JUDGMENT 1. The present Plaintiff-Respondent brought this suit in the Court of the Munsif of Chuadanga as reversionary heir to the estate of the father of Defendant No. 1, Makhanmoyi Debi. He alleged that a half share of a certain lakhiraj estate, which originally belonged to the father of Defendant No. 1, had come into her possession and that the other half of the estate was in his own possession. It appears that two separate accounts for these two separate shares had been opened in the Collectorate for payment of the Government revenue and that in consequence of default on the part of both the co-sharers the two eight-annas shares were sold at a sale for arrear of Government revenue. The share of Defendant No. 1 was purchased by Defendant No. 2 and for the purposes of this case we are only concerned with the share of Defendant No. 1. 2. The Plaintiff brought this suit to have it declared, first, that the purchase made by the Defendant No. 2, was made benami for Defendant No. 1 and that therefore Defendant No. 1 was still in possession of the half share of the property. There was also an alternative prayer that if the Court held that the purchase by Defendant No. 2 was not made benami for Defendant No. 1, but was made on behalf of Defendant No. 2 himself with his own money, then a declaration be made that what had passed under the sale was the life interest of Defendant No. 1 only and not the whole interest of the owner of the half share of the estate. There was a third alternative prayer that if it be found that the full rights of the owner passed at the sale to Defendant No. 2, then an injunction be granted against Defendant No. 1 prohibiting her from wasting or squandering purchase money. 3. The Defendants denied that Plaintiff was the reversionary heir of the father of Defendant No. 1, they denied that Defendant No. 2 had purchased the property benami for Defendant No. 1, and they also contended that what had passed at the auction-sale was the entire interest of the owner of the estate and not the life interest of Defendant No. 1. 4. The Court of first instance dismissed the entire suit of the Plaintiff. 4. The Court of first instance dismissed the entire suit of the Plaintiff. The Munsif held that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that he was the reversionary heir of the father of Defendant No. 1; that the purchase by Defendant No. 2 was for his own benefit and not benami for Defendant No. 1; and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to any injunction against Defendant No. 1. 5. On appeal to the District Judge, the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance were set aside, and a decree was given in favour of the Plaintiff declaring that all that passed under the sale to Defendant No. 2 was the life interest of Defendant No. 1. The District Judge also found that the Plaintiff had proved that he was the reversionary heir of the father of Defendant No. 1. 6. Against that judgment and decree Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 have appealed to this Court. There is no appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff against the judgment of the lower Court deciding that he had no right to an injunction against Defendant No. 1. 7. For the purposes of this appeal one question only requires consideration and that is whether the Judge was right in the conclusions at which he arrived that what passed under the sale was the life interest only of Defendant No. 1 and not the entire interest of the owner. The question whether the purchase by Defendant No. 2 was benami or not, cannot be reopened in this appeal, as both the lower Courts, on the evidence, have found as a fact that Defendant No. 2 purchased on his own behalf and not as benami for Defendant No. 1. 8. In support of the judgment of the District Judge the learned vakil for the Respondent relies on the provisions of sec. 54 of Act XI of 1859, and he contends that as at the sale only, a share of the estate was sold, the purchaser acquired the share subject to all incumbrances and did not acquire any rights which were not possessed by the previous owner or owners. He contends that as the widow, Defendant No. 1, had only a life interest in the share, therefore all that passed under the sale was her life interest. He contends that as the widow, Defendant No. 1, had only a life interest in the share, therefore all that passed under the sale was her life interest. This contention is certainly a novel one and is in our opinion one which cannot be accepted as sound. The estate which a widow has by inheritance is clearly explained in the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Moniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitani I. L. R. 5 Cal. 776 (1880) in the following passage in the judgment;-" According to the Hindu Law, a widow who succeeds to the estate of her husband in default of male issue, whether she succeeds by inheritance or survivorship, as to which see the Shivagunga case 9 M. I. A. 604 (1863), does not take a mere life-estate in the property. The whole estate is for the time vested in her absolutely for some purposes, though in some respects for only a qualified estate." 9. There can be no doubt that during her lifetime the widow has an absolute right to the property to this extent, namely, that she can alienate a portion of it for legal necessity and this would include an alienation for the purpose of paying the Government revenue. It is in our opinion impossible to hold, that so far as the provisions of sec. 54 of Act XI of 1859 are concerned, her rights are less than the rights of a complete owner. It cannot, in our opinion, be argued or even suggested that the reversionary interest is an in cumbrance on her estate, for until her death it cannot be ascertained who in fact are the persons entitled to that interest. We, therefore, think that the view which the learned Judge has taken that all that passed under the sale to Defendant No. 2, was the life interest of Defendant No. 1 is wrong in law. Accordingly we set aside that finding, and as both the Courts have found that the purchase by Defendant No. 2 was made bond fide for his own benefit, we hold that the entire rights of the owner in the share sold, passed to Defendant No. 2. 10. We may observe that the same view was taken though for different reasons by this Court in the case Debt Das v. Bipro Charan ILR 22 cal. 641 (1895). 11. 10. We may observe that the same view was taken though for different reasons by this Court in the case Debt Das v. Bipro Charan ILR 22 cal. 641 (1895). 11. We therefore set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge in so far as it affects Defendants Nos. 2 and S, Appellants, in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly decreed in favour of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and the Plaintiff's suit against them is dismissed with costs in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court.