamoyi Dasi 49 under the Civil Procedure Code, and passed only the rights of the benamidar, the purchaser taking nothing by the transaction. The District Judge decided that the suit, being virtually to set aside a sale, was barred by the one-year period of limitation. The High Court set aside this decree and remanded the suit. The District Judge on remand held that art. 95 of the Limitation Act did not apply, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover within twelve years. The High Court affirmed this decision. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and C. W. Arathoon, for the appellants, contended that the suit was barred by art. 95 of Act XV. of 1877. It was brought to set aside a decree and sale thereunder on the ground of fraud, more than three years after the fraud was dis covered see also s. 4 of Act XV. of 1877. The decree was valid as it stood, and must be set aside before the plaintiff could recover. It was made against the recorded owner, for the benamidar had in this case been registered as the tenant in the zemindars books and in the Collectors books. Reference was made to the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII. of 1877. The decree was valid as it stood, and must be set aside before the plaintiff could recover. It was made against the recorded owner, for the benamidar had in this case been registered as the tenant in the zemindars books and in the Collectors books. Reference was made to the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII. of 1885), s. 12, sub-s. 2, s. 170, and s. 188; to Beni Madhub Roy v. Jaod Ali Sircar (( 1890) I. L. R. 17 Calc. 390.) ; and to s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was contended that under these circumstances he alone could be recognized as tenant liable for arrears of rent. The decree and sale operated to divest the plaintiff of whatever interest he had in the tenure. It must be presumed that the necessary proceedings under s. 12 of the Bengal Tenancy Act were taken, and that the landlords had notice of the transfer to Sarat Chandra. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff was estopped from denying that a decree against his benamidar and consequent sale of the tenure operated upon the title. The respondent did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. This is an appeal by the defendants from a decision of the High Court of Bengal, affirming the decision of the District Judge passed on remand, which had affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiffs claim was to recover possession of certain land from the defendants, together with mesne profits. The facts were complicated, and several difficult questions of fact and law arose for decision, but the only question raised before their Lordships on this appeal is whether art. 95 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, is a bar to the plaintiffs claim. The land in question is known as Mehal Arjunbani, and is a putni tenure which was once held by a lady named Damayanti Debi; she died leaving six daughters, of whom five, acting as executors of their mothers will, of which they had obtained probate, granted a darputni, or underlease, to one Jogendra Nath Singh on May 25, 1885. On February 8, 1891, the five daughters (the sixth was then dead) sold their putni or superior rights to Raghu Nath Panja, under whom the defendants (the appellants) claim. On February 8, 1891, the five daughters (the sixth was then dead) sold their putni or superior rights to Raghu Nath Panja, under whom the defendants (the appellants) claim. Meanwhile, viz., on November 24, 1886, the original plaintiff, Dhan Krishna Mandal, had bought from Jogendra Nath Singh his darputni right benami, that is to say, in the name of, his son-in-law, Sarat Chandra Mandal, whose name accordingly was entered in the Collectors book as the darputni holder. Though much contested at the trial, it is now formally admitted that in this transaction Sarat Chandra Mandal was merely a prete-nom for the plaintiff, Dhan Krishna Mandal, who was the real purchaser and beneficial owner of the interest purchased. Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 138 ( 1906- 1907) Annada Pershasd Panjar V. Prasannamoyi Dasi 50 In these circumstances Raghu Nath Panja, being the owner of the putni or superior rights, entered into a fraudulent arrangement with Sarat Chandra Mandal, the nominal holder of the darputni or sub-lessee rights, whereby a collusive judgment was obtained as for rent in arrear, and a sale of the darputni interest of which Sarat Chandra Mandal was the nominal holder was ordered and Raghu Nath Panja allowed to become the purchaser. This sale took place on June 20, 1891. Dhan Krishna Mandal commenced this suit on October 25, 1895. It is admitted that he had become aware of the fraud which had been practised upon him, on or before July 29, 1892, and, therefore, more than three years had elapsed between his discovery of the fraud and the commencement of the suit. By art. 95 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, the period of limitation for a suit to set aside a decree obtained by fraud, or for other relief on the ground of fraud, is three years from the time when the fraud became known to the party wronged. The Courts below have held that the article is not a bar to the action, and the only question on this appeal is whether they are right. Their Lordships concur in the result arrived at by the Court below. The Courts below have held that the article is not a bar to the action, and the only question on this appeal is whether they are right. Their Lordships concur in the result arrived at by the Court below. On the facts, as now admitted, Dhan Krishna Mandal was the true owner of the interest in the land which was sold by Jogendra Nath Singh, and nothing that happened between Sarat Chandra Mandal and Raghu Nath Panja could affect his title unless he was estopped from denying the authority of his benamidar to deal with it. On the facts of the case no such estoppel could exist, and, therefore, Raghu Nath Panja could not acquire from Sarat Chandra Mandal more than the latter had to give. Nor has it been proved before their Lordships, any more than it was proved to the satisfaction of the Court below, that the Court purported to direct a sale of anything more than such interest as Sarat Chandra Mandal had in the premises. The onus on this point was on the defendants, who, to make good their defence on the statute, must shew that the plaintiff cannot succeed without setting aside the decree. As pointed out by the officiating District Judge, the sale certificate was in the hands of the defendants, and was not produced. The plaintiffs title, therefore, for anything that appears to the contrary, was in no way affected by the sale under order of the Court, and it is not necessary for him to have the sale set aside. He is entitled to possession of the land from which the defendants have ousted him, but to which they can shew no title, together with mesne profits, from the date of his dispossession, which is all that this suit was brought to procure. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The respondent not having appeared, there will be no order as to costs.