JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought to eject the Defendants from certain land, after a declaration of the Plaintiffs' right thereto. The Defendant No. 1 is the tenant of the land. The Defendant No. 2 is the shebait of the idol to whom the land belongs. 2. The Plaintiffs' predecessor in title, Nilu, had a karsha tenancy of the land. In 1262, he paid a bonus of Ra. 51 to the former shebait, Tarini, the predecessor of the Defendant No. 2 and obtained a permanent lease of the land. The rent payable under the lease was the same as under the karsha pottah. On the death of Tarini, the Defendant No. 2 succeeded as shebait to the property. He accepted rent from the Plaintiff or his predecessor for upwards of 30 years. He recently entered on occupation of the land with the assistance of the Defendant No. 1, and gave the Plaintiff notice to quit, and so determined his karsha right, 3. The Plaintiff now seeks for Khas possession. 4. The lower Court has held that the permanent lease granted to Nilu in 1262 was void for want of legal necessity. He has accordingly dismissed the suit. 5. The Plaintiff appeals on the following grounds; (1) that the lease of 1262 was not void but voidable; (2) that the Defendants are barred by limitation from questioning the validity of this lease; and (3) that the Plaintiff has a title by more than 50 years' adverse possession under this lease. 6. There can be no question as to the want of substance in the first of these pleas. A permanent lease of debutter property is undoubtedly void, if not executed for legal necessity. The Judge has found as a fact that there was no legal necessity for the grant of the permanent lease and this would seem to settle this point. There can be no question as to the want of substance in the first of these pleas. A permanent lease of debutter property is undoubtedly void, if not executed for legal necessity. The Judge has found as a fact that there was no legal necessity for the grant of the permanent lease and this would seem to settle this point. In support of the contention that the Plaintiff has been in adverse possession of the land under the permanent lease for more than 50 years and hence, that the Defendant No. 2's title has been extinguished, and that the Plaintiff has thereby acquired a valid title, the Appellant's pleader relies on the oases of Shama Charan Nandi v. Abhiram Goswami 10 C. W. N. 738 (1906), Ram Kanai Ghosh v. Sari Narayan Singh Deo 2 C. L. J. 546 (1905), Mahomed v. Ganapati I. L. R. 13 Mad. 277 (1889), Nil Money Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy I. L. R. 23 Cal. 536 (1896) and Duttagiri v. Duttatraya I L R. 27 Bom, 868 (1902), the principle underlying all of these cases apparently being that if a permanent lease of debutter and trust property is granted to a lessee who holds under such lease to the knowledge of the lessor's successor, the successor must sue within 12 years, or be barred by limitation. On the other land, the Respondent's pleader relies on the decision of their" Lordships of the Privy Council In Beni Pershad Koeri v. Dudhnath Roy (6), in which it has been held that the possession of a tenant for life is not rendered adverse within the meaning of Act XV of 1877 by a notice from the tenant that he claims to be holding on a perpetual or hereditary tenure. This has been followed In Srinivasa Ayyar v. Muthutami Pillai I. L. R. 24 Mad. 246 (1900), in which it has been laid down that a tenant repudiating the title under which he entered becomes liable to immediate eviction at the option of the landlord, but until the landlord indicates that be intends to exercise his option, the tenancy subsists. The cases of Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegads I. L. R. 25 Mad. 507 (1902) and Rama Swami Naik v. Thayammal I. L. R. 26 Mad. 488 (1902) have been decided on the same principle. The cases of Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegads I. L. R. 25 Mad. 507 (1902) and Rama Swami Naik v. Thayammal I. L. R. 26 Mad. 488 (1902) have been decided on the same principle. The learned pleader points out that the cases relied on by the Appellant are cases in which the lessees entered under the permanent leases they set up, and would be in the position of trespassers if the leases they held under were invalid, whereas in the case of Beni Pershad v. Dudhnath I. L. R. 27 Cal. 163 (1900) and the cases in which it has been followed, the lessee was a tenant from before and therefore he could not by setting up a right different from that under which he entered the land acquire a title by adverse possession against his lessor or the latter's successor. In the present case, the Plaintiffs predecessor, Nilu, was a karsha tenant. He paid a bonus to the Defendant No. 2's predecessor, Tarlni, and obtained from him an invalid and void permanent lease. He continued paying rent at the same rate as before. The Defendant No. 2 took rent from him no doubt for a long series of years, but seeing that Nilu was a tenant from before, his or the Plaintiff's possession cannot be regarded as adverse to the Defendant No. 2, nor can the latter's acceptance of the rent from the Plaintiff either operate as an admission of the Plaintiff's having a permanent right In the land or cause an extinction of his own title. We agree with these contentions of the learned pleader for the Respondent. We consider that the decree of the lower Appellate Court is right and we dismiss this appeal with costs.