Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (March 13, 1905), varying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Negapatam (February 17, 1902). The suit was brought on September 23, 1899, by the first respondent against the appellants to recover the principal and interest due under an instrument of mortgage dated September 22, 1883. The plaintiff was the receiver appointed by the Court in a suit for the partition of the family property of the mortgagees. Under the decree in the partition suit the interests of the family in the mortgage, and the debt secured thereby, fell to the share of the second respondent, who was accordingly brought on to the record. The Subordinate Court passed a decree for Rs. 10,605.12.6, together with further interest. On appeal the High Court, in substitution for the said decree, passed a decree for Rs. 46,341.12, together with subsequent interest and costs. On September 22, 1883, the first and third appellants, who are respectively the fathers of the other appellants, executed the instrument above referred to, to secure the repayment of a sum of Rs. 8000, as therein provided, to one Krishna Mudaliar, who was the managing member of the family of the second respondent. After reciting that the sum of Rs. 8000 was owing by the obligees, as therein mentioned, the document proceeded as follows " The said sum shall bear interest at f per cent, per mensem, and we shall pay the interest of each year by the 30th Panguni of that year, and the principal at the rate of Rs. 1000 per annum from this date. In default of our paying the principal and interest as aforesaid, compound interest, calculated at 5/8 per cent, per mensem, with twelve months rests from the date succeeding, that of default on the aggregate principal and interest due till then, and the principal amount shall, on demand by you, be paid by us without reference to the term." The annual instalments of Rs. 1000 were not paid by the mortgagors. But payments were made by them at various dates from 1885 to 1890; and the mortgage account was alleged in the plaint to have been settled on October 14, 1889, between the parties, and the sum of Rs. 11,092.9.4 to have been found due. 1000 were not paid by the mortgagors. But payments were made by them at various dates from 1885 to 1890; and the mortgage account was alleged in the plaint to have been settled on October 14, 1889, between the parties, and the sum of Rs. 11,092.9.4 to have been found due. The plaint also alleged that subsequent to that date payment had been made on account of interest, and that in a partition suit between the appellants there had been an acknowledgment of liability. The partition suit was brought in 1898, and the receiver appointed therein sued the appellants on September 23, 1899. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was prima facie barred by limitation, the period of limitation being twelve years from the date of the first default. He decided that there had been no settlement of accounts, no part payment of interest, and no acknowledgment of liability sufficient to extend the said period of limitation. He was, however, of opinion that, the debt being payable by instalments, the last five instalments from September 22, 1887, were recoverable within twelve years from the date on which each of the said instalments fell due. He held that the benefit of the clause in the deed of mortgage, which provided that on default of payment of any instalment the whole amount should become due and recoverable, could be and had been waived by the mortgagee, and required a demand for payment by the mortgagee as a condition precedent for enforcement. He considered any personal claim against the mortgagors was barred by limitation, and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff for payment of " the five instalments and interest on each of these instalments, with interest thereon from the time each instalment fell due as per contract, and after term at contract rate of 12 annas per cent, per mensem up to realization," to be recovered by sale of the mortgaged property. The High Court in appeal held that the document sued upon was an instrument of mortgage as opposed to an instrument creating merely a charge within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the rule of limitation applicable was the sixty years rule under the Limitation Act, 1877, Sched. II., art. 147, and that none of the claim was barred by limitation, They accordingly passed a mortgage decree for Rs. II., art. 147, and that none of the claim was barred by limitation, They accordingly passed a mortgage decree for Rs. 46,341.12, but they gave no personal decree against the defendants. De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that the suit was barred by limitation. Art. 132 applied, and not art. 147. He referred to Shib Lal v. Ganga Prasad (( 1884) I. L. R. 6 Allah. 551.) ; Girwar Singh v. Thakur Narain Singh. (( 1887) I. L. R. 14 Calc. 730.) Art. 147 only applies to English mortgages, and should be construed irrespective of definitions contained in the Transfer of Property Act. Simple mortgages existed before that Act see Macpherson on Mortgages, p. 14. He referred to Act IX. of 1871, art. 132 of which Act is differently worded from art. 132 of the present Act; and there is nothing in the earlier Act which corresponds to art. 147 of the later, which was intended, according to its true construction, to be of limited application. There was no intention to make a wide alteration in the law. He referred to Ramdin v. Kalka Pershad (( 1884) L. R. 12 Ind. Ap. 12.); Act XIV. of 1859, clause 16, s. 1; Junes war Dass v. Mahabeer Singh. (( 1875) L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 1.) In 1877 there was no suit for foreclosure except on English mortgages ; but a suit for money charged on immovable property was a well-recognized class of suit. A. suit for possession was required to extinguish the mortgagors interest under Indian mortgages, which were mostly by conditional sale, foreclosure being an inappropriate remedy see Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum (( 1865) 10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 340.) ; Gaupal Pandurang v. Adarji Dadabhai, (( 1877) I. L. R. 3 Bomb. 312.) In 1877 the Civil Procedure Code of that year provided a form of plaint, No. 109, for foreclosure or sale applicable to simple mortgages. The construction of art. 147 adopted by the Calcutta Courts is correct see Modun Mohun Chowdhry v. Ashad Ally Baheree. (( 1883) I. L. R. 10 Calc 68.) In Act IV. of 1882 special definitions of mortgage and charge are given see ss. 58 and 100; but as this was live years after the Limitation Act they do not affect its construction. See also Girwar Singh v. Thakur Narain Single (I. L. R. 14 Calc. (( 1883) I. L. R. 10 Calc 68.) In Act IV. of 1882 special definitions of mortgage and charge are given see ss. 58 and 100; but as this was live years after the Limitation Act they do not affect its construction. See also Girwar Singh v. Thakur Narain Single (I. L. R. 14 Calc. 730.) ; Ramachandra Rayaguru v. Modhu Padhi (( 1898) I. L. R. 21 Madr. 326.) ; Narayana Ayyar v. Venkataramana Ayyar. (( 1902) I. L. R. 25 Madr. 220, 238.) The Bombay Courts, on the other hand, have followed the decision of the Allahabad High Court see Motiram v. Vitai (( 1888) I. L. R. 13 Bomb. 90.); Datto Dudheshwar v. Vitha. (I. L. R. 20 Bomb. 408.) Cohen, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the second respondent, contended that art. 147 was the applicable provision, and that the suit was not barred. That article is not confined to English mortgages. The two Acts of 1871 and 1877 differ materially. The action in this case was by a mortgagee to obtain a decree for sale, and under a transaction of this sort the Court has always had power to sell. It was always considered a simple mortgage, not merely under the Transfer of Property Act—see ss. 69, 58 and 100—but previously see Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 340, 346.), where its character and incidents are discussed. See also Ganpat Pandurang v. Adarji Dadabhai (I. L. R. 3 Bomb. 312, 330.); Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan (( 1882) I. L. R. 5 Allah. 5.); Shift Lal v. Ganga Prasad. (I. L. R. 6 Allah. 551.) Art. 147 applies to any suit by a mortgagee for sale, which includes any case in which the plaintiff stands to the defendant in the relationship of mortgagee and mortgagor. Art. 148 allows a mortgagor sixty years in which to redeem, and it is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature intended that the mortgagee should have a similar period in which to foreclose or sell. The Transfer of Property Act must be read into the Limitation Act, for it contains the substantive law as to what is a charge and what is a mortgage. They referred to Girwar Singh v. Thakur Narain Singh (I. L. R. 14 Calc. 730.); Nilcomal Pramnath v. Kamini Kumar Basu (( 1891) I. L. R. 20 Calc. The Transfer of Property Act must be read into the Limitation Act, for it contains the substantive law as to what is a charge and what is a mortgage. They referred to Girwar Singh v. Thakur Narain Singh (I. L. R. 14 Calc. 730.); Nilcomal Pramnath v. Kamini Kumar Basu (( 1891) I. L. R. 20 Calc. 269.); Kishan Lal v. Ganga Ram (( 1890) I. L. R. 13 Allah. 28, 41, 47.) and the cases in 21 and 25 Madr. referred to on the other side. With regard to Form 139 in the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, it refers only to the case of an English mortgage ; the section must be referred to as well as the form. If art. 132 governs the case, the period of limitation should be computed with reference to the dates of settlement of accounts, acknowledgments, and payments. Demand should be made before action brought, and limitation runs from demand see Hanmantram Sadhuram Pity v. Bowles (( 1884) I. L. R. 8 Bomb. 561, 566.) ; Netta Karuppa Goundan v. Kumarasami Goundan. (( 1898) I. L. R. 22 Madr. 20.) Then, as regards s. 19 of Act XIV. of 1877, an acknowledgment need not be made to a creditor Maniram Seth v. Seth Rupchand (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 165.) ; Moodie v. Bannister (( 1859) 4 Drew. 432.) ; Motiram v. Vital. (I. L. R. 13 Bomb. 90, 94, 96.) With regard to s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, relating to penalty, reasonable compensation is to he ascertained having regard to the terms of the transaction see Rani Sundar Koer v. Rai Sham Krisher(Ante, p. 9.); Clydebank Engineering, &c., Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdoy Castaneda. ([ 1905] A. C. 6.) De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Madras, dated March 18, 1905, modifying those of the Subordinate Judge of Negapatam of February 17, 1902. The controversy arises out of a mortgage executed on September 22, 1883, by the first and third appellants in favour of Krishna Mudaliar Avergal, to secure Rs. 8000 and interest as stipulated. The mortgage was of the kind long known as a mortgage bond or hypothecation bond, and now described in the Transfer of Property Act as a simple mortgage. The controversy arises out of a mortgage executed on September 22, 1883, by the first and third appellants in favour of Krishna Mudaliar Avergal, to secure Rs. 8000 and interest as stipulated. The mortgage was of the kind long known as a mortgage bond or hypothecation bond, and now described in the Transfer of Property Act as a simple mortgage. In the course of a partition suit, relating to the estate of the mortgagee, the first respondent was appointed receiver of that estate, and as such he instituted the present suit, joining as defendants the two actual mortgagors and their respective sons, which four persons are now the appellants. The object of the suit, so far as it need now be noticed, was to enforce payment of the amount due under the mortgage, by sale of the mortgaged property. In carrying out the partition the claim now in question was allotted to the now second respondent, whereby he became the person really interested in the claim. Accordingly he was made a party to this appeal, by order of the High Court, and he is the contesting respondent. The only issue in the case which need be noticed was whether the suit was barred by limitation, and the principal question discussed on the argument of this appeal (the only one on which their Lordships propose to express an opinion) is whether the period of limitation applicable to such a case is sixty years, under art. 147 in the Second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act (XV. of 1877), as held by the High Court, or twelve years, under art. 132, as contended for by the appellants. This question is one as to which there has been great diversity of opinion among the several High Courts in India for many years past, almost from the time of the passing of the Act of 1877. If there had been a uniform current of decision in India upon such an Act and for such a period of time, their Lordships would have been very slow to interfere. But though the Act to be construed is one applicable to India generally, and must bear the same meaning everywhere, different and conflicting views have so far prevailed in the different provinces of India. Their Lordships have therefore no alternative but to decide between the conflicting opinions. But though the Act to be construed is one applicable to India generally, and must bear the same meaning everywhere, different and conflicting views have so far prevailed in the different provinces of India. Their Lordships have therefore no alternative but to decide between the conflicting opinions. The two articles in question run thus—Art. 132 Suit " to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property," "twelve years." Art. 147 Suit "by a mortgagee for foreclosure or sale," " sixty years." Before balancing the two views which have been taken of the effect of these articles, it may be well to see how the law stood when they were passed. The previous Act was Act IX. of 1871, in which art. 132, referring to suits " for money charged upon immovable property," was practically the same as the present article bearing that number. There was nothing corre sponding to art. 147. Under that state of things it was perfectly settled law that suits of the present class were governed by art. 132, whilst some uncertainty had been felt as to the rule of limitation applicable to another class of mortgage, the English mortgage. The two views taken under the Act of 1877 are these According to one view, art, 147 applies to every suit by a mortgagee, in which he asks either for foreclosure or for sale. According to the other view; art. 147 applies only to the class of mortgages (English mortgages) in which the suit may be, and in fact always is, brought for "foreclosure or sale," while art. 132 means what the corresponding article meant before. In support of the first of these constructions, reliance has mainly been placed upon the view that the terms of art. 147 require its acceptance, and that the other construction is not a legitimate construction, as not giving fair effect to the language used. If this be so it is of course conclusive. But their Lordships think it is not so. They are of opinion that the narrower construction of art. 147, limiting its application to the one class of mortgages in which alone the suit can be, and always is, brought for " foreclosure or sale," is a legitimate construction, and gives reasonable effect to the language used. That being so, their Lordships think that the reasons for adopting the narrower interpretation of art. 147, limiting its application to the one class of mortgages in which alone the suit can be, and always is, brought for " foreclosure or sale," is a legitimate construction, and gives reasonable effect to the language used. That being so, their Lordships think that the reasons for adopting the narrower interpretation of art. 147 greatly outweigh those on the other side. The preponderating considerations, in their Lordships opinion, are the following. The narrower construction escapes the necessity of attributing to the Legislature a great and sudden change of policy. It also gives effect to the ordinary presumption that the Legislature, when it repeats in substance in a later Act an earlier enactment, that has obtained a settled meaning by judicial construction, intends the words to mean what they meant before. The other construction fails in both these particulars. One argument urged for the respondent calls for notice. It was said that, whatever might have been the original operation of the Limitation Act of 1877, the effect of art. 147 might be extended by the subsequent passing of the Transfer of Property Act in 1882, so as to make the article apply to everything which was declared to be a mortgage by the later Act. This contention appears to their Lordships to assume the very point in controversy, namely, that art. 147 purports to apply to every suit on a mortgage, in which there is claim for foreclosure or for sale. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that it should be declared that art. 132 is the article which provides the rule of limitation applicable to this case, and that the case should be remitted to the High Court to be disposed of in accordance with this declaration. The second respondent will pay the costs of this appeal.