Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (March 6, 1900), affirming a decree of the District Judge of Rae Bareli (January 23, 1899). The appellants sued as next heirs to recover possession of the estate of Sitla Bakhsh Singh, who died prior to the annexation of Oudh, leaving him surviving a widow, Daryao Kunwar, and two daughters, Janga Kunwar and Jagrani Kunwar. The widow succeeded to possession of the estate, and died on August 6, 1892; and the main question raised in this appeal was whether the appellants on her death became entitled to the immediate possession of the estate to the exclusion of the daughters and their issue. The respondent is the son of the said Jagrani Kunwar, who married one Maheshar Bakhsh Singh. Daryao Kunwar had during her lifetime executed several conveyances of portions of the estate. On October 21, 1872, she sold the village of Surpur to Maheshar Bakhsh for Rs. 1000. On the same date she sold the villages of Misirpur and Mansahpur to the same person for Rs. 900 and Rs.1000 respectively. On July 24, 1875, she sold the remaining portion of the estate to Maheshar Bakhsh for Rs. 9000. In pursuance of these sale deeds the purchaser was placed in possession and his name duly recorded in the revenue registers. In 1873 Matadin, the father of the appellants, sued Daryao Kunwar to obtain a declaration that the said sale deeds dated October 21, 1872, should be cancelled and set aside. That suit was dismissed by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner on May 6, 1874. A similar suit by Janga Kunwar, one of the daughters of Sitla Bakhsh, was also dismissed on August 25, 1876. Subsequently, on May 4, 1877, some of the contingent reversioners to the estate, including Baijnath, the father of Mahpal Singh, one of the plaintiffs since deceased, executed a deed by which they ratified and confirmed the said deeds of sale executed by Daryao Kunwar, and on January 29, 1878, a similar deed was executed by Janga Kunwar and Matadin Singh, the father of the appellants Bajrangi and Jagdamba. After the death of Daryao Kunwar in 1892, and of Maheshar Bakhsh in 1893, the name of Maheshars son, the respondent, was entered in the revenue records and he was placed in pos-session of the estate in dispute. After the death of Daryao Kunwar in 1892, and of Maheshar Bakhsh in 1893, the name of Maheshars son, the respondent, was entered in the revenue records and he was placed in pos-session of the estate in dispute. In 1894 the predecessors of the appellants sued, alleging that the said sale deeds were not executed under circumstances which would bind the reversioners, and claiming certain movable property as well as the said villages. It was further contended that daughters and their issue were excluded from succession by the custom of the tribe. The respondent denied the title of the appellants, and alleged that the succession was governed by the ordinary Hindu law, and not by custom. He pleaded that Daryao Kunwar had an absolute title to all the property in suit except one house, and had bequeathed the movable property to him by her will dated November 18, 1887. He also contended that the said sale deeds bound the plaintiffs, not only because of the circumstances under which they were executed. but also in consequence of their con-firmation by the deeds executed by Baijnath and Matadin in 1877 and 1878. The District Judge decided (a) that the plaintiffs were not the nearest heirs ; (b) that the custom was not proved; (c) that the sale deeds were not binding as having been executed under legal necessity; (d) that the suit was not barred by limitation. On these findings he dismissed the suit. The appellate Court decided (a) that the plaintiffs were on the pedigree the nearest male heirs of Sitla Bakhsh Singh ; [b) that the custom excluding daughters and their issue was sufficiently proved ; and (c) that the conveyances executed by Daryao Kunwar in favour of Maheshar Bakhsh Singh, having been ratified and confirmed by Baijnath and Matadin, were binding on the plaintiffs. He accordingly affirmed the decree of the District Judge. The main issue in the appeal was as to the validity and effect of the sale deeds taken in connection with the subsequent deeds of agreement. Upon this issue the District Judge expressed himself as follows— " The correct view of the law appears from I. L. R. 10 Cale. He accordingly affirmed the decree of the District Judge. The main issue in the appeal was as to the validity and effect of the sale deeds taken in connection with the subsequent deeds of agreement. Upon this issue the District Judge expressed himself as follows— " The correct view of the law appears from I. L. R. 10 Cale. 1102) to be that the widow can relinquish her estate in favour of the next reversioner ; that the latter can thereupon transfer the property; to any one he pleases, and therefore the widow, with the consent of the nearest reversioner, can alienate the property. It is a very different proposition to say that the widow can alienate and subsequently get the alienation ratified by the heirs of her husband. I do not think that the Calcutta Full Bench ruling referred to justifies such a conclusion. The principles of estoppel would, I consider, apply to the former state of things, and not to the latter. The consent of the heirs of her husband might lead a widow to make an alienation which, but for that consent, she would never have made. In such a case the widows position would be altered by the consent of the heirs. This leads me to the argument put forward by Mr. Lincoln for the plaintiffs, that acquiescence to be binding must amount to an estoppel. It is clear that the agreements in question would not act as estoppels, as the widow was in no way induced to alter her position. On the contrary, they confirmed her in the position which she had taken up five or six years earlier. Nor can the agreements be binding as contracts, for there was no consideration. They are in my opinion only promises to abstain from disputing the alienations made by Musammat Daryao Kunwar, and amount to admissions, and, therefore, are conclusive. On these grounds I find that the suit is not barred by the agreements in question having been executed by Matadin and Baijnath." The Court of the Judicial Commissioner upon this issue referred to Rajkristo Roy v. Kishen Mohun ((186} 3 S. W. R. 14.); Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah ((1801) 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529, 551.) ; Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry (13 Moo. lnd. Ap. Ind. Ap. 529, 551.) ; Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry (13 Moo. lnd. Ap. 209, 228.); Nobokishore Sharma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy (( 1884) I. L. R 10 Calc. 1102.) ; Ram Chunder Poddar v. Hari Das Sen (( 1882) I. L. R. 9 Calc. 463.); Gopeenath Mookerjee v. Knlly Doss Mullick(( 1883) I. L. R. 10 Calc. 225.) ; Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kuari (( 1885) I. L. R. 6 Allah. 116.) ; Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal (( 1891 L. R 19 Ind. Ap. 30.); and concluded "On a consideration of the cases cited it appears to me that a conveyance by a widow made with the consent of all the heirs of her husband living at the time, will conclude a person not living at the time who may be the heir of the husband at the time of the widows death. In this view, if the transfers by Daryao Kunwar in favour of Maheshar Bakhsh Singh had been executed by Sheo Bakhsh Singh, Sheonarain Singh, Sheodayal Singh, Baijnath Singh, Hanuman Singh, and Matadin Singh, or those persons had at that time in any other manner signified their consent to such transfers, such transfers would be valid as against the appellants, even if there were no legal necessity for them. Those persons did not at the time of the transfers signify their consent to them. They did so subsequently by the deeds of agreement, dated respectively May 4, 1877, and January 29, 1878. The question then arises as to what the legal effect of the transfers, taken with the deeds of agreement, is. "It was not disputed that the executants of these deeds received consideration for ratifying the transfers and agreeing not to dispute their validity. Indeed, it was said that they were paid to execute the deeds. It was argued that they had mere contingent reversionary interests in expectancy, and such interests could not be released or relinquished. It sems to me that the argument does not touch the point, which is, whether the effect of the transfers, taken with the deeds of agreement, is the same as if the executants of those deeds had joined Daryao Kunwar in transferring the property, or had at the time of the transfers consented to them. I am unable to see any distinction between the two cases. I am unable to see any distinction between the two cases. It seems to me that the transfers, when ratified by the reversionary heirs for consideration, have the same effect as if the reversionary heirs had joined in making the transfers, or had consented to them at the time they were made. I am of opinion, therefore, that the transfers having been ratified for consideration by the reversionary heirs, are valid as against the appellants and Mahpal Singh, who were not reversionary heirs at the time the deeds of agreement were executed, even if there were no legal necessity for them. Further, I think that the questions as to whether Daryao Kunwar understood the nature of the transfers, or as to whether the transfers were colourable, do not arise. If they do, the appellants were bound to give some proof that the transfers would not be binding on Daryao Kunwar, or that they were colourable, and they have given none. " Although, therefore, I think that at the time when Daryao Kunwar died the appellants were the heirs of her husband, that Daryao Kunwar was in possession of the property in dispute as a Hindu widow, and that the appellants have proved that by custom the property of a Bhale Sultan Chhattri devolves upon his collateral male kindred, notwithstanding his daughter or her sons may be living, yet, as I think that the sales of the property in suit by Daryao Kunwar to the defendants father are valid as against the appellants, I am of opinion that the appeal fails." Boss, for the appellants, contended that inasmuch as it was proved that they were the nearest reversionary heirs of Sitla Bakhsh, and that the sales in question effected by Daryao Kunwar were not made under legal necessity, or with a view to the spiritual welfare of the deceased, those sales did not operate to bind the interests of the appellants in the property sold. The appellants sued as the nearest reversionary heirs of Sitla Bakhsh in existence at the time the succession opened. They are not barred by any disclaimer of reversionary rights made by their ancestors. The reversionary interest is a contingent one. The appellants sued as the nearest reversionary heirs of Sitla Bakhsh in existence at the time the succession opened. They are not barred by any disclaimer of reversionary rights made by their ancestors. The reversionary interest is a contingent one. There is no actual vested interest until the widow dies, and a sale of contingent rights, where the contingency never happens, the widow surviving the contingent reversioner, has no effect upon the proprietary right, and does not bind the actual reversioner who, on the death of the widow, succeeds by inheritance to her husbands estate. His title is direct from the deceased owner, and is not derived from preceding reversioners who never had title of any kind to transmit, the contingency on which their title would accrue never having happened. The respondent relies on certain reversioners having ratified the widows sales for consideration. This ratification, it was contended, bound only the contingent reversioners who signed, but not the actual reversioners ,who were no parties to the transaction, but succeeded by a title independent of that claimed by those who signed. Reference was made to Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah. (8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529.) In the cases cited in the judgment appealed from, the widow aliened after obtaining the reversioners consent. Here a subsequent ratification is relied upon, and that by reversioners other than the plaintiffs. Reference was made to Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Single (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 1, 8.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 855, and 6th ed. pp. 687, 638; Bhagivanta v. Snkhi. (( 1899) I. L. R. 22 Allah. 33.) On the question whether a custom to exclude daughters from inheritance was established by the evidence, reference was made to Lekraj Kuar v. Mahpal Singh (( 1879) L. R. 7 Ind. Ap. 63.); Uman Parshad v. Gandharp Singh (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 127.) ; Musst. Lali v. Murli Dhar (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 97.), which relate to the probative value of wajib-ul-arzes. De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the appellants were bound by the deeds of sale in question. The consent of the reversioners was obtained. It made no difference that it was after and not at the time of the transactions of sale. Ap. 97.), which relate to the probative value of wajib-ul-arzes. De Gruyther, for the respondent, contended that the appellants were bound by the deeds of sale in question. The consent of the reversioners was obtained. It made no difference that it was after and not at the time of the transactions of sale. The effect of that consent, being of all those who were likely to be interested in disputing the transaction, was to validate the widows alienation as having been fairly made under such circumstances as would justify it by Hindu law. It placed the widow in the same position as if actual necessity had been proved. The consent operated to remove the usual restrictions on her power of alienation. Besides being a proof of good faith, the effect of such consent must be considered in reference to the established principle that a Hindu widow can surrender her estate to the next contingent reversioner, and thereby vest in him an absolute title to her deceased husbands estate. His consent to her alienation to a third party has a like effect, and operates to validate it even in the absence of legal necessity. Reference was made to Jadomoney Dabee v. Saroda Prosono Mookerjee (( 1856) 1 Boulnois, 120.); Dibeah v. Korad Lala (( 1847) 4 Moo. Ind. Ap. 292.); Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah (8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529, 550.) ; Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry (13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 209, 228.); Nobokishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy (I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1102.); Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal. (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 30.) He also contended that the appellants were not proved to be the nearest reversionary heirs of Sitla Bakhsh, and that the tribal custom excluding the daughters was not proved, and in consequence the daughters were the next heirs to Sitla Bakhsh, and not the appellants. Ross replied, citing Indian Evidence Act, s. 32, sub-s. 4, and s. 48, and Behari Lal v. Madho Lal Ahir Gyawal. (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 30.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. Sitla Bakhsh Singh, a Hindu of the tribe of Bhale Sultan Chhattris, resident in Sultanpur, died some time before the annexation of Oudh, leaving him surviving a widow named Daryao Kunwar, and two daughters, Janga Kunwar and Jagrani Kunwar. (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 30.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ANDREW SCOBLE. Sitla Bakhsh Singh, a Hindu of the tribe of Bhale Sultan Chhattris, resident in Sultanpur, died some time before the annexation of Oudh, leaving him surviving a widow named Daryao Kunwar, and two daughters, Janga Kunwar and Jagrani Kunwar. He was absolute owner of an estate known as Pindara Karnai and other property, which at his death passed to his widow, and, at her death, would have passed to his daughters, but for a custom of the tribe excluding daughters and their issue from succession. The widow died on August 6, 1892, having previously sold the whole of the estate to her son-in-law Maheshar Bakhsh Singh, the husband of her daughter Jagrani Kunwar, and mutation of names in the Revenue Registers was effected in his favour. After the death of Maheshar, which occurred on April 3, 1893, the name of his son, Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh, the present respondent, was entered in the Government records as proprietor of the estate ; and the present appellants (with one Mahpal Singh, who died while the case was pending) brought the suit now under appeal, claiming that, by reason of the custom of the Bhale Sultan Chhattris, they were the next heirs in the reversion of the estate of Sitla Bakhsh. In the Courts below, and before their Lordships, two main questions were raised First, whether the custom had been proved; and, secondly, whether certain deeds confirming the sales by the widow to Maheshar, executed by the then nearest reversioners, and disclaiming all title to the property in dispute, were binding on their descendants, the appellants, who were the nearest reversioners at the time when the succession opened, at the widows death. In the Courts in India, the District Judge held the custom not proved and the deeds not binding; the Judicial Commissioner came to the exactly opposite conclusion on both points. The conflict of opinion in the Courts in India upon the question of custom has made it necessary for their Lordships to examine carefully the evidence in this case, in order to ascertain whether the alleged custom has been satisfactorily proved. In making this examination, their Lordships have been materially assisted by the elaborate analysis of the evidence made by both the learned judges below, and by the learned counsel who argued the appeal. In making this examination, their Lordships have been materially assisted by the elaborate analysis of the evidence made by both the learned judges below, and by the learned counsel who argued the appeal. They will briefly state the grounds on which they consider the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner on this point must prevail. The Bhale Sultan clan appear to have derived their name, some three centuries ago, from their warlike exploits in the service of the Emperors of Delhi. They are now settled in considerable numbers in the district of Sultanpur in Oudh, in several villages, in which they constitute the bulk of the population. In the language of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 48, they form a “considerable class of persons." The evidence in support of the custom was mainly oral, and no document was produced of an earlier date than the British annexation. Thirty-five witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellants. They were all members of the Bhale Sultan clan, mostly men of mature age and of good position. They all gave evidence that in their clan it was the custom that daughters and their issue were excluded from succession to the separated estate of their father, and put forward thirty-nine instances in which this exclusion had taken place. The Judicial Commissioner held that twenty of these instances had been satisfactorily proved. For the respondent no evidence was given in contradiction of these instances, though ample time was allowed for the production of such testimony had it been available ; but six witnesses were called, one of whom had signed a wajib-ul-arz in which the custom was set up, and two gave evidence in support of the custom. In corroboration of the oral evidence, a number of village administration papers (wajib-ul-arz) were produced, of which seven were admitted by both Courts to be relevant, as relating to Bhale Sultan villages. In all these the rule is stated that a daughter and her issue do not alal-umum (that is, as a general rule) obtain the share. One of them is attested by forty-four zemindars and lambardars of the village, another by forty-nine, others by eight or ten. The dates of these documents are not given, but they were all officially recorded prior to the institution of this suit, and quite independently of the parties thereto. One other piece of evidence remains to be noticed. One of them is attested by forty-four zemindars and lambardars of the village, another by forty-nine, others by eight or ten. The dates of these documents are not given, but they were all officially recorded prior to the institution of this suit, and quite independently of the parties thereto. One other piece of evidence remains to be noticed. It has been stated that Sitla Bakhsh left two daughters, Janga Kunwar and Jagrani Kunwar. In 1876 Janga Kunwar filed a suit against her mother Daryao Kunwar and her brother-in-law Maheshar Bakhsh for a declaratory decree that she was entitled to succeed to half her fathers estate; and in answer to her claim, the vakil for the defendants put forward the plea that " among Bhale Sultans a daughter never succeeded to the inheritance of her father." The Court came to no decision on the point, but disposed of the suit on another ground, reserving Janga Kunwars right to put forward her claim on the death of her mother. The fact, however, that thi defence was raised shews that the existence of the custom was present to the mind of Daryao Kunwar at the date of the transactions to which their Lordships will now proceed to refer. Although Daryao Kunwar appears to have been willing to invoke the custom as a defence against the claim of her unmarried daughter, she was at the same time endeavouring to defeat the operation of the custom in regard to her married daughter, Jagrani Kunwar, and her husband, Maheshar Bakhsh Singh, the father of the present respondent. During the period from October 21, 1872, to July 24, 1875, she executed five deeds of sale, by which she purported to transfer, for valuable consideration, successive portions of her husbands property to Maheshar Singh. The District Judge has found that these deeds were executed without "legal necessity "; and it is certain that the preliminary consent of her husbands reversionary heirs was not obtained. One of these heirs, Matadin Singh, the father of the appellants Jagdamba Singh and Bajrangi Singh, brought a suit in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner of Sultanpur in 1873 to set aside three of the deeds ; but on appeal this suit was dismissed on a technical ground by the Judicial Commissioner on May 6, 1874. Janga Kunwars suit, already referred to, was . dismissed on August 25, 1876. Janga Kunwars suit, already referred to, was . dismissed on August 25, 1876. Having thus succeeded for the time being in the Courts, Daryao Kunwar entered into negotiations with the persons who were at that time admittedly the nearest reversionary heirs to her husbands estate, and obtained from them two documents called deeds of relinquishment, one dated May 4, 1877, and the other dated January 29, 1878. The first of these was signed by five persons, four of whom died without issue in Daryao Kunwars lifetime, and the fifth, Baijnath Singh, is the father of the plaintiff Mahpal Singh, who died while this suit was pending in the Court of the District Judge, and is now represented by the appellants. The second was signed by Janga Kunwar, Matadin Singh (the father of the present appellants), and Hanuman Singh, who is still living, but is not a party to this suit. In these documents, which are identical in terms, after enumerating the sales by Daryao Kunwar to Maheshar Singh, the executants go on to say " We all have given our full consent to all those sale-deeds which the Thakurain has executed in favour of the Babu, and will ever remain so satisfied. And after the death of the Thakurain we shall bring no claim against the Babu on account of the moveable and immoveable property owned by her; hence we have executed this deed of agreement so that it may serve as an authority and be of use in time of need." "It was not disputed," says the Judicial Commissioner in his judgment," that the executants of these deeds received consideration for ratifying the transfers and agreeing not to dispute their validity. Indeed it was said that they were paid to execute the deeds." Upon these facts, the Judicial Commissioner found that the transfers to Maheshar Singh were valid and dismissed the appeal. The restrictions imposed by the Hindu law upon the widows power to alienate her deceased husbands estate have frequently been the subject of consideration by this Committee. "For religions or charitable purposes, or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband, she has a larger power of disposition than that which she possesses for purely worldly purposes. To support an alienation for the last she must shew necessity. "For religions or charitable purposes, or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband, she has a larger power of disposition than that which she possesses for purely worldly purposes. To support an alienation for the last she must shew necessity. On the other hand it may be taken as established that an alienation by her which would not otherwise be legitimate may become so if made with the consent of her husbands kindred" Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah. (8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529, at p. 551.) "The kindred in such case,” their Lordships observe in a later case," must generally be understood to be all those who are likely to be interested in disputing the transaction. At all events, there should be such a concurrence of the members of the family as suffices to raise a presumption that the trans-action was a fair one, and one justified by Hindu law " Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry. (13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 209, at p. 228.) Upon the practical application of this general principle there has been much discussion in the High Courts in India. A Full Bench of the High Court at Allahabad, in the case of Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kuari (I. L. R. 6Allah. 116,), considered that "The plain principle deducible from these rulings of the Privy Council is that in order to validate an alienation by a Hindu widow of her deceased husbands estate for purposes other than those sanctioned by the Hindu law, it must have the consent of all those among his kindred who can reasonably be regarded as having an interest in questioning the transaction." And they accordingly held that the consent of the heir presumptive to an alienation by a widow was not sufficient to defeat the rights of a more remote reversioner, and that an assignment by the widow to the heir presumptive had no greater effect in her favour than it would have had if he had been a stranger. "We think," say the learned judges, "that the spirit of the Hindu law is to keep the right of succession to the deceased husbands estate open until the widows death, free of any control by her, except in such cases as she has a power to adopt; and that no reversioner possesses such a present vested interest as enables him to combine with her in defeating his co-reversioners. In other words, her right and theirs have one common basis, that of survivorship to the widow, and it is incapable of anticipation" The High Court of Calcutta has taken a different view, based upon a long current of authority in that Court, albeit two of the learned judges, Garth C.J. and Pigot J., considered that the principles on which the decision was founded were open to great objection. In the case of Nobokishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy (I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1102.) a Full Bench held that, under the Hindu law current in Bengal, " A transfer or conveyance by a widow upon the ostensible ground of legal necessity, such transfer or con veyance being assented to by the person who at the time is the next reversioner, will conclude an other person not a party thereto, who is the actual reversioner upon the death of the widow, from asserting his title to the property." The ground of the decision is thus shortly stated by Garth C.J. "If it is once established as a matter of law that a widow may relinquish her estate in favour of her husbands heir for the time being, it seems impossible to prevent any alienation which the widow and the next heir may agree to make." And more fully by Mitter J. " Whatever conflict there may be upon the question whether a Hindu widow may sell the whole inheritance without any legal necessity, merely with the consent of the next male heir, there is no conflict in the decisions, since the case of Jadomoney (1 Boulnois, 120.) was decided in the late Supreme Court of Calcutta, upon the question whether the relinquishment by a Hindu widow of her estate to the next male heir of her husband is valid or not. Such relinquishment by the widow has been held for a long series of years to be valid. .... Such relinquishment by the widow has been held for a long series of years to be valid. .... But if the widow is competent to relinquish her estate to the next male heir of her husband, it follows, as a logical consequence, that she can alienate it merely with his consent without any legal necessity." In a subsequent case, Radha Shyam v. Joy Ram Senapati (( 1890) I. L. R. 17 Calc. 896.), the same High Court held that the consent must be of the whole body of persons constituting the next reversion. The Calcutta decision, of course, is not binding upon other High Courts, but it has been followed in Madras. In the case of Marudamuthu Nadan v. Srinivasa Pillai (( 1898) I. L. R. 21 Madr. 128.), decided by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in 1898, Subramania Ayyar J. says "I think it unnecessary to go into the question whether the Hindu law, according to the texts or the commentaries, lends support to the doctrine that a female holding a qualified estate can validly surrender such an estate so as to entitle the then immediate reversioner to enter upon the inheritance and to hold it absolutely as if the succession had opened by the natural or civil death of the qualified owner. Though there has been no course of decisions on the point in this Presidency as in Bengal, yet instances have occurred which shew that parties have acted upon the view that such surrenders are valid in these parts as well. This appears even from some of the cases which have come before the Court. Since there is nothing in the doctrine itself which makes it less suited to the community in this Presidency than to the community in Bengal, it is not surprising that the Calcutta rulings have in practice been followed in this Presidency also. In such circumstances the rule, as stated by the Judicial Committee in Behari Lal v. Madho Lal (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. In such circumstances the rule, as stated by the Judicial Committee in Behari Lal v. Madho Lal (L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 30.), should, I think, be taken to be a rule applicable to this Presidency too, subject, no doubt, to the restriction pointed out by their Lordships, viz., that the surrender should be absolute and complete, and that the whole limited estate should be with-drawn, a restriction that would guard against the injurious results which would follow if the rule were not so qualified." The question was also considered by the High Court of Bombay in 1901 in the case of Vinayak v. Govind.(( 1900) I. L. R. 25 Bomb. 129.) In the course of his judgment Jenkins C.J. says (lbid. at p. 133.) " There can be no question that, apart from legal necessity, a widow can validly alienate land that has devolved upon her from her husband with the con-sent of the reversioner. The basis on which this rests is a matter of controversy. The High Court of Calcutta on the whole appears to favour the view that the consent derives its effect from the power supposed to reside in a widow of accelerating, by the surrender of her own interest, the interests of the reversioners. It is impossible not to feel some difficulty as to this doctrine. .... The other view is that the consent of the persons interest ed to oppose the transaction evidences its propriety, if not its actual necessity. This has a parallel in the law relating to a widows adoption under certain circumstances, and it finds support in the texts.....This view has, too, in a measure, the sanction of the Privy Council." And he quotes the cases in 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. and 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. which have been already referred to. “Turning then to Bombay," he goes on to say, " the High Court here appears to have accepted this view rather than that which finds favour in Calcutta." In the same case Ranade J. observes (I. L. R. 25 Bomb. 129, at p. 139) " The Bengal theory that the widows interest was a life interest, and that her surrender or release of that interest to the next reversioner accelerates his obtaining the full title, has never met with much acceptance on this side of India. 129, at p. 139) " The Bengal theory that the widows interest was a life interest, and that her surrender or release of that interest to the next reversioner accelerates his obtaining the full title, has never met with much acceptance on this side of India. Our leading case— Varjivan Rangji v. Ghelji Gokaldas (( 1881) I. L. R. 5 Bomb. 563.)—lays down that the con sent must be of all the kindred, but that does not mean that every single member who is a kindred must actually join in the conveyance." And the conclusion to which he comes is that, in order to validate an alienation by a widow otherwise than from legal necessity, " The consent of the reversioners must be of such kindred the absence of whose opposition raises a presumption that the alienation was a fair and proper one." The principle being thus admitted by the High Courts in India, the question of the quantum of consent necessary only remains. The High Court of Allahabad, indeed, does not recognize the validity of surrenders in favour, or alienations with the consent, of presumptive reversioners, so as to defeat the title of the actual reversioner at the time of the widows death. But this restriction is at variance with the principle itself, and is not in accordance with the practice in other parts of India in which the Mitakshara law prevails. Their Lordships have not been referred to any cases in the province of Oudh in which this restriction has been acted upon; and, though they would be unwilling to extend the widows power of alienation beyond its present limits, they cannot adopt the further limitation which the Allahabad High Court has sought to establish. They agree with the High Court of Calcutta—Radha Shyam v. Joy Ram (I. L. R. 17 Calc. 896.)—that ordinarily the consent of the whole body of persons constituting the next reversion should be obtained, though there may be cases in which special circum-stances may render the strict enforcement of this rule impossible. Applying this rule to the case now under consideration, the Judicial Commissioner has found that "of the reversionary heirs who executed the deeds, Hanuman Singh and Sheo Dayal Singh were four degrees removed, and Sheo Bakhsh Singh, Sheo Narain Singh, Baijnath Singh and Matadin Singh were five degrees removed from Jai Singh, the common ancestor of themselves and Sitla Bakhsh Singh. There do not appear to have been any other reversionary heirs alive at the time of the transfers superior in degree to Hanuman Singh and Sheo Dayal Singh, or equal in degree to Sheo Bakhsh Singh, Sheo Narain Singh, Baijnath Singh and Matadin Singh, or indeed any other reversionary heirs at all in the line of Jai Singh Rai." Their Lordships agree with the Judicial Commissioner that the consent of these persons was sufficient, and that it is immaterial that it was given after the execution of the deeds. Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur. The appellants who claim through Matadin Singh and Baijnath Singh must be held bound by the consent of their fathers. Their Lordships will humbly ad vise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed and the decree of the Judicial Commissioner dated March 6, 1900, confirmed. The appellants must pay the costs of the appeal.