Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (December 1G, 1904), reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh (May 30, 1904). The property in dispute was Shamspur. Surajpal, its owner, died intestate and childless on February 21, 1892, and under Act I. of 1869, s. 23, was succeeded by his widow, Thakurain Raghubans Koer. On her death on November 11, 1901, the succession opened to the next heir of Surajpal, who, according to the family pedigree, was his brother, the respondent. The Revenue Court, by order dated March 19, 1902, directed his name to be entered on the registers as proprietor, and placed him in possession. In consequence, Balbhaddar Singh, the predecessor of the appellants, sued to eject him from a one-fourth share thereof. The plaint alleged that the respondent had been validly adopted as the son of Lal Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh, in consequence of which he ceased to be a son of Ajmir Singh and brother of Surajpal, and that, according to the family pedigree, the plaintiff, the respondent, Lal Chanderpal Singh and Huninat Singh were each entitled to a one-fourth share in the estate. The last-named two persons were added as defendants. The respondent denied both the factum and validity of the alleged adoption. It was alleged to have taken place in 1853, and to have been made by Thakurain Baijnath Koer, the widow of Lal Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh. It was not disputed that the natural parents of the respondent died in his infancy, and that he was brought up and supported by Thakurain Baijnath Koer. She died on December 18, 1879. Claims to succeed her in respect of her husbands estate were made in the Revenue Courts by Chatrpal Singh, who asserted that he was her adopted son; by the respondent, who asserted that "the Thakurain brought up and adopted the applicant from his infancy, and she herself performed all the ceremonies, such as marriage, &c, of the applicant. She having constituted the applicant her heir and successor, installed him on the gaddi in 1272 F " ; and a third claim was made by Chanderpal Singh. On June 23, 1880, an order was made directing the entry of the respondents name in the revenue register as owner of the Bargaon estate in succession to Thakurain Baijnath Koer. She having constituted the applicant her heir and successor, installed him on the gaddi in 1272 F " ; and a third claim was made by Chanderpal Singh. On June 23, 1880, an order was made directing the entry of the respondents name in the revenue register as owner of the Bargaon estate in succession to Thakurain Baijnath Koer. Thereupon Chatrpal Singh in 1891 sued to recover the said estate ; and in defence the respondent denied Chatrpal Singhs adoption, and set up an adoption of himself. Both plaintiff and defendant, being unable to prove any permission to adopt on the part of Thakurain Baijnath Koers husband, agreed on the pleadings that by custom such permission was not requisite. The suit was dis missed, both the Courts in Oudh finding that Chatrpal Singh had not been adopted, and that the respondent had been adopted by Thakurain Baijnath Koer. On appeal to His Majesty in Council the decision was that Chatrpal Singhs adoption had not been proved, but no opinion was expressed in regard to the adoption of the respondent. No oral evidence was produced by the plaintiff in the present case. The only evidence of a custom validating an adoption by a widow without her deceased husbands permission was the admission or agreement above referred to. The Subordinate Judge decided that the respondent had been in fact adopted, and that his adoption was valid in law. He also held that the respondent was estopped by his conduct from denying the said adoption; and that the question adoption or no adoption was res judicata, inasmuch as the British Indian Association of Oudh, who sat as arbitrators to decide/claims for maintenance made against taluqdars, had on December 16, 1867, dismissed a claim made on behalf of the respondent against Surajpal Singh, on the ground that Thakurain Baijnath Koer had adopted him. A decree was made for a one-fourth share of Shamspur. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner decided that Thakurain Baijnath Koer had not in other than a popular sense adopted the respondent; that the adoption, if made in fact, was invalid in law ; that the respondent was not estopped from denying the said adoption; and that the said finding of the British Indian Association did not operate as res judicata. Ross, for the appellants, contended that the issue as to the adoption of the respondent by Baijnath Kunwar as son to her deceased husband was res judicata within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It had been disposed of by the British Indian Association of Oudh. That was a body of Oudh taluqdars which decided claims to maintenance, and it had on December 16, 1867, refused a claim to maintenance brought by the respondent against his brother Surajpal on the ground that he had been adopted and thereby removed from the family of Surajpal to that of his adoptive father. The award to that effect was confirmed by the Financial Commissioner. Reference was made to the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, s. 33, as to the effect of this award. Also to ss. 13, 40, 41, 42, and 43 of the Indian Evidence Act and Collector of Gorakhpur v. Palakdhari Singh. (( 1889) I. L. R. 12 Allah. 1.) [Sir A. Wilson. It must be shewn that the British Indian Association had jurisdiction to decide the present issue before you can rely on s. 13.] Reference was made to Bhaiya Ardawan Singh v. Raja Udey Partab Singh (( 1896) L. R. 23 Ind. Ap. 64, 69.) and Muhammad Imam Ali Khan v. Sardar Husain Khan. (( 1898) L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 161, 168, 169.) Further, the respondent was estopped from denying both the fact and the validity of his adoption by Baijnath. In 1879 he claimed, by virtue of his adoption, to succeed at her death to the estate of her deceased husband. He made good this claim against Par tab, who would otherwise have succeeded as the right heir. He is consequently estopped as against Partab and against the plaintiff, who in this suit claimed through him. His general conduct and admissions in various documents in evidence, which he failed to explain in a contrary sense, was consistent with this claim. He in fact repeatedly set up the adoption now sought to be established against him. Even if he were not estopped it was submitted that the onus originally on the appellant to establish the adoption in this suit was thereby shifted to the respondent, who had not disproved either the factum or the validity of his adoption see Chandra Kunwar v. Narpat Singh. (Ante, pp. Even if he were not estopped it was submitted that the onus originally on the appellant to establish the adoption in this suit was thereby shifted to the respondent, who had not disproved either the factum or the validity of his adoption see Chandra Kunwar v. Narpat Singh. (Ante, pp. 27, 35.) It was contended, further, that the evidence proved the factum of the adoption by Baijnath, and under the circumstances, and owing to the lapse of time, it must be presumed that the necessary permission or authority no longer capable of proof in that respect had been given to her by her deceased husband see Mynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 204. De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that his adoption had not been proved. Even if it were shewn that Baijnath had taken him in adoption, that was of no effect without proof of her authority to do so as son to her deceased husband. Of the grant of such authority there was no evidence, and it could not be presumed. The circumstances did not authorize a presumption to that effect and did not create an estoppel. Partab did not contest the respondents claim in 1879 ; he neither claimed himself as true heir to the last owner nor did he object to the respondents claim. The respondents assertions and admissions on some occasions of his alleged adoption were not sufficient to estop him, and, moreover, were counterbalanced by denials upon other occasions. His adoption was alleged or denied by him as suited the occasion. Then, as to res judicata, the award of the association was not the decision of a Court within the meaning of s. 18. It had no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption in a way which was binding on the parties. It had to deal authoritatively with the claim to maintenance, and if incidentally it had to form an opinion as to the adoption, that opinion had not the force of a binding decision, and could not operate as res judicata. Reference was made to Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 196, 202.); Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1882) L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 197.) ; Chitpal Singh v. Bhairon Bakhsh Singh (( 1905) I. L. R. 28 Allah. 219.) ; Sykes Taluqdari Law, pp. 151, 153 ; Raj Bahadoor Singh v. Achumbit Lal. Ap. 196, 202.); Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh (( 1882) L. R. 9 Ind. Ap. 197.) ; Chitpal Singh v. Bhairon Bakhsh Singh (( 1905) I. L. R. 28 Allah. 219.) ; Sykes Taluqdari Law, pp. 151, 153 ; Raj Bahadoor Singh v. Achumbit Lal. (( 1879) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 110.) Ross replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. The appellants, who are the successors in title of the original plaintiff, appeal from a decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh in favour of the defendant Lal Raghuraj Singh, the present respondent, overruling a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh in favour of the plaintiff. The matter in dispute is the right of succession to the Taluqa of Shamspur, and the question for decision is whether or not the respondent was validly adopted as the son of Lal Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh by the widow of the latter, Thakurain Baijnath Kunwar. The suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Partabgarh by Balbhaddar Singh, the predecessor in title of the present appellants. The taluqa in question was granted by sanad to one Lal Surajpal Singh, brother of the respondent, in 1872. Lal Surajpal Singh died childless and intestate on February 21, 1892, and was succeeded by his widow, Thakurain Raghubans Kunwar, who took the estate of a Hindu widow. She died .on November 11, 1901. On March 19, 1902, the Assistant Commissioner of Partabgarh caused the name of the respondent to be entered as holder, and he obtained and holds possession. The original plaintiff thereupon claimed as one of four persons entitled to succeed on the death of the widow to a fourth share, and sought to oust the respondent by proving that he had been adopted into another family and thus lost the right which would otherwise have been his of succeeding to the property as heir to his natural brother, Lal Surajpal Singh. Hence the importance of the question whether the respondent had been validly adopted r out of his own family. Hence the importance of the question whether the respondent had been validly adopted r out of his own family. There was considerable evidence of con duct on the part of the respondent holding out and asserting, when it suited his purpose to do so, that he had been adopted as the son of Lal Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh, and three issues were formulated and considered by both Courts on this part of the case— 1. 1. Was it res adjudicata? 2. 2. Was the respondent estopped as against the plaintiff from denying it ? 3. 3. Supposing the plaintiff failed on both these issues, had he proved a valid adoption in fact ? The Subordinate Judge found all these issues in favour of the plaintiff. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner arrived at the opposite conclusion. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider each of these questions. First, as to res adjudicata. The contention of the plaintiff on this point is based upon the award of the Committee of Taluqdars in 1867, affirmed by the Financial Commissioner in 1869. This award was made on a claim for maintenance or for a 4 annas share in the taluqa brought forward by the present respondent against Surajpal Singh. This claim was dismissed on the ground that the applicant (the respondent) had been adopted by Thakurain Baijnath Kunwar and had consequently ceased " to have any interest in the heritage of his natural father." The argument for the appellants on this part of the case was based on s. 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV. of 1882), which provides that " no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title in a Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. He is bound, therefore, to shew that the Committee of Taluqdars formed such a Court, and he relies on s. 33 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, as justifying this contention. He is bound, therefore, to shew that the Committee of Taluqdars formed such a Court, and he relies on s. 33 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, as justifying this contention. That section runs thus " And whereas bodies of taluqdars have in several cases made awards respecting the provision to be made for certain relatives of taluqdars, and it is expedient to render such awards legally enforceable it is hereby further enacted that every such award shall, if approved by the Financial Commissioner of Oudh and filed in his Court within six months after the passing of this Act, be enforceable as if a Court of competent jurisdiction had passed judgment according to the award and a decree had followed upon such judgment." (See Syk es, p. 282.) It seems quite clear, therefore, that the Committee of Taluqdars was not in any sense a Court, much less a Court with such jurisdiction as is described in s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code above cited as essential to found an estoppel, and, for the reasons given in the judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioner, their Lordships are of opinion that the committee had no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, and the affirmation by the Financial Commissioner of their refusal to award maintenance could not give judicial validity to their decision on a point outside their jurisdiction. Their Lordships therefore concur with the view taken by the Court below on this issue. Next, as to the question of estoppel. That which is set up is said to arise from the fact that on the death of Thakurain Baijnath Kunwar in 1879 the respondent set up title to succeed her as the adopted son of her husband Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh, and on this footing secured the succession to which Partab Singh, as the nearest heir, would have been entitled but for the respondents intervention ; that the respondent was thus estopped as against Partab from denying the adoption; and that the appellants are now claiming under Partab. But there is no evidence that Partab in any way opposed the respondents claim; on the contrary, he was living with, and apparently co-operating with, the respondent at the time, and consequently the essential elements of an estoppel between these persons are lacking, and even if the appellants were claiming through Partab, they cannot establish an estoppel. But there is no evidence that Partab in any way opposed the respondents claim; on the contrary, he was living with, and apparently co-operating with, the respondent at the time, and consequently the essential elements of an estoppel between these persons are lacking, and even if the appellants were claiming through Partab, they cannot establish an estoppel. Their Lordships therefore agree with the Court below on this point also. The remaining question is whether the appellants have established the fact that the respondent was effectually adopted as the son of Lal Bisheshar Bakhsh Singh. To establish this they must prove that, if the adoption was ever formally made at all by Thakurain Baijnath Kunwar, as he alleges, it was made by the direction of her husband, and further that the respondents father had given him in adoption. Having regard to the length of time which has elapsed since these conditions could have been fulfilled, if they ever were fulfilled, the appellants admit that they cannot prove them, but contend that they ought to be presumed. But to justify such a presumption they ought to establish an initial probability that the adoption was likely to have been validly made, and that the conduct of the parties cognizant of the facts has been at least consistent with such an hypothesis. It would not be right to repeat here the reasoning by which the Court below have come to the conclusion that, putting aside the statements made by the respondent himself when it suited his purpose, the position of the Thakurain and the necessary consequences to her of the adoption rendered it unlikely that she should have made it; and that her conduct on crucial occasions was more consistent with the hypothesis that she did not regard him as having been validly adopted than that she did. It is quite clear that no weight can be given to any statements of the respondent, if they fall short of founding an estoppel, as he has asserted or denied the adoption just as it suited his purpose throughout the whole of the protracted litigation between the members of the family. It has been already pointed out that they do not suffice to found an estoppel, and, taking into consideration the rest of the evidence, their Lordships fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusion of the Court below. It has been already pointed out that they do not suffice to found an estoppel, and, taking into consideration the rest of the evidence, their Lordships fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusion of the Court below. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the appeal.