JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal is against an order passed on an application made apparently under the provisions of sec. 103 of the CPC for the readmission of a Reference in the Court of the Land Acquisition Judge of the 24-Purgunnahs which had been dismissed on the 26th February 1906, for default. The Judge rejected the application. A preliminary objection to the appeal has been taken on the ground that the provisions of sec. 103 of the CPC do not apply to a case like the present which was a Reference made under the provisions of sec. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is suggested that in a case of this description there can be no persons who are in the position of Plaintiffs and Defendants in a suit. We do not think, however, that the contention is sound. In this case the Petitioner disputed the correctness of the order of apportionment of the compensation passed by the Collector and claimed to be entitled to a portion of the money apportioned and the case was referred for trial to the Civil Court. In such a case the Petitioners as claimants must necessarily be regarded as occupying the position of Plaintiffs and the other party who appeared to support the order of the Collector must be taken as occupying the position of Defendants in the Judge's Court. Under these circumstances, we think that the secs. 53 and 54 of the Land Acquisition Act would make the provisions of the CPC applicable to the case, and we can see nothing in the provisions of sec. 103 of the CPC that can be regarded as in any way inconsistent with the provisions of the sections of the Land Acquisition Act. In somewhat analogous references this view was adopted by this Court in the case of Ezra, v. The Secretary of State 7 C. W. N. 249: s. c. I. L. R. 30 Cal. 36 (1902), and by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kishan Chand v. Jagdnnath Prasad and Ganesh Prasad I. L. R. 25 All. 138 (1902). We think therefore that in this case the provisions of the CPC apply and that the preliminary objection fails. 2. 36 (1902), and by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kishan Chand v. Jagdnnath Prasad and Ganesh Prasad I. L. R. 25 All. 138 (1902). We think therefore that in this case the provisions of the CPC apply and that the preliminary objection fails. 2. The case which the claimants put forward in support of their application was that they had instructed a pleader Babu Mon Mohon Banerjee to appear for them in the case before the Judge, but that shortly before the date fixed for the hearing, the pleader went to Cawnpur on account of his wife's serious illness and made over the case to another pleader Babu Girish Chandra Ghose. The latter left for Bagerhat on Saturday the 24th of February 1906 on special business but on his return journey he was detained owing to the steamer, by which he was travelling, running aground and so he failed to attend the Court on Monday the 26th, the date fixed for hearing. The Judge appears to have accepted this as a sufficient explanation for the failure on the part of the pleader to attend Court in time, but he says that so far as the claimants were concerned they were absent though they ought to have been present and they had no witnesses present in Court. He therefore considered that they had not made out sufficient cause for the readmission of the case. 3. It seems that on the date fixed for the hearing of this Reference three other cases were above it on the cause list of the Court, and these would in the ordinary course of business be taken up for hearing before it. Relying on this fact, the Petitioners seem to have been led to believe that their case would not come on for hearing at any early hour on the 26th February. No doubt it may be. as the Judge remarks, that they were not justified in concluding that these three cases would occupy the Court for a considerable time, and in fact they were short cases and were disposed of before 12 o'clock. At any rate the Petitioners seem to have been misled. 4. No doubt it may be. as the Judge remarks, that they were not justified in concluding that these three cases would occupy the Court for a considerable time, and in fact they were short cases and were disposed of before 12 o'clock. At any rate the Petitioners seem to have been misled. 4. There are, therefore, in favour of the Petitioner, first, the fact that the pleader originally engaged could not attend on account of his wife's illness, secondly, the fact that the pleader who agreed to take up the case as his substitute was unavoidably prevented from attending the Court; and, thirdly, that the fact that as three other cases were on the board for hearing before this case the Petitioners did not anticipate that their case would be taken up till a late hour in the day. We think that these facts when combined make out a case of sufficient cause for the readmission of the Petitioner's case but only subject to conditions. 5. For the Respondents it has been argued that as the Petitioners faded to secure the attendance of their witnesses as ordered by the Court they were not entitled to any indulgences. On referring to the order-sheet, however, we find that summonses to the witnesses were issued on the 15th of September 1905 and that the case was not taken up after that date till the 15th February 1906. Apparently, during that long interval, the Court was occupied with other business. On the 15th February, a petition was put in by the Petitioners praying for an adjournment of 15 days, and the 26th February was fixed as the date for hearing. Even supposing that some of the witnesses attended on the summons issued on the 15th September it might not have been easy for the Petitioners to secure their attendance on the 26th February without further assistance. We are unable to conclude from this circumstance that the Petitioners failed to prosecute the case with due diligence. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order rejecting the application and direct that the case of the Petitioners be restored to the file for the re-hearing, on the condition that the Petitioners do pay beforehand to the opposite party the costs of the hearing of the case on the 26th February, the subsequent costs of this application to the Land Acquisition Judge and the cost of this appeal. We direct that this order with a statement of costs incurred in this Court be sent down to the lower Court with as little delay as possible in order that an account of the amount due as costs from the Petitioners to the opposite party may be prepared without delay. 6. We fix the hearing fee at two gold mohurs. Should the Petitioners fail to pay the costs of the opposite party as directed in this judgment, this appeal will stand dismissed with costs.