Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (August 26, 1903), reversing a decree of the District Court of Dacca (February 13, 1900). The question in the appeal is whether the appellants Shahzadi Begam and Puti Begam were entitled to letters of administration to the estate of one Mir Amir Ali Khan, who died at Dacca on October 30, 1897. The two appellants on November 30, 1897, applied in that behalf to the District Court of Dacca, claiming the letters on the ground that they were the next heirs of the deceased. This application was opposed by the Secretary of State for India in Council, who alleged that the deceased had died without leaving any heir, in consequence of which his estate had escheated to Government. The dispute resolved itself into the proof of a pedigree which shewed that the deceased Amir Ali Khan was great-grandson or third in descent from Haidari Begam, and that Shahzadi Begam and Puti Begam were third in descent from Mirza Mahsum, who on the lace of the pedigree Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 194 ( 1906- 1907) Shahzadi Begam V. Secretary of State for India in Council 85 was uterine brother to Haidari Begam. The pedigree also shewed that Haidari Begam was one of six children of Nawab Sarfaraz Khan, four of whom, including Haidari and Mirza Mahsum, had left descendants, but that at the death of Amir AH Khan all the persons named in the pedigree were dead except the two appellants. It was finally admitted that the appellants and the deceased were respectively descended from Mirza Mahsum and Haidari, and the contention in appeal was limited to the issue whether the former was brother of the latter. The District Judge held that the appellants were next of kin of the deceased, and directed that letters of administration should issue to them under Act V. of 1881. The High Court reversed this decision, holding that the appellants had not proved themselves to be next of kin. Part of the estate of the deceased consisted of a share in Jowar Barim taluq, which had formerly vested in Haidari Begam. In 1797 one Mirza Mahomed obtained possession of the taluq. The High Court reversed this decision, holding that the appellants had not proved themselves to be next of kin. Part of the estate of the deceased consisted of a share in Jowar Barim taluq, which had formerly vested in Haidari Begam. In 1797 one Mirza Mahomed obtained possession of the taluq. Suits were brought against him in consequence, and amongst them a suit by Haidari Begam, in which she claimed a 13 ½ annas share, and obtained a final decree in 1808 for a 5 annas and 2 couries share jointly with her three surviving brothers. In that litigation a pedigree was filed by Haidari Begam which shewed that Mirza Mahsum was her brother. A copy of this pedigree and a certified copy of a deed of exchange disclosing the same relationship, and dated January 17, 1782, were adduced in evidence—the first Court finding them to be genuine and admissible, the High Court finding them to be forgeries. The reasons of the District Judge, which were approved by their Lordships, are as follows — " As for the ewaznama, its appearance shews that it bears the seal of the District Judges Court at Dacca, and the signature of Mr. Davidson, who was then the judge.....It comes from Shahzadi Begam, in whose custody, apparently, it has been for many years; and here is evidence that Shahzadi Begam is living on the site of the old house and near the tank referred to in this document, which is still called Mirza Mahomed Mahsums tank. Shahzadi Begam and other witnesses say so, and this same tank is referred to in [another exhibit]. "As for the kursinama, the circumstances under which this was first filed before the Collector of Mymensingh are reasonable enough, namely, to rebut the false pedigree filed by Mirza Mahomed and Hayatunnissa in their suit before the appellate Court; and it may be taken as included in the general item ‘Persian documents entered in the list setting forth the papers filed in that record. The fact therein stated that Mirza Mahomed Mahsum was the uterine brother of Fatema Bibi and Haidari Begam is corroborated by the ewazpatra; and beyond the delay that occurred in applying for copies of this document, no valid reason has been shewn why this Court should reject the same as a forgery. The fact therein stated that Mirza Mahomed Mahsum was the uterine brother of Fatema Bibi and Haidari Begam is corroborated by the ewazpatra; and beyond the delay that occurred in applying for copies of this document, no valid reason has been shewn why this Court should reject the same as a forgery. This document also shews that Amina Khanum and Miskina Khanum, through whom Shahzadi Begam and Puti Begam claim descent as set forth in the decision on the second issue, are the daughters of this same Mirza Mahomed Mahsum. I therefore find on this evidence that Mirza Mahomed Mahsum and Haidari Begam were brother and sister, and there is reason to believe that the brother predeceased the sister." Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that Shahzadi and Puti had sufficiently established their title as next heirs to the deceased Amir Ali Khan. It was proved by the evidence, independently of two documents which were mainly relied on, viz., a kursinama, or genealogical table, which disclosed that the ancestor of the appellants and the ancestress of the deceased were uterine brother and sister, and a certified copy of an ewaznama, or deed of exchange, dated in January, 1782. The former was filed in Court in 1804 in a suit brought by Haidari Begam, the Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 194 ( 1906- 1907) Shahzadi Begam V. Secretary of State for India in Council 86 ancestress of the deceased, and her brothers and sisters to recover their shares in certain property which had come into the possession of third parties, viz., Mirza Mahomed and his wife. Decrees were made on the strength of this pedigree in their favour by the Provincial Court in 1807 and by the Sudder Dewani Adawlut in 1808. Haidaris share so recovered formed part of the estate of the deceased see Mirza Mahomed v. Jareutozzohra. ((1808) 1 Macn. Sel. Rep. 243.) The High Court was wrong in holding that this pedigree was forged and that it was inadmissible in evidence see Jagatlal Singh v. Jageshar Baksh » Singh. (( 1902) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 27, 33, 34.) The pedigree in this case was made with Haidaris knowledge and belief by the pen of her gomasta. Sel. Rep. 243.) The High Court was wrong in holding that this pedigree was forged and that it was inadmissible in evidence see Jagatlal Singh v. Jageshar Baksh » Singh. (( 1902) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 27, 33, 34.) The pedigree in this case was made with Haidaris knowledge and belief by the pen of her gomasta. The statement s as to relationship was therefore made by her authority, and was admissible as made by herself see s. 32, clause 5, of the Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872). Besides, its admissibility was not objected to in the first Court, and the grounds on which it was rejected by the High Court were inadequate. The High Court was also wrong on the evidence in finding that the ewaznama was also, a forgery. The certified copy obtained in 1851 was admissible see ss. 4 and 79 of Act I. of 1872. It must be presumed to be genuine until proved to be a forgery, and for this proof the evidence was wholly insufficient. Its effect was to corroborate the evidence of the pedigree as to the relationship in question. Cohen, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, contended that the High Court was right on the evidence in finding these two documents to have been forged. There was nothing to shew that the kursinama was more than thirty years old, and its genuineness had therefore to be satisfactorily proved by those who relied on it. It could not be presumed see Act I. of 1872, s. 90. If genuine they were not admissible in evidence see Act I. of 1872, s. 32, clause 5; Sang ram Singh v. Rajan Bibi (( 1885) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 183.) ; Jagatpal Singh v. Jageshar Baksh Singh. (L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 27, 31, 34.) Moreover, the judgment in 1 Sel. Rep. 243 did not refer to any kursinama filed by Haidari. As regards the ewaznama, no evidence had been given of the execution of the original deed. Till the execution had been proved, a certified copy of it was not admissible under ss. 74 and 79. Neither document had been registered, as was posible, and perhaps requisite, under Regulation XX. of 1812 and Regulation XXXVI. of 1798, ss. 2, 3 (clauses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), and ss. 4, 5, 9 and 10. Till the execution had been proved, a certified copy of it was not admissible under ss. 74 and 79. Neither document had been registered, as was posible, and perhaps requisite, under Regulation XX. of 1812 and Regulation XXXVI. of 1798, ss. 2, 3 (clauses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), and ss. 4, 5, 9 and 10. According to Salimatul Fatima v. Koylashpoti Narain Singh (( 1890) I. L. R. 17 Calc. 903.), registration, if effected, was insufficient to prove these documents. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., replied, citing Khetterchunder Mookerjee v. Khettu Paul Sreetarutno (( 1880) I. L. R. 5 Calc. 886.) to shew that the certified copy objected to was admissible without proof of execution of the orginal, and pointing out that under the regulations referred to registration was optional. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. The plaintiffs in this case, Shahzadi Begam and Puti Begam, claimed to be the heirs of one Mir Amir Ali Khan, who died on October 30, 1897, intestate. The claim was opposed by the now respondent, who contended that the deceased had left no heir, and that his estate had escheated to the Government. There were numerous other claimants, whose cases were successively dismissed by the District Judge of Dacca. He decided, however, that the plaintiffs had proved their case, and granted administration accordingly. On appeal by the Secretary of State to the High Court at Fort William, the decision of the District Judge was overruled. Hence the present appeal. Since this appeal was entered, viz., on June 9, 1904, Shahzadi Begam died, and by an order of the High Court of May 16, 1905, on the application of the respondent, the appeal was allowed to proceed at the risk of the surviving appellants, viz., Puti Begam and two other persons, who had purchased from the plaintiffs nearly the whole of the interests acquired by the latter on the death of Mir Amir Ali. On April 25, 1906, Puti Begam, the other plaintiff, died, and by an order of His Majesty in Council of December 21, 1906, her legal representatives were substituted as appellants in her place. Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. On April 25, 1906, Puti Begam, the other plaintiff, died, and by an order of His Majesty in Council of December 21, 1906, her legal representatives were substituted as appellants in her place. Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 194 ( 1906- 1907) Shahzadi Begam V. Secretary of State for India in Council 87 When the suit first came before the District Judge a very wide field of controversy was open, and three issues were framed by him as arising for decision as to the descent and relationship of the parties, all which issues he decided in favour of the plaintiffs. On the hearing in the High Court the findings as to two of these issues were accepted by the now respondent, and the area of controversy has thus been most materially narrowed. In order to make the point left in dispute intelligible, it will be necessary to state as shortly as possible what was the alleged relationship of the parties. The plaintiffs contended, and it must now be taken as admitted, that the deceased was the great-grandson of a lady called Haidari Begam, said to have been a daughter of Nawab Sarfaraz Khan. It must also now be taken as established that the plaintiffs Shahzadi Begam and Puti Begam were the great-granddaughters of one Mirza Mahsum, said to be a son of the same Nawab Sarfaraz Khan and brother of Haidari Begam. The point in dispute is that which was formulated by the District Judge as the third issue, viz., was Mirza Mahsum the uterine brother of Haidari Begam ? If he was, it is admitted that the plaintiffs claim is established, and it is not necessary to follow out the family history further. The learned judge had before him evidence both oral and written, and as part of the latter two documents, either of which, if admissible and genuine, has been treated by both sides as conclusive upon the issue in the plaintiffs favour. They are what has been called a kursinama, or genealogical table, and a certified copy of an ewaznama, or deed of exchange, dated January, 1782. The kursinama purported to have been filed in a suit in 1804, in which Haidari Begam had established her right to a share in a certain taluq which had come to her sister Fatema, alias Bukshi Begam, from her husband, Mirza Bakar, in lieu of dower. The kursinama purported to have been filed in a suit in 1804, in which Haidari Begam had established her right to a share in a certain taluq which had come to her sister Fatema, alias Bukshi Begam, from her husband, Mirza Bakar, in lieu of dower. On the death of Fatema, one Mirza Mahomed, the husband of Hayatunnissa Begam, who owned a certain share in the taluq, took forcible possession of Fatemas share to the exclusion of Haidari and her co-plaintiffs, described in the decree as " the full brothers and sisters " of Fatema. Mirza, in support of his claim, had put in a fictitious pedigree, and it was to rebut this that the kursinama now in question was said to have been filed by Haidari. The result was a decree upholding the claims of Haidari and her co-plaintiffs, and it is to the share thus adjudicated to Haidari that the deceased Mir Amir Ali Khan ultimately succeeded, and that is the subject of the present litigation. The kursinama was filed in this suit by the plaintiffs on January 10, 1899. What purported to be the original was produced at the trial. It does not appear that any objection was made to its admissibility, though that point has been strongly pressed before their Lordships. It was, however, contended that it was a forgery concocted some hundred years later, after this suit had begun, and though this view was rejected by the District Judge, it found acceptance in the High Court. The latter Court drew the inference, contrary to the finding of the District Judge, that Haidari Begam had not filed a kursinama at all in the suit of 1804, and thought they detected a tremor in the signature of the Collector, Mr. Legros, not visible in his signature on other papers in the same record. They also placed some reliance on the fact that it did not purport to have been indorsed, but it was pointed out to their Lordships that the same observation might have been made with regard to all the other original documents produced from the same record. Another point seems to have weighed heavily with them, viz., that the plaintiffs, though they had applied as early as January, 1898, for copies of certain documents relating to the proceeding of 1804, did not apply for the kursinama till January 9, 1899. Another point seems to have weighed heavily with them, viz., that the plaintiffs, though they had applied as early as January, 1898, for copies of certain documents relating to the proceeding of 1804, did not apply for the kursinama till January 9, 1899. But this delay was clearly explained by Mr. De Gruyther, who referred to the order of the District Judge, who, finding that he had a great many applicants to deal with in July, 1898, postponed the hearing of Shahzadi Begams case till January, 1899. Their Lordships are by no means satisfied that the grounds upon which the High Court rely support the inference which they draw that Haidari never did put in a kursinama. On the contrary, it seems to their Lordships that the terms of her petition make this suggestion improbable. She says " After their death the said Mirza filed a feraz contrary to the kursinama and obtained a decree." The High Court suggest that the words in the original do not involve the insertion of the definite article before kursinama which appears in the Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 194 ( 1906- 1907) Shahzadi Begam V. Secretary of State for India in Council 88 English translation; but, be this as it may, she is clearly asserting a contrariety between the feraz put forward by Mirza and the pedigree for which she is contending, with the result that the decree which was made and affirmed divided the estate among the persons who are shewn on the kursinama now produced to have been the heirs of Fatema Begam. Having carefully weighed the arguments on both sides as to the genuineness of the kursinama, their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the difficulties in accepting the theory of the High Court far outweigh chose involved in the contrary hypothesis, and they therefore adopt the opinion on this point of the learned judge who tried the case. Their Lordships are farther of opinion that it is now too late for the respondent to take an objection to the admissibility of a document which was received without objection at the trial. With regard to the ewaznama, or deed of exchange, a certified copy of it was produced from the custody of Shahzadi Begam, and was found to be written on paper bearing the same stamp and water-mark as the other contemporary documents in the record of that litigation. With regard to the ewaznama, or deed of exchange, a certified copy of it was produced from the custody of Shahzadi Begam, and was found to be written on paper bearing the same stamp and water-mark as the other contemporary documents in the record of that litigation. Their Lordships agree with the District Judge that it was admissible in evidence, and, for the reasons given by him, adopt his conclusion as to its genuineness. Though these two documents, together or separately, might suffice to decide the issue in the appellants favour, their case by no means rests on these documents alone. On the contrary, the oral evidence and the documents other than the two named would, in their Lordships view, suffice of themselves to raise a strong presump tion in favour of the appellants. The High Court seem to have under-estimated the weight given by the trial judge to these elements in the case. Shahzadi Begam, in an examination extending over ten days, in which she displayed very remarkable gifts of memory and intelligence, gave evidence which, if it can be relied upon, proved the plaintiffs case. She was a lady of about eighty years of age, and was thoroughly at home in the family history, a large part of which was covered by her own life, and she deposed to the relationship of Mirza Mahsum, from whom she and her co-plaintiff, Puti Begam, were descended, to Haidari, the ancestress of the deceased Mir Amir Ali, as children of Yusuf Ali, alias Feda Ali Khan, afterwards known as Nawab Sarfaraz Khan, giving the names of Fatema and the other children who appear as her heirs in the decree in the taluq suit in 1804. According to her story she had learnt the family history before her own time largely from conversations with her grandmother, Miskina Khanum. She was quite unshaken on cross-examination. The District Judge evidently regarded her as trustworthy, for he relies in terms upon her statement as to one link in the chain of the family history. In addition to the evidence of this lady there was also that of Gholam Mustafa, an ex-pleader and honorary magistrate, to whom the learned District Judge refers favourably, who spoke to the terms of acknowledged blood-relationship which had existed between the deceased and Shahzadi Begam. In addition to the evidence of this lady there was also that of Gholam Mustafa, an ex-pleader and honorary magistrate, to whom the learned District Judge refers favourably, who spoke to the terms of acknowledged blood-relationship which had existed between the deceased and Shahzadi Begam. Besides this oral evidence there were the other documents referred to by the learned judge in his judgment, which confirm the common descent of the claimants and the deceased from Nawab Sarfaraz Khan, e.g., exhibits F. 2, P. 3, F. 8, F. 9, F. 10, F. 11, and F. 13. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court be reversed, and the decree of the District Judge restored, and that the respondent pay to the appellants their costs of the appeal to the High Court. The respondent will pay to the appellants the costs of the appeal to His Majesty in Council.