JUDGMENT Brett, J. - The facts of the present case have been set out at length in the judgment of my learned colleague, which I have read, and it is not necessary for me to burden my judgment with a repetition of them The main question which has come before us for determination in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff No. 1 and after his death his heirs and representatives as heirs of Musst. Bashiran, their grandmother, and Plaintiff No. 2 as assignee of the original Plaintiff No. 1 are entitled to sue separately to recover the share to which they claim to be entitled under the Mahomedan law of that share in the deferred dowers of Musst. Zainab which on her death devolved on Musst Bashiran, her grandmother. The suit is brought against Defendant No. 1, the husband of Musst. Zainab, and all the other persons who as heirs of Musst. Zainab are entitled to share in the dower have been brought on the record as pro forma Defendants. One of them however, Musst Mahmudan, was not brought on the record till the 1st June 1904, Musst. Zainab died on the 8th September 1900, and Musst Bashiran died on the 5th January 1901. The case of Defendant No. 1, the husband, was that the Plaintiff could not bring the suit without making all the persons who were entitled to any share of the deferred dower parties, that the suit so far as Musst. Mahmudan was concerned was barred by Art, 104, Sch. II of the Limitation Act at the time when she was brought on the record as more than 3 years had then elapsed from the death of Musst. Zainab, and therefore that the whole suit was barred under the provision of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. 2. The Court of first instance held that the omission to make Musst. Mahmudan a party within the period of limitation was not fatal to the case as the claim was not against her but against Defendant No. 1 only, that no relief was sought against her and that she and the Defendants other than the Defendant No. 1 were pro forma Defendants only. 3. Finding this point and the others raised in the issues in favour of the Plaintiff the Subordinate Judge gave the Plaintiff a decree for the full relief claimed. 4. 3. Finding this point and the others raised in the issues in favour of the Plaintiff the Subordinate Judge gave the Plaintiff a decree for the full relief claimed. 4. On appeal the District Judge has come to a different conclusion on the point noted above and has reversed the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge and has dismissed the Plaintiffs suit. The Plaintiffs have appealed. 5. The District Judge held that there was only one cause of action against Defendant No. 1 for the dower due by him to his deceased wife, Musst. Zainab, and that the claim being founded on a single cause of action all the heirs are necessary parties to a suit for the enforcement of the claim. In support of this view he relied on the cases of Ahinsa v. Abdul ILR 25 Mad. 26 at p. 35(1901) and Kandhiya v. Chunder ILR 7 All. 313 (1884) as also on the cases of Ram Sebuk v. Rom Lall Koondoo ILR 6 Cal. 815(1881), Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo ILR 14 Cal. 791(1887), Durga Charan Sarkar v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore ILR 27 Cal. 493 (1899). 6. Though he confirmed the findings of the Subordinate Judge on the other points in issue between the parties he decreed the appeal because he thought that the suit ought to have been dismissed because Musst. Mahmudan was not made a party in time. 7. The arguments in support of this appeal have been confined to attacking this finding of the District Judge and after consideration of the facts and the arguments advanced on both sides, I am of opinion that the view taken by the District Judge is not correct. 8. In the first place I am unable to agree with the District Judge in holding that the claim is founded on a single cause of action and therefore I hold that the cases on which he relies cannot be taken as authorities for determining the present case No doubt if the cause of action were one and indivisible the remarks of the Judges of the Madras High Court in Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader Saheb ILR 25 Mad. 26 at p. 35 (1901) would apply and the cause of action could not be divided against the Defendant the obligee, without his privity. 26 at p. 35 (1901) would apply and the cause of action could not be divided against the Defendant the obligee, without his privity. But in this case he is himself one of the persons entitled with the Plaintiffs and the other Defendants to a share in the dower as one of the heirs of his deceased wife and so far as he is concerned he could hardly join in a joint cause of action with the others against himself. Clearly in a case like the present the cause of action must be divisible. 9. The agreement to pay dower is certainly not one which in the present case gave a cause of action to the wife which cause of action passed to her heirs. 10. Until her death no cause of action arose and her death, followed apparently by the refusal of her husband to pay the deferred dower, gave rise to a cause of action, not to her but to her heirs. The observation of Tindal, C.J., in Decharms v. Horwood 10 Bingh. 526 at p. 529 (1834), quoted by the learned Judge of the Madras Court in the judgment referred to above, do not therefore apply to the present case. This is not a case in which a right accruing to a single person from a covenant in his favour has devolved on her death on two or more of her heirs in several shares, in which case the only difference caused by the death of the covenantee is that the cause of action which resided in one person is by operation of law transferred to a number of parceners who constitute, one heir. In a case like the present where the right to the deferred dower accrues on the death of the wife the agreement must be taken to be one between the husband and the heirs of the wife to pay over to them the money which becomes due after her death. 11. The interests which the heirs have in the dower are not joint but different, and each on the basis of the facts which constitute him an heir has a distinct title on which cause of action is based. 11. The interests which the heirs have in the dower are not joint but different, and each on the basis of the facts which constitute him an heir has a distinct title on which cause of action is based. The title of all is not common, and in fact a case might arise in which the title of one as heir might be disputed by one or more of the other persons claiming to be heirs. 12. For the above reasons I have no hesitation in holding that the Plaintiffs are entitled to bring a separate suit to recover from Defendant No. 1, the share in the deferred dower of Musst. Zainab to which they claim to be entitled through Musst. Bashiran. The next question which has been raised is whether all the other persons who claim to be entitled as heirs to shares in the dower of Musst Zainab are necessary parties to the suit together with the husband, against whom alone relief is claimed, and if they are necessary parties whether the 4th clause of sec. 32 of the CPC applies so as to make the addition of them as parties on the record, subject to the provisions of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. 13. The District Judge has held that all these persons are necessary parties to the suit and that view appears to me to be correct Each and all of these persons claiming to be entitled to shares in the dower are in my opinion necessary parties to the suit because each and all are interested in the result of the trial and in seeing that the Plaintiffs do not obtain a decree for a larger share than they are entitled to, and, it may be in disputing the claim of the Plaintiffs to any shares at all in the dower. They are therefore persons whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 14. Musst. Mahmudan was therefore a necessary party to the suit It seems that the Plaintiffs omitted to add her as a party when the suit was brought because she was hostile to their claim. 14. Musst. Mahmudan was therefore a necessary party to the suit It seems that the Plaintiffs omitted to add her as a party when the suit was brought because she was hostile to their claim. She was brought on the record afterwards on the death of Faizul Huq, Plaintiff No. 1, and as she refused to join as a co-Plaintiff she was made a pro forma Defendant. She then filed a written statement supporting the defence of Defendant No. 1. After she had been brought on the record, it was for the purposes of the suit immaterial in what capacity she had been added as a pro forma Defendant. 15. The fact however that she was brought on the record in the manner stated above as representative of Faizul Huq would not be sufficient to save limitation if it were held that for the purposes of this suit it was necessary that she should have been brought on the record as a party in her personal capacity within 3 years from the date of the death of Musst. Zainab. 16. In the present case no relief was sought against her by the Plaintiffs which relief would have been barred by the omission to make her a party to the suit in time. 17. The question however arises whether if she was a necessary party in order to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate on the suit, the provisions of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act would bar the suit because she was not made a party within 3 years of the death of Musst. Zainab. I think not and for the following reason. 18. Limitation merely bars the remedy by suit, and the only parties in a suit between whom question of limitation can possibly arise, are those who seek relief and those against whom relief is sought. This indeed seems to be the view taken by the Judges in the case of Durga Charan Sarkar v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore ILR 27 Cal. 493 (1899) for they held in that case that the persons should have been added as parties as they were persons who had an interest in the suit and they were persons against whom a right to relief existed in the Plaintiff if the suit were well-founded. 19. Musst. 493 (1899) for they held in that case that the persons should have been added as parties as they were persons who had an interest in the suit and they were persons against whom a right to relief existed in the Plaintiff if the suit were well-founded. 19. Musst. Mahmudan was brought on the record as a pro forma Defendant in ample time to enable the Court to determine the matters in issue before it and it was therefore immaterial whether she was or was not brought on the record within the time fixed by the law within which the Plaintiffs were bound to bring their suit against Defendant No. 1 to secure the relief which they sought against him. 20. The suit therefore was not in my opinion bad for any defect of party. It was correctly framed and all the necessary parties were before the Court in time to enable the Court to adjudicate on the matters before it. It was not barred by limitation as held by the Judge of the lower Appellate Court because Musst Mahmudan was not made a party within 3 years from the death of Musst. Zainab. 21. For the above reasons the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance restored. 22. The appeal is decreed with costs. Mookerjee, J. 23. The circumstances which gave rise to the litigation out of which the present appeal arises, were not disputed before this Court and may be briefly outlined. One Musst. Zainab, the wife of the first Defendant Sheikh Akramul Huq, died on the 8th September 1900. At the time of her marriage the Defendant had agreed to pay a deferred dower of Rs. 41,025. Upon her death she left her husband, two sons, two daughters, a maternal grandmother, Bashiran, two step brothers and a stepsister. Her grandmother died subsequently on the 5th January 1901. On the 4th September 1903, her step-brother, Faizul Huq and a transferee from him, instituted the present action to recover a share of Zainab's dower, which had been taken by inheritance by her maternal grandmother. The Plaintiffs joined as parties Defendants all the persons, who were the heirs of Zainab at the time of her death excepting his step sister, Mahmudan, who was left out for some unexplained reason. The Plaintiffs joined as parties Defendants all the persons, who were the heirs of Zainab at the time of her death excepting his step sister, Mahmudan, who was left out for some unexplained reason. The claim was resisted on various grounds of fact and law, one of which was that the frame of the suit was defective inasmuch as Mahmudan had not been joined as a party Defendant During the pendency of the suit in the Court of first instance, the Plaintiff died, leaving as heirs her stepbrother and step-sister. Of these the former applied to be substituted on the record as Plaintiff; as the latter did not join as co-Plaintiff, she was brought on the record on the 3rd May 1904, and made a pro forma Defendant on the 1st June following It was then contended on behalf of the first Defendant that as Mahmudan had been made a party more than three years after the death of Zainab, i.e., the date when the right to sue accrued, the suit was barred by limitation, not only as against the added Defendant, but also as against the husband. The Court of first instance overruled this objection on the ground that as no relief was claimed against the added Defendant and as she disclaimed all interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, sec. 22 of the Limitation Act had no application. Upon the merits, the Subordinate Judge found in favour of the Plaintiffs and gave them a decree. Upon appeal the District Judge affirmed the conclusions of the Subordinate Judge on the questions of fact but dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not properly constituted till the expiry of the period of limitation. The Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court and on their behalf the decision of the District Judge has been challenged, on the ground, that as no relief is claimed against Mahmudan who disclaims all interest in the dower-debt and as the suit was instituted within time against the husband who is the person solely liable for payment of the dower, the claim is not barred by limitation. On the other hand, it has been argued, on behalf of the husband, that the suit has not been properly framed, that the right of the heirs to recover the dower-debt is a joint right that even though it be open to one of several heirs to bring a suit for recovery of the debt, the claim must include the whole of the dower-debt, and that assuming that the Plaintiff may sue in respect of his share only, the suit is barred by limitation under sec. 22 of the Limitation Act, inasmuch as it was not properly constituted till the expiry of the period of limitation. In order to determine which of these contentions ought to prevail it is necessary to examine the nature of the right which the Plaintiff seeks to enforce, and the relief which they are entitled to claim, in respect thereof. 24. As has been already stated the dower in question was a deferred dower, in other words, it was payable only upon dissolution of marriage, either by divorce, or by death of one of the contracting parties. Meer Meher Ali v. Amanee 11 W.R. 212 (1869). There was no dower deed executed and consequently the terms of the contract must be assumed to have been such as are consistent with the principles of the Mahomedan law on the subject. The terms, therefore, must be assumed to have been as follows :--(a) if the marriage tie was dissolved by divorce, the husband would pay to the wife the dower due, (b) if the marriage was dissolved by the death of the husband, the heirs of the husband would pay the dower to the widow, (c) if the dissolution of the marriage was caused by the death of the wife, the husband would pay to the heirs of the wife the amount of dower he had agreed to pay. 25. The first two contingencies have not : happened but the third contingency has come to pass. We may assume, therefore, that there was an implied agreement by the husband to pay to the heirs of the deceased wife the amount of the dower-debt. He himself, however, is under the Mahomedan law one of the heirs. The position, therefore, is that, the debtor is bound to pay to the creditors, in which category he himself must be included, the amount of the dower-debt. He himself, however, is under the Mahomedan law one of the heirs. The position, therefore, is that, the debtor is bound to pay to the creditors, in which category he himself must be included, the amount of the dower-debt. Under these circumstances it has been argued on behalf of the Appellants that the right of the heirs to receive the dower-debt was not a joint right and that in reality their rights were several and distinct inasmuch as the shares in which they are entitled to receive the debt are specified by the Mahomedan law of inheritance. It has been contended on the other hand that the right is a joint and indivisible right enforceable only by alb the creditors acting jointly and further that in any view of the matter, if it be treated as enforceable at the instance of one creditor that creditor must sue to enforce the entire claim. The question raised turns upon the determination of the nature of the obligation of the husband to pay the dower-debt to the heirs of his deceased wife, who have, as is well settled, a simple money claim founded solely on the contract entered into by the husband, [Meer Meher Ali v. Amanee 11 W.R. 212(1869)]. In dealing. with this question it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between a promise by two or more persons to perform an act and a promise to two or more persons to perform an act. A promise by two or more persons to perform an act is a promise that they or some or one of them will perform it. Addison v. Gibson 10 Q.B. 106 (1847); but a promise to two or more persons to perform an act is not a promise to them or some or one of them but a promise to them all to perform it, [Rolls v. Yate Yelverton 177 (1611)]. In the former case, the entire promise may be performed by one. In the latter case the entire promise cannot be enforced by one. In the former case, the entire promise may be performed by one. In the latter case the entire promise cannot be enforced by one. In the former case, the parties to the agreement contemplate that the obligation may be discharged by one, for a man who agrees in con junction with others to pay A sum of money does not agree with A that he will only pay the sum in such conjunction and not otherwise, in other words, a joint agreement by several to perform an act may be resolved into an agreement by all or some or one of them to do it and an agreement inter se as to how the debt is to be distributed amongst themselves. The case of an agreement by one person to pay a sum to two is very different, for this does not imply an obligation to pay the sum to the separate account of any; payment to two persons and a payment to one are different and inconsistent things, and a promise to two and a promise to one are equally different and inconsistent. It is obvious, therefore, that a right may belong to two or more Individuals severally but not to two or more jointly and severally but it may belong to two or more jointly. On the other hand, an obligation may be imposed upon two or more persons severally or jointly or jointly and severally at the same time. [Slingby's case 5 Coke 18b (1588), Harriman on Contracts, p. 137]. If we remember these principles, it follows that there can be nothing more clear than that the question whether a contract is joint or several or joint and several is a question of construction, i.e., a question of the intention of the parties to the contract. The rule applicable to cases of this description was thus stated by Baron Parke, in Sorsbie v. Park 12 M. and W. 146 (1843): "The rule is that a covenant will be construed to be joint or several according to the interest of the parties appearing upon the face of the deed, if the words are capable of that construction; not that it will be construed to be several by reason of several interests, if it could be expressly joint." In other words, as stated in a work of almost conclusive authority, [Notes to Saunders' Reports by Williams, Vol. I, p. 162, notes to Eccleston v. Clipsham I Saund 153], though a covenant be joint and several in the terms of it, yet if the interest and cause of action be joint, the action must be brought by all the covenantees; on the other hand, if the interest and cause of action be several, the action may be brought by one only. As stated in Bullen and Leakes Precedents and Pleadings, 6th Edn., p. 20, whether a contract is joint or several depends primarily on the language used. It is a question of intention to be determined by considering not only the language but also the interests and relations of the parties; accordingly the contract will be construed to be joint or several so far as regards the contractees, according as the interests of the parties are joint or several, respectively, and will be deemed to be joint if the interests are joint, and several if the interests are several, Pugh v. String-field 3 C.B.N.S. 2 (1857), Thompson v. Hakewill 19 C.B.N.S. 713(1865), Palmer v. Mallet 36 Ch. Div. 411 (1887), White v. Tindall 13 App Cas. 263(1888). This is well illustrated by the cases of Withers v. Bircham 3 B. and C 254; 27 R.R. 350 (1824) and Palmer v. Sparshott 4 M. & G. 137; 61 R.R. 501 (1842). In each of these cases it was ruled that where a man covenants with two or more jointly, yet if the interest and cause of action of the covenantees be several and not joint, the covenant shall be taken to be several and each of the covenantees may bring an action for his particular damages; in other words the action follows the nature of the interest, if the interest of the covenantees is joint, the action must be brought in the name of all the covenantees, if the interest is several they may maintain separate actions [see also Williams' Saunders, Vol. II, p. 383, notes to Coryton v. Lithebye a Saund, Pt. 4, 112]. In the present case, there can be no doubt, that the interest of the heirs in the dower-debt, though joint as to the whole, is several as to the share of each. II, p. 383, notes to Coryton v. Lithebye a Saund, Pt. 4, 112]. In the present case, there can be no doubt, that the interest of the heirs in the dower-debt, though joint as to the whole, is several as to the share of each. This is established conclusively by two circumstances, vis., first, that the share of each is fixed unalterably by the law of inheritance; and, secondly, as the husband himself is the debtor as well as one of the creditors, none of the creditors could bring an action to recover the whole of the dower-debt. In such a case it is impossible to hold that the right of the creditors is joint and several, so as to entitle one to sue for the whole debt or to make it obligatory upon him to do so. In my opinion, each of the heirs is entitled to bring an action for recovery of his share of the dower-debt. This view is amply supported by an examination of the nature of a joint obligation. Thus in Domat on Civil Law [Part 1, Book 3, Tit. 3, secs. 1 and 2, Vol X, pp. 712 to 718], it is stated that, if there is solidity among two or more creditors, the result is that every one of the creditors is entitled alone and by himself to exact the whole debt and to discharge the debtor of it with respect to all the other creditors although ultimately there may be a contribution amongst the creditors themselves. Whether, however, there is such solidity or not, depends upon the intention of the parties, namely, whether it was intended that what is owing to several persons is due to every one of them in the whole, that is, whether the intention is that they will be creditors, each of them for the whole. In the absence of such intention, however, if it were only said that a debtor should owe a sum of money to two creditors without mentioning anything of the solidity, in that case, each creditor could demand no more than his own portion. To the same effect is the exposition of Pothier in his Treatise on Obligations. [Translated by Evans, Part a, Ch. 3, Art 7, Vol. To the same effect is the exposition of Pothier in his Treatise on Obligations. [Translated by Evans, Part a, Ch. 3, Art 7, Vol. I, p. 144]: "regularly when a person contracts the obligation of one and the same thing in favour of several others, each of these is only creditor for his own share, but he may contract with each of them for the whole; when such is the intention of the parties so that each of the persons in whose favour the obligation is contracted is creditor for the whole, but that a payment made to anyone liberates the debtor against them all, this is called solidity of obligation." The effects of this solidity among creditors are stated to be, first, that each creditor may demand the whole debt, secondly, acknowledgment made to any one of the creditors interrupts prescription of the whole debt, and, thirdly, payment made to any creditor extinguishes the debt. [See also Vol. II, App. XI, pages 55 to 62]. The same analysis is adopted by Savigny in his Treatise on Obligations [Translated by Jerardin and Jozon, secs. 16 to 36, Vol. I, pages 150 to 421] and by Thibaut in his System [Translated by Lindley, secs 109 and 117A and App., page LXXIV]. The substance of this analysis is that if it is the intention of the parties, to be determined either from the expression of their will or from the nature of the obligation itself, that the obligation is to be indivisible, there is a joint right which is vested in several persons and which must be enforced by them jointly. It is also pointed out that one of the most important characteristics of a joint right, strictly so called, is that upon the death of one of the persons in whom the right is vested the whole right devolves upon the survivors to the exclusion of representatives of the deceased [Pothier, Vol II, page 60, and Thibaut, p. LXXV]. If these principles are kept in mind, the inference is irresistible that each of the heirs is entitled to sue in respect of his share of the dower-debt. In reality, each has a distinct right enforceable by himself though all may jointly sue, because each obtains a share of the whole debt. If these principles are kept in mind, the inference is irresistible that each of the heirs is entitled to sue in respect of his share of the dower-debt. In reality, each has a distinct right enforceable by himself though all may jointly sue, because each obtains a share of the whole debt. The view I take is consistent with what has been recognised as the settled rule almost since the establishment of the British Courts in this country, see for instance, Ali Baksk v. Kalu Beebe Machaghten Sel. Rep 110(1804), decided by the Bengal Sudder Court so far back as 1804, where upon the death of a Mahomedan woman one of her heirs was allowed to maintain an action for the recovery of her share only of the dower-debt. 26. The question next arises whether in a suit so framed the other heirs ought to be joined as parties. In my opinion they ought to be on the record as Defendants for two reasons. In the first place, if any question arises as to the total amount of the dower-debt, it ought to be determined in the presence of all the parties who claim interest in that debt. In the second place, if there is any dispute as to the share to which the Plaintiff is entitled, the question ought to be settled in the presence of all the other heirs; as otherwise the debtor may be placed in a position of difficulty if, after he has submitted to a decree in favour of one of the heirs, it is established, as against him by another that the decree has been obtained in respect of a share to which the first Plaintiff was not entitled. It follows, consequently, that in a suit so framed the Plaintiff claims relief primarily and substantially against the husband who is liable for the dower debt and the other Defendants are brought on the record, not because any relief is claimed against them, but because the question in the determination of which they have an interest ought to be settled in their presence. In this view of the matter it is impossible to hold that the suit is barred by limitation. In this view of the matter it is impossible to hold that the suit is barred by limitation. It is true that one of the heirs was not originally made a party Defendant but the suit was instituted in time so far as the husband is concerned and it is as against him only that the Plaintiff claims relief. Sec 22 of the Limitation Act has, to my mind, no application to a case of this description. Sec. 22 provides that when after the institution of a suit a new Plaintiff or Defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. It may be taken therefore, that so far as Mahmudan is concerned, the suit as against her was not commenced until the 3rd May 1904, but the suit was instituted as against first Defendant, the husband, on the 4th September 1903, i.e., within three years from the dissolution of marriage by death, as required by Art. 104 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act. No relief is claimed as against Mahmudan, and, indeed, when joined as a party Defendant, she disavowed all interest in the dower-debt. Under these circumstances I feel no doubt that the suit as against the first Defendant is not barred by limitation. The attention of the Court was invited to several cases, which it was suggested, were inconsistent with the view. Reliance was placed very strongly upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader ILR 25 Mad. 26 at p. 35 (1901). That case, however, is clearly distinguishable, as there the original cause of action was joint and it was held that when on the death of the person in whom the original cause of action resided it had devolved upon his heirs, they constituted substantially one heir and must, therefore, join in a suit to enforce that claim. It cannot be suggested that in the present case, the wife had any cause of action which upon her death devolved upon her heirs. No doubt the contract for payment of the dower-debt was made with her, but under the contract as the dower was deferred, she could not take anything. It cannot be suggested that in the present case, the wife had any cause of action which upon her death devolved upon her heirs. No doubt the contract for payment of the dower-debt was made with her, but under the contract as the dower was deferred, she could not take anything. It was only upon her death that a cause of action would, for the first time, come into existence in her heirs, who would then become entitled to recover from the husband their share of the dower-debt. Reference was also made to the cases of Ram Sebuk v. Ram Lal Koondoo ILR 6 Cal. 815 (1881) and Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo ILR 14 Cal. 791 (1887) which were cases of partnership accounts, and the parties, who were added, had interest of such a description in the subject-matter of the litigation that without them, in the one case, the remaining Plaintiffs could not maintain an action, and in the other case no relief could be had against the remaining Defendants. In such cases as those, sec. 22 of the Limitation Act is obviously applicable Reliance was also placed upon Durga Charan Sarkar v. Jotindra Mohan Tagore ILR 27 Cal 493 (1899) in which a question was raised as to who were necessary parties in a suit under sec. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but no question arose as to the applicability of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act Reference was further made to the case of Kandhiya Lal v. Chander ILR 7 All. 313 (1884) in which it was ruled by a majority of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court that, when upon the death of the obligee of a money bond, the right to realize the money has devolved in specific shares upon his heirs, each of such heirs cannot maintain a separate suit for recovery of his share of the money due on the bond. It is not necessary for our present purposes to consider how far this position is well-founded and how far the contrary view expounded by Mr. Justice Mahmood in his dissentient judgment is successfully controverted by the reasoning in the judgment of the majority of the learned Judges. It is sufficient to say that this decision is, as appears from the cases of Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader ILR 25 Mad. Justice Mahmood in his dissentient judgment is successfully controverted by the reasoning in the judgment of the majority of the learned Judges. It is sufficient to say that this decision is, as appears from the cases of Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader ILR 25 Mad. 26 at p. 35 (1910) and Sitaram v. Sridhar I.L.R 27 Bom. 292 (1903), based upon the principle that the several heirs of the original promisee cannot be regarded as joint promisees; they constitute one heir and are connected together by unity of interest and unity of title and must enforce their right by one action properly framed. In the present case, the right of action of the heirs of the wife of the first Defendant has not been transmitted to them by inheritance from her, and as one of the heirs happens to be and must necessarily be, under the Mahomedan law, the debtor as well as a creditor, the right of action, even if it was joint has been split up. It follows, consequently, that each heir has a separate right, which he is entitled to enforce separately in respect of his share of the dower-debt, although for the protection of the debtor and for the convenience of the creditors, the right of each must be enforced in the presence of the others. In my opinion, the view taken by the District Judge cannot be supported and his judgment must be reversed. No question has been raised as to the shares of the parties, or, the amount to which the Plaintiffs are entitled. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed, the decree of the District Judge discharged and that of the Subordinate Judge restored with costs in all the Courts.