JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - These two suits are brought under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Plaintiff is not asking for possession nor can it be given him. What he asks for is that the record-of-rights be amended upon declaration of his title to lands which belong to his Mouzah Ramchunderpur but which have been entered in the record as parts of Mouzahs Pursottampur and Debata Sahi. The District Judge is wrong in holding that these are not suits for the correction of entries. The cases were headed under sec. 106 brought before the Revenue Officer and by him and under that section transferred to the Civil Court. The first paragraph of the plaints states that the suits have been brought "for getting lands alleged to belong to Ramchunderpur removed from the record-of-rights of Pursottampur and Debata Sahi respectively. On the merits it has been found by the first Court that both possession and title were with the Plaintiff and that the lands in dispute form part of the Plaintiff's mouzah and the record should be amended accordingly. On this point the District Judge reversed the finding of the first Court as he held that the identity of the Bhauria numbers of the Survey of 1268 with the Khasra numbers mentioned in the plaint had not been established. In so holding he has dismissed the suit on the ground that a fact was not proved which it was unnecessary to prove. No doubt it was for the Plaintiff to show that the Khasra numbers in the plaint covered his lands but it does not appear to have been in contest that the Khasra numbers in the record covered the disputed land. The only point to be proved there was whether the disputed land appertained to Ramchunderpur and this was shown by reference to the Bhauria or Survey numbers. The enquiry by the Amin would have been wholly useless unless the identity of the Khasra numbers in the record and the disputed land was assumed and no objection was taken to the admissibility of the evidence given on the report. The appeal therefore must be reheard unless the suit is as the Respondents contend, barred. The Subordinate Judge held that the suits were in time under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a point to which I will refer later. The appeal therefore must be reheard unless the suit is as the Respondents contend, barred. The Subordinate Judge held that the suits were in time under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, a point to which I will refer later. In the lower Appellate Court a fresh objection was taken on the ground of limitation, and it was held that Art. 120 applied. The grounds upon which the District Judge proceeded were that the suit was not one for the correction of the record under sec. 106 and that the Plaintiff had himself stated that his cause of action arose on the 22nd December 1892. In so stating an erroneous view was taken of his rights and of the nature of the suit. In a suit (such as this is) under sec. 106 the cause of action can only arise on the date of the final publication of the record-of-rights. The suit is not governed by Art. 120 which applies to suits for which no special provision is made but by the special provisions of sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. This part of the finding of the lower Appellate Court has hardly been attempted to be supported before us. The question which has been argued is whether assuming that sec. 106 applies, the suits have been brought within the two months mentioned in that section. It is said that the suits are barred as not having been instituted within two months of the publication of the record-of rights of Ramchunderpur (28th November 1900). I however agree with the conclusions and reasonings of the Subordinate Judge that the final publication mentioned in sec. 106 must be taken in this case to be final publication of the record-of-rights of the land itself which was done on the 19th December 1900 and nth February 1901 when the record-of-rights of the Defeneant's mouzahs were published containing the disputed land. As the Judge in my opinion rightly remarks, until the record-of-rights including the disputed lard was published how could the Plaintiff know whose name was recorded and whom to sue. Sec. 106 requires that there should be a dispute and for this two parties are necessary. It is said that the Plaintiff knew from before the publication of the Defendant's record that the dispute was with him. Sec. 106 requires that there should be a dispute and for this two parties are necessary. It is said that the Plaintiff knew from before the publication of the Defendant's record that the dispute was with him. But the dispute must be as to something in the record and this did not arise until a record was made including the Plaintiff's lands in the Defendant's mouzahs. 2. Next it is said that the name of the party against whom the original suit was brought and whose name was on the record (Lakmi Rani) was expunged and that the executors whose names were substituted are new Defendants within the meaning of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. I do not think that this is so. The Plaintiff might, I think, proceed either against the person whose name was recorded or any other person representing the same interest as the former person. I think it must be taken that Lakmi Rani's name was entered in the record as representing the estate of her deceased husband and that the executors do so in succession to her. They are not in my opinion new Defendants. The suits are therefore In time having been instituted within the period of two months of the publication of the record. 3. Lastly, it is said that the suit should fail because the Plaintiff has sued the wrong party. It is argued that the only person against whom he might proceed was the person whose name was recorded, viz, Lakmi Rani. But I do not think that is so, for if Lakmi Rani formerly represented the estate, he might and indeed should sue those who now in succession to her now do so. 4. There must therefore be a remand. The only question is as to the point to be remanded. Upon the facts in this case and for the reasons stated by my learned brother in the judgment he is about to deliver, I think that the only question which should be remanded is whether the Plaintiff is in possession of the disputed land in which case only he is entitled to have the record corrected in accordance with such possession. The costs will abide the result of the suit. The costs will abide the result of the suit. Though Lakmi Rani and the executors have been made parties, their appearance here appears to have been quite unnecessary as the interests of the estate have been represented by the Manager under the Court of Wards. I would therefore allow only one set of costs for the Respondents. Coxe, J. 5. With regard to the question whether the District Judge's decision on the facts is final and the question whether the suits are barred by sec. 22 of the Limitation Act, I agree fully with the observations of Mr. Justice Woodroffe. But as to the limitation of two months prescribed by sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, I agree with some hesitation. That section, as it stood when these suits were instituted, permitted the institution of a suit, within two months of the date of the final publication of the record, for the decision of disputes regarding entries in, or omissions from, the said record. Sec. 103A, sub sec. (3) provides for the publication of separate records for separate areas, apparently with the object of ensuring that a person aggrieved by an entry in a particular record should be compelled to sue within two months of publication of that record. In one of the present suits the Plaintiff sued for the transfer of the disputed lands from the village of Pursottampur to that of Ramchunderpur, by which he must be taken to have meant that certain entries should be expunged from the record of Purottampur and inserted in the record of Ramchunderpur with the modification that his own name should be substituted in the place of the Defendants as the landlord of the land. 6. Now no doubt the suits so far as they seek omissions in the records of Pursottampur and Debata Sahi are not barred As regards the village of Debata Sahi, no question of limitation appears to arise. But as regards the prayer for the entry in the record of Ramchunderpur of certain particulars now contained in the record of Pursottampur, I think it is open to considerable doubt if the suit is in time. It is argued that, the land being one and the same, limitation should run from the dale of the publication of the last entry affecting the land. It is argued that, the land being one and the same, limitation should run from the dale of the publication of the last entry affecting the land. But on the other hand, it may be said with some show of reason that, as the suit is not, and could not be, a suit for the recovery of land, or even for a declaration of a right to land, but only a suit for the correction of a record, the identity of the land can make no difference. Again it is argued that it takes two to make a quarrel, and that the publication of the record of Ramchunderpur, with the land omitted, could raise no "dispute " before the record of Pursottampur in which the land was definitely assigned to that village was published. To this, it has been answered by the learned pleader for the Respondents that, if a " dispute" cannot be raised by a mere omission, then in that case if Pursottampur had been a continuous village, not within the settled area, no "dispute" could ever have arisen, and the Plaintiff would have obtained no right of suit under sec. 106. It is argued that it cannot have been intended to limit the operation of the section in this way, and that it must have been intended that an omission should by itself justify a suit. 7. I think, therefore, that it is open to some doubt whether the Pursottampur suit, so far as it seeks the insertion of entries in the Ramchunderpur record, is in time. But the point is one of little practical importance. The Plaintiff may certainly sue for the exclusion of entries from the Pursottampur record, and the decision of that prayer will have the force of a decree. On the other hand, if he is barred by the lapse of time from suing to have these entries added to the Ramchunderpur record, the result-is that the dispute regarding the omissions in the Ramchunderpur record must be taken to have failed. Those omissions therefore must be regarded as undisputed omissions, and consequently their only effect is to give rise to certain presumptions of correctness which, if the Plaintiff is successful, the decree with respect to the Pursottampur record will at once rebut. In these circumstances I certainly do not think that I should be justified in dissenting from Mr. Those omissions therefore must be regarded as undisputed omissions, and consequently their only effect is to give rise to certain presumptions of correctness which, if the Plaintiff is successful, the decree with respect to the Pursottampur record will at once rebut. In these circumstances I certainly do not think that I should be justified in dissenting from Mr. Justice Woodroffe's conclusions and accordingly I agree that the suits are not barred by the limitation of two months prescribed by sec. 106. 8. The decision of the three points mentioned above in favour of the Plaintiff, would ordinarily necessitate a remand. But in framing the order for remand the question has arisen as to whether in a suit under sec. 106, the Plaintiff can plead his title, or whether the Court is confined to the question of possession. Moreover we were at first informed that the question of possession had been decided with respect to Pursottampur and Debata Sahi by awards under the Bengal Survey Act, 1875, and as an award under that Act carries the force of an order of a Civil Court declaring the possession of the parties, the further question arose whether, in the event of the suit having to be decided according to possession, the Plaintiff could be permitted to plead his possession in the teeth of the survey awards. The parties have accordingly been heard again on these points, and the record has been further examined. It is now clear for reasons that I will state later, that there is no bar to the consideration and decision of the question of possession, and all that remains to be decided is whether the Plaintiff is confined to proof of possession or can go further and ask the Court to adjudicate upon his title. 9. I am of opinion that he is confined to proof of possession. Sec. 106 provides that a suit may be instituted for the decision of any dispute, regarding any entry, which a Revenue Officer has made in a record of rights. Now the disputed entries in these suits are firstly, the entries which show that the disputed lands, the plot number of which are stated in the plaint, lie in the village of Pursottampur and Debata Sahi, and secondly, those which show that the landlord of those lands and the tenant thereon is the Defendant. Now the disputed entries in these suits are firstly, the entries which show that the disputed lands, the plot number of which are stated in the plaint, lie in the village of Pursottampur and Debata Sahi, and secondly, those which show that the landlord of those lands and the tenant thereon is the Defendant. And of these two sets of entries, those which show the Defendant to be the landlord are far the most important. It would be of little avail to the Plaintiff to prove that the lands lay in Ramchunderpur if the Defendant remained recorded as the landlord. How the landlord of any plot is to be ascertained, is therefore the first thing to decide. According to sec. 101 the record of rights is to be prepared in accordance with rules made in that behalf by the Local Government. Rule 8 of Chap. VI of the rules so made, prescribes that the record shall be contained in the khewat and khatian and Rule 9 deals with the preparation of the khewat, which is to show the character and extent of proprietary interests. It is to be first drawn up with reference to the registers kept by the Collector under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, registers which, it may be observed, are prepared according to possession and possession alone, as a reference to sees. 29, 32, 38, 52, 55, 59 of the Act will show. And as the record writing proceeds the khewat is to be altered in accordance with the facts of possession, alterations are to be notified to the Collector, in order that he may correct his registers which, as I have said are based exclusively on possession, and have no concern with title unaccompanied by possession. 10. Moreover the preparation of the record-of rights is usually preceded by a survey under the Bengal Survey Act, 1875, for the purposes of marking out the villages which are subsequently to be cadastrally surveyed and settled, and of settling all boundary disputes. It is in these proceedings that the names of the proprietors are first ascertained, and they have to be conducted with regard solely to the facts of possession, as a reference to sec. 41 of the Act will show. 11. It is in these proceedings that the names of the proprietors are first ascertained, and they have to be conducted with regard solely to the facts of possession, as a reference to sec. 41 of the Act will show. 11. Moreover, to look at the matter from a different standpoint, it is evident that in proceedings under the Tenancy Act no disputes of title between rival proprietors, considered merely as proprietors, can legitimately arise. The Act deals with the relations of landlords and tenants, and it is no part of its purposes to regulate disputes between rival proprietors, except in so far as such disputes affect their relations with their tenants. And the practical effect of sec. 60 of the Act is to render it unnecessary to go into questions of title in order to ascertain who is the landlord of any tenant. It is necessary only to ascertain who is the registered proprietor; and the registered proprietor, as has been pointed out above, is the proprietor in possession, be the title with whom it may. 12. These considerations demonstrate, and indeed the learned pleader for the Appellant concedes, that in framing a record-of-rights under sec. 103A of the Act, the Revenue Officer must record the proprietors according to possession. But it is contended that when the record has been finally published, and disputes have arisen about its correctness with respect to the interest of proprietors, the Revenue Officer is no longer confined to the question of possession, but may go into questions of title and may decide who, by reason of his title, irrespective of his possession, should be regarded as the true landlord. 13. For this view there is undoubtedly much to be said. In the first place the wording of the section is very comprehensive. It authorises the Revenue Officer to decide any dispute regarding any entry. But I think it is reasonable to suppose that these words are confined to disputes, which may legitimately arise from incorrect entries. 13. For this view there is undoubtedly much to be said. In the first place the wording of the section is very comprehensive. It authorises the Revenue Officer to decide any dispute regarding any entry. But I think it is reasonable to suppose that these words are confined to disputes, which may legitimately arise from incorrect entries. If the entries have been made in strict accordance with rules of Government which have the force of law, and show all that a record-of-rights is required to show, I do not think that the section authorises an objector to plead that, although the record has been properly prepared and gives a correct view of the landlords and tenants actually on the land; yet it ought to be altered and prepared other-wise than in accordance with the rules, because it is incorrect for the purpose of ascertaining the legal titles of the proprietors, a purpose which is not one of the purposes either of the Tenancy-Act or of a settlement under it. 14. Secondly, it is pointed out that sec. 109A gives a right of appeal to a Special Judge, and of second appeal to the High Court, and it is argued that, if suits under sec 106 were confined to questions of possession, there would be no more need of this appellate machinery, than there is in cases under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. This argument however is two-edged for, as has been pointed out by the learned pleader for the Respondent, if Revenue Officers may decide pure questions of title between rival proprietors, it is strange that, in cases of high value, the first appeal should lie to the Special Judge, and that there should be no appeal on the facts to the High Court But the true answer to the argument is that suits between rival proprietors form but an insignificant fraction of the suits, with which sec. 106 deals. Almost all the suits brought under this section are suits between tenant and tenant, or between landlord and tenant, and relate to entries to which the rule quoted above for the preparation of the khewat has no application. 106 deals. Almost all the suits brought under this section are suits between tenant and tenant, or between landlord and tenant, and relate to entries to which the rule quoted above for the preparation of the khewat has no application. For such suits the appellate machinery described in sec 109A is clearly necessary, and this fact seems to me to render it unsafe to draw any inference from the fact, that that machinery is unsuitable for the rare and exceptional cases of which the present suits are examples. 15. Thirdly, we have been referred to the Board's Instructions These have not the force of law, but non the less, deserve great respect as indicating the view of the most experienced Revenue Officers of the scope of the law which they are accustomed to administer. In Rule a of Chap. 9 of Part III of the Survey and Settlement Manual it is stated that disputes under sec. 106 may be regarding possession on regarding right or title; and further on, it is said that suits to obtain possession may be accepted. But here too, it is possible that the experienced authors of these rules were not adverting to disputes between proprietors, but were thinking of the suits, which probably form an overwhelming majority of suits brought under sec. 106, namely, suits between tenant and tenant, or between landlord and tenant, in which questions other than that of possession may legitimately arise. This explanation will not apply to the concluding words of Rule II, Chap 5, Part II of the Manual, and with regard to those words I can only say with all respect, that I am unable to agree that they are a correct statement of the law. 16. As has been said, it is conceded that the Revenue Officer in dealing with the rights of proprietors, is confined to the question of possession when he is farming the record. 16. As has been said, it is conceded that the Revenue Officer in dealing with the rights of proprietors, is confined to the question of possession when he is farming the record. If then the entries are accurate according to the method by which the record must necessarily be prepared, and show merely the facts of possession, and neither show nor are intended to show with whom the title to the land rests; it seems to me that they cannot reasonably be held to give rise to a cause of action for a suit to declare that though originally they were correctly prepared, they are inaccurate from another point of view, and do not show what they were never intended to show. The result is that, in my opinion, the Revenue Officer in deciding disputes between rival proprietors under sec. 106, is confined to the question of possession, and I feel no doubt that a Civil Court to which a suit is transferred under the proviso to that section, cannot have any wider jurisdiction than the transferring Revenue Officer himself could exercise. 17. It is necessary, in conclusion, to deal with a point that has been argued on behalf of the Respondent to the effect, that the question of possession has already been finally decided. The survey award to which a reference has already been made was found on examination, to relate to the land claimed by the Plaintiff within the village of Sasantima. The suit relating to that village has been dismissed. With respect to the villages of Pursottampur and Debata Sahi a decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer, dated the 6th October 1893, about a year after the survey proceedings, is put forward. It is argued that as the Assistant Settlement Officer was empowered to act under Survey Act, this decision must be regarded as a survey award. This however by no means follows The usual course, I believe, is that the area to be settled is first surveyed under the Survey Act, the villages demarcated, and the proprietors ascertained. Thereafter the cadastral survey of the lands, village by village, and the preparation of the record-of-rights under the Tenancy Act is taken in hand. Because the same officers may be employed throughout, it does not follow that in the second stage of the proceedings they are exercising the powers which were suitable to the first. Thereafter the cadastral survey of the lands, village by village, and the preparation of the record-of-rights under the Tenancy Act is taken in hand. Because the same officers may be employed throughout, it does not follow that in the second stage of the proceedings they are exercising the powers which were suitable to the first. I feel no doubt that the Assistant Settlement Officer's order, whatever, it may be, is not an award under the Survey Act. What precisely it is it is by no means easy to say, but to take it at its highest value it can only be one of two things. That is to say, it may be either the summary disposal of an objection under the Tenancy Act as it then stood, or if it is taken to be the decision of a dispute under the Civil Procedure Code, it can only be regarded as a dismissal of the Plaintiffs suit in default under sec 157 of the Code. In neither case, can it be regarded as precluding the Plaintiff from now proving that he is in possession of the disputed land. Accordingly, I would set aside the decision of the District Judge, and remand the cases for decision of the question whether the Plaintiff is in possession of the disputed land, as the Special Judge has found. If the learned District Judge finds that the Plaintiff is in possession, he should direct the entry of his name as landlord in the records under sec. 107, sub-sec. (2). Otherwise the suits should be dismissed.