JUDGMENT 1. The proceedings in this case were commenced, on the 23rd February 1906, in the Court of the District Judge of Rungpur, on an application made by the Collector of that district under sec. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for the appointment of a common manager of certain estates and tenures which go by the name " Bhiturband." The Collector in his petition alleged that there was a long-standing dispute between the co-owners of estate No. 204 of the Touzi of the Collectorate, consisting of an 8 annas 15 gundas share of Pergunnah Bhiturband, and of estates Nos. 348, 371, 375, 377, 378, 440, 454 and 457 with the revenue-free estates 2B, 9B, 11B, 12B, 13B, 35B, 41B, 61B, 140B, 142B, 143B, 148B, 181B, and 183B, that the dispute assumed a serious aspect in the year 1891, that since then managers had been appointed jointly by all the co-sharers for some time, that at the present time no manager was appointed by all the co-sharers and that consequently there were grave acts of oppression on the raiyats, and there was likelihood of a very serious breach of the peace. On the presentation of this petition, the District Judge issued notices on the co-owners calling on them to show cause why they should not appoint a common manager. Cause was shown by some of the co-owners, though it appears that some amongst the co-owners were agreeable to the appointment of a common manager. Girish Mohini Debi Chowdhurani and Kumar Saradindu Roy were the principal objectors and they alleged that there were no dissensions between the co-owners regarding the management of the revenue-paying and the revenue-free estates mentioned in the petition of the Collector, and that they were each realizing rent from the tenants and the raiyats in occupation according to their admitted shares. There was indeed no dispute as to the respective shares of the co-owners. 2. On the 21st November 1906, the learned District Judge passed on order in which he held that there were good reasons for the appointment of a common manager inasmuch as there were serious differences as to the management of the properties concerned, and that it was in the interest of the public that such a common manager should be appointed. He, accordingly, made an order under sec. 94 of the Act directing the co-owners to appoint a common manager. He, accordingly, made an order under sec. 94 of the Act directing the co-owners to appoint a common manager. From this judgment of the learned District Judge two applications were made to this Court, one by Girish Mohini Debi Chowdhurani and the other by Kumar Saradindu Roy Chowdhury. The rules issued on these applications came to be heard on the 28th January 1907, when we held that the finding of the learned District Judge as to the necessity for the appointment of a common manager, could not be questioned before us, inasmuch as the cases had to be dealt with under sec. 622, C. P. C. We, also, held that tile facts stated in the judgment of the learned District Judge showed that there was serious inconvenience to the public and likelihood of a breach of the peace on account of separate management of the several shares of the co-owners; but we sent the case back to the learned District Judge for dealing with the properties in group with reference to the different sets of co-owners of the different properties. 3. It appears that estate No. 204 was owned by seven proprietors, Girish Mohini Debi Chowdhurani and Jogesh Chandra Majumdar representing one and the same deceased co-owner and Kumar Saradindu Roy being one of the other co-owners; whereas as regards the- other revenue-paying and revenue-free estates, Kumar Saradindu Roy had no interest in them. Following the decision in Fazal Ali Chowdhury v. Abdul Mojid Chowdhury I. L. R. 14 Cal. 659 (1887), we directed the District Judge to consider the case of estate No. 204 separately from the other estates, to make separate orders as to the appointment of a common manager for each, and to specify the shares of the different co-owners of each of these groups of property though, if he thought proper, to appoint the same individual as the common manager of the two different groups, he could do so. We expressed our desire that the Collector 6hould make separate applications in respect of the separate groups of property. We, also, stated in our judgment that it was desirable that the Collector should specify in a supplemental petition the jotes with respect to which the learned Judge had stated in his judgment that there was a serious dispute between the parties. We, also, stated in our judgment that it was desirable that the Collector should specify in a supplemental petition the jotes with respect to which the learned Judge had stated in his judgment that there was a serious dispute between the parties. Our reference to the jotes, however, was due to a mistake which arose from certain observations made by the learned Judge in his judgment. The learned Judge said, in one part of the judgment:-" It may be said that this and similar though less aggravated acts of oppression were not the effect of any dispute among the co-proprietors but were acts performed not in their capacity of zemindars but as individuals interested in jote rights, though the jotes may have been under the estate of which they were part owners. This argument is to some extent plausible; but it is certainly nothing more. Had it not been that they were proprietors of the estate under which the jotes were held, they would not have coveted them." From this passage in the judgment and the arguments addressed to us by learned Counsel we came to be under the impression that the jotes were jointly owned by sets of co-owners and that one of the principal causes of dispute related to the management and realisation of rent of these jotes and it was necessary that a common manager should be appointed for the jotes as well. 4. We were not then informed that the jotes were owned by the co-sharers individually, and that the co-sharers in the estates had no joint interest in them, and that the jotes could not be the subject of a proceeding under sec. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. When the case went back to the learned District Judge, the Collector presented a petition, in which he asked the learned Judge to deal with estate No. 204 separately from the other estates; and he further stated in his petition that the jotes were not the joint property of two or more of the co-owners and could not, therefore, be the subject of a proceeding under sec. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is now conceded by all the parties concerned that the jotes are owned by the co-sharers individually without copartnership, and that they could not form the subject of a proceeding under sec. 93. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is now conceded by all the parties concerned that the jotes are owned by the co-sharers individually without copartnership, and that they could not form the subject of a proceeding under sec. 93. When, therefore, the case went back, the learned Judge had to deal exclusively with the estates, and any reference that he had made and any evidence that was used regarding the dissensions about the jotes had necessarily to be excluded. Sec. 93 of the Bengal Tenancy Act says: "When any dispute exists between co-owners of an estate or tenure as to the management thereof, and in consequence there has ensued or is likely to ensue, (a) inconvenience, to the public or (b) injury to private rights the District Judge may on the application in case (a) of the Collector direct a notice to be served on all the co-owners, calling on them to show cause why they should not appoint a common manager." The dispute which should induce the District Judge to make an order under sec. 93 must be one between the co-owners as to the management of the estate or tenure which is the subject of an application for the appointment of a common manager. Any dispute with reference to one estate or tenure cannot be a reason for the appointment of a common manager with respect to another estate or tenure, though the two might be intimately connected in some respects. Any dispute as regards the jotes, and any inconvenience to the public arising out of a dispute as to possession of these jotes, could not, therefore, be taken into consideration in basing a finding as to the necessity for the appointment of a common manager of the estates which were specified in the Collector's application. The mistake, therefore, which led to the finding of the learned District Judge as well as the observations made by us concerning the jotes, vitiated to a considerable extent our judgment pronounced on the 28th January 1907. The legality and the propriety of the subsequent proceeding must, therefore, be judged exclusively by a consideration of the disputes as regards the estates. 5. The learned District Judge directed, on the 18th March 1907, after our order of remand, and on the presentation of the petition by the Collector, notices to be issued on all the co-sharers under sec. The legality and the propriety of the subsequent proceeding must, therefore, be judged exclusively by a consideration of the disputes as regards the estates. 5. The learned District Judge directed, on the 18th March 1907, after our order of remand, and on the presentation of the petition by the Collector, notices to be issued on all the co-sharers under sec. 94 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, asking them to appoint a common manager of the estates covered by the former proceeding of his Court. He did not issue any notice under sec. 93 of the Act which would have given the co-sharers a fresh opportunity of showing that there was no necessity for the appointment of a common manager. The order of the learned Judge was made ex parte and, thereafter, Girish Mohini Debi as well as Kumar Saradindu Roy made applications for rescinding the order of the 18th March 1907 on the ground that the proceedings should have been commenced de novo as if no order had been made by the learned Judge under sec. 93 of the Act directing the co-owners to show cause why a common manager should not be appointed. On the 23rd April 1907 the learned Judge held that according to the order of remand passed by us, it was not necessary for him to commence the proceedings, de novo, but that, on the presentation of the petition by the Collector, separating estate No. 204 from the other estates covered by his original application, he could make an order directing the appointment of a common manager under sec. 94 of the Act, and that it was not necessary for him, according to our order of remand, to make any further enquiry as to the necessity for such appointment. 6. The learned Judge was in one sense right in construing our order of remand Our attention was not drawn-at the time when we made the order-to the precise question which has now arisen, and in fact, as we have said, our judgment was to a considerable extent based on a misapprehension of facts due to the observations made by the learned Judge himself in his previous judgment. It was not then necessary for us to consider whether the learned Judge should commence proceedings de novo, on the presentation of a new petition by the Collector, or whether he should take up the matter from the stage at which the case had arrived on his finding that there was a dispute likely to cause inconvenience to the public. 7. The present applications were made to us on the 29th April 1907 for a revision of the orders of the learned Judge, and thereupon we issued two rules calling on the opposite party, as also, on the Collector of Rungpur, to show cause why the orders, dated the 18th March and 23rd April, should not be set aside on the ground that the learned Judge, before making an order under sec. 94 of the Act directing the appointment of a common manager, ought to have given the Petitioners an opportunity of showing cause why a common manager should not be appointed as provided by sec. 93 of the Act. The discussions before us have turned on the true interpretation of our order of remand and the necessity, or otherwise, for the commencement of the proceedings de novo. Our order remanding the case was not precise as to the stage from which the learned Judge should recommence the proceedings. The impression which we then had as to the facts would have induced us to hold, if we had to give a distinct opinion, that it was not necessary that the learned Judge should recommence proceedings de novo as if the Collector had made a fresh application under sec. 93 of the Act; and the learned Judge, in dealing with our order of remand, was so far quite correct. 8. But the aspect of things has now changed. The proceedings were commenced early in the year 1906. In the meantime, the co-owners had been managing their respective shares of the estates and Kumar Saradindu Roy had applied for a partition of estate No. 204 which is the largest property covered by the proceedings. It is now found that the jotes could not be the subject of a proceeding under sec. 93 of the Act, and that any dissensions between the co-owners, as regards the possession of the jotes and the realization of rent from the raiyats in occupation of these jotes, must be excluded from consideration. It is now found that the jotes could not be the subject of a proceeding under sec. 93 of the Act, and that any dissensions between the co-owners, as regards the possession of the jotes and the realization of rent from the raiyats in occupation of these jotes, must be excluded from consideration. The case must be dealt with exclusively on a consideration of the management of the different estates covered by the proceedings. The lapse of time since the first application was made is a matter of the greatest importance. 9. Though the learned Judge was correct in the interpretation he put on our order of remand, we think it desirable, having regard to the altered state of things, that the proceedings should be commenced de novo, and that the learned Judge should now issue notices under sec. 93 of the Act requiring the co-owners to show cause why they should not appoint a common manager. If, excluding the evidence as to dissensions regarding the jotes, and taking into consideration the altered state of things, brought about by the application of Kumar Saradindu Roy for partition, and the cadastral survey proceedings which, we are informed, are being taken, the learned Judge be of opinion that there is no occasion for the appointment of a common manager, he should drop the proceedings. If, on the other hand, he comes to a different conclusion, he ought to make the necessary orders under sec. 93 of the Act, and proceed according to the subsequent sections of the Act for the appointment of a common manager or managers. He should, however, as we said in our order of remand, make two separate orders as to the appointment of a common manager or managers. He should specify the shares of the different co-owners of the different estates, and give the necessary directions so as to avoid future complications. It is absolutely necessary, in the interest of the public as well as of the co-owners, that any future dispute should, so long as the common manager is not removed, be avoided. 10. We need hardly point out to the learned Judge that, even if he had thought it proper, following our order of remand, not to make a further enquiry as to the necessity for the appointment of a common manager, he could, under sec. 10. We need hardly point out to the learned Judge that, even if he had thought it proper, following our order of remand, not to make a further enquiry as to the necessity for the appointment of a common manager, he could, under sec. 95, have considered the matter at any time before he made a final order, if it was shown to his satisfaction that there was no further cause for apprehension, or inconvenience to the public, or that there was a fair prospect of a satisfactory arrangement being made within a reasonable time by the co-owners themselves as to the management of the different estates. He has also the power, under the Act, to direct at any time that the management of the estate or the estates be restored to the co-sharers, if he be satisfied that the management will be conducted by them without inconvenience to the public. The law gives the District Judge ample powers to deal with the question of the propriety of the appointment of common manager, whatever may be the stage at which the proceedings may have arrived. 11. The consideration of these matters is within the discretion of the District Judge, but we ought to point out that he should exercise his discretion according to well-established rules and not arbitrarily. Simply because he held in November 1906 that it was necessary to appoint a common manager, he is not bound to hold, months after when the state of things may have altered, that his order passed in November 1906 should still be maintained. We, accordingly, remand the case to the learned District Judge for dealing with it in accordance with the observations made by us. We make no order as to the costs of these rules.