JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - This is not a case where money has been paid to stay a sale in execution by a person who intends to bring a suit to test the right of a decree-holder to attach and sell. Therefore we are not concerned with any oases which have these facts as the basis of their decision, we are concerned with the particular facts of this particular case. The case before us is one where the Plaintiffs property was in fact sold for the debt of his sister. The ordinary procedure In such a case would be that a suit should be brought by the person whose property has been so sold to establish his title. If he succeeded, he would get back his property and if the auction-purchaser was thus deprived of the property by reason of the want of saleable interest in the judgment-debtor he would be entitled to a refund of the purchase-money. On the other hand, the decree-holder who had by reason of the establishment of the Plaintiffs title been deprived of the proceeds of sale for the satisfaction of his debt, would be entitled to proceed against other properties of the judgment-debtor for the purpose of such satisfaction. In this the ordinary way the rights of all the parties would have worked out. In 1894, the Legislature introduced into the CPC a special provision for the benefit of the judgment-debtor and any person whose Immoveable property had been sold in execution. Such a person might at any time within thirty days from the date of sale apply to have the sale set aside on making certain deposits in Court. Now, what has happened is shortly this that the Plaintiff instead of pursuing the ordinary course, the one which I have indicated, mistook his remedy and applied under sec. 310A of the CPC which had no application to his case. He could not in fact, apply under that section which applies only to oases of persons whose interest are affected by the sale. The Plaintiff was not a parson whose Interest was affected by the sale and he could not have applied under the terms of that section. He was not merely not bound but he was not entitled to have the sale set aside. The Plaintiff was not a parson whose Interest was affected by the sale and he could not have applied under the terms of that section. He was not merely not bound but he was not entitled to have the sale set aside. The sale however was wrongly set aside at his instance and he now wants back the money which has been paid to set aside the sale and which has been made over to the decree-holder. 2. I do not myself think that he is entitled to get this money back. The property, as I have said, had been sold. His remedy was not that under sec. 310A, C.P.C., for be was not affected by the execution proceedings. This was not a case in which the money had been deposited for the purpose of staying the execution. The execution proceedings had, except as regards those of confirmation, practically came to an end and would have come to an end but for sec. 310A. It is said that there are equities in favour of the Plaintiff. For my part I think that, with the exception of one circumstance, all the equities appear to be the other way. Owing to the erroneous and unwarranted action of the Plaintiff in applying under provisions which had no relation to his case, the sale was set aside and the purchase-money which would have been available to the decree-holder was turned away. It is true that instead of that money which would have been available for the purpose of the decree-holder's debt was substituted the money of the present Appellant. But he now seeks to get the money back. In short having wrongfully deprived the decree-holder of the benefit of his case he in addition seeks to deprive him of the money conditional upon the payment of which alone the sale was set aside. Further the position of the decree-holder appears to be likely to be a difficult one if he is deprived of this money. It is doubtful whether under the circumstances of this case the execution proceedings could be revived. 3. According to the evidence adduced in the lower Court the judgment-debtor who is the Appellant's sister is a lady of property and who is in a position to satisfy the debt. It is doubtful whether under the circumstances of this case the execution proceedings could be revived. 3. According to the evidence adduced in the lower Court the judgment-debtor who is the Appellant's sister is a lady of property and who is in a position to satisfy the debt. The money which was paid by the Appellant was paid directly for her benefit and by the payment her debt was satisfied. 4. It appears to me that the justice of the case requires that at any rate the decree-holder should not be called upon to refund the money. 5. Whether or not the money is properly recoverable from the judgment-debtor, we are not concerned, because the judgment-debtor has not appealed against the decision of the lower Appellate Court. I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs, a separate set of costs is payable to the auction-purchaser who has been made a party. Coxe, J. 6. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. 7. The decision in Jugdeo Narain Singh v. Raja Singh ILR 15 Cal. 656 (1888) seems to be authority for the proposition that when A's property is notified for sale as being the property of B in execution of a decree against B and A, after an unsuccessful objection, pays the decretal amount in order to prevent the sale, the payment is not a voluntary one and A is entitled to sue the decree-holder for a refund. The difficulty of reconciling this view with Chap. V of the Contract Act Is evident from the observations of Markby, J., quoted in the ruling. The learned Judges, however, considered that they were bound by the decision of the Privy Council in Dulichand v. Ram Kishen Sing ILR 7 Cal. 648 (1881), in which it was held that such a payment was not a voluntary one but made under the compulsion of law. It may seem somewhat anomalous that when a third party deposits money in order to prevent a sale, the payment should be involuntary; but then when he pays money after the sale in order to set it aside it should be voluntary. If in the latter case he is not a person whose immoveable property has been sold, it would seem that in the former case also he is not a person whose immoveable property is going to be sold. If in the latter case he is not a person whose immoveable property has been sold, it would seem that in the former case also he is not a person whose immoveable property is going to be sold. But I think it would be still more anomalous to hold that a payment which a prior purchaser is not authorized by law to make is a payment made, to quote the words used in Dulichand v. Ram Kishan Sing ILR 7 Cal. 648 (1881), under the compulsion of law. I do not think, therefore, that we are bound to decide this case on the principle which was laid down in Dulichand v. Ram Kishen Sing ILR 7 Cal. 648 (1881) in which case, all the circumstances, besides the fact that the Bale had not taken place, were altogether different. In that case the decree-holder had no equitable right to retain the money at all; whereas in the present case the District Judge finds that the decree-holder acted perfectly bond fide and the property that he attached was in the name of his judgment-debtor. I think therefore that the Plaintiff is not entitled under sec. 72 of the Contract Act to recover the money from the decree-holder, and as regards his claim to recover on the general equities of the case I agree entirely with the observations of my learned brother.