JUDGMENT 1. The Petitioner, Nanda Kumar Sirkar, has been convicted under sec. 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to six weeks' simple imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 500, or, in default, to six weeks' further simple imprisonment. The Petitioner, Bharat Chandra Kobra, has been convicted under the same section of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to four weeks' simple imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 300, or, in default to one month's further simple imprisonment. The Petitioners were also directed, under sec. 106 of the Code, to be bound down to keep the peace with one surety each for one year. Three cases were instituted against the Petitioners at the instance of three different complainants though the cases arose at or about the same time at the same place, namely, a hat named Mogra hat. The three complainants lodged separate informations, their allegations being that the Petitioners Nanda Kumar and Bharat with others formed members of an unlawful assembly, committed rioting and individually caused hurt to each of them. Thus though there were three different cases, the Additional Magistrate of Tipperah tried them together. The reason stated for the joint trial of three cases is, that the facts alleged formed part of the same transaction. But though the origin and the preparations for the commission of the offences might be the same, the offences of simple hurt were distinct from each other, hurt having been caused to different individuals by separate and distinct attacks. The common object of the unlawful assembly in each case was also separate, an assembly which used force against three different persons for stopping the sale by each of goods manufactured in foreign countries. Such a joint trial is not allowable under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 233 of the Code lays down the general rule that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately. The reason is obvious. The evidence of an attack on A and causing him hurt may be different from the evidence of the same offences against B. A joint trial of different cases may be highly prejudicial to the accused. 2. The learned vakil who has appeared in support of the conviction has relied on sec. The reason is obvious. The evidence of an attack on A and causing him hurt may be different from the evidence of the same offences against B. A joint trial of different cases may be highly prejudicial to the accused. 2. The learned vakil who has appeared in support of the conviction has relied on sec. 234 of the Code as supporting the procedure adopted by the Magistrate, but that section evidently refers to different acts done by the same individuals or same sets of individuals as against the same complainant or complainants so connected with each other that they may in law be taken to be one person. The section allows a joinder of charges under certain circumstances; such as in cases of cheating, criminal breach of trust or criminal misappropriation and offences of like nature. We are of opinion that the trial of the Petitioners jointly on three separate complaints was illegal and the illegality could not be cured by the fact that no objection was taken to the procedure adopted either in the first Court or in the Sessions Court. The illegality has affected the jurisdiction of the Court; Subrahmania Ayyar v. The Kingre Kingr Emperor I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61 (1901). The conviction and the sentences passed on the accused must, therefore, be set aside and we direct accordingly. 3. We have now to consider whether we should direct a retrial of the accused. The facts as stated in the judgment of the Additional District Magistrate as the basis of the complaints are these: - "The complainants are itinerant shopkeepers who sell salt, pulse and other articles on market-days at Mogra hat and other places. They state that they had been prohibited by Nanda Kumar Sirkar and some other persons from selling foreign salt at Mogra hat; but, in spite of this, they continued to do so. On the date of this occurrence, they had as usual gone to Mogra hat and exposed for sale foreign salt, pulse and other goods. At about 3 or 3-30 P.M. a crowd of Hindus armed with lathis came to their stalls crying bande mataram. Nanda Kumar and some others said that they would not be allowed to sell foreign salt. Some of the Hindus then tried to drag away Abdul Ali's bags of salt. At about 3 or 3-30 P.M. a crowd of Hindus armed with lathis came to their stalls crying bande mataram. Nanda Kumar and some others said that they would not be allowed to sell foreign salt. Some of the Hindus then tried to drag away Abdul Ali's bags of salt. He opposed it and Nanda Kumar Sirkar, on this, struck him on the head with a lathi. Abdul Ali returned the blow with a split bamboo which is used for carrying burdens on the shoulder. His bags of salt and pulse were taken away." Similar stories were also told by the complainants Rahim Khan, Tomizuddi and Aftauddi. The Additional District Magistrate was of opinion that the witnesses on both sides were interested persons and he could not rely on their statements. But he came to the conclusion that the stories told by complainants were more probable inasmuch as the complainants had lodged their complaints as early as possible. 4. The learned Sessions Judge on appeal has also come to the same conclusion, namely, that the complainants should be believed for the same reason. He, however, adds that the stories of the complainants are more probable, as it is well known that the Hindus are opposing the sale of goods manufactured in a foreign country. In this, however, he has relied on what we may say his own impression of facts not spoken to by the witnesses in the case and legally proved. 5. Assuming the stories told by the complainants to be true, considerations as to the relative legal rights of the parties, i.e., itinerant stall-keepers and the proprietors of a market are relevant for determining the offence committed by the latter and the proper punishment for the offence, if any. In this country, there is no especial law for regulating the establishment and the carrying on of a market. Reg. XXVII of 1793 applied to markets existing at that time, Bangshodhur Biswas v. Mudhoo Mohuldar 21 W. R. 383 (1874). The Regulation itself has now been repealed by Act XXIX of 1871 as obsolete. The owner of land may establish a market wherever on his own land and whenever he desires to do, provided he does not commit an offence involving disturbance of public peace by establishing the market close to another existing market. The Regulation itself has now been repealed by Act XXIX of 1871 as obsolete. The owner of land may establish a market wherever on his own land and whenever he desires to do, provided he does not commit an offence involving disturbance of public peace by establishing the market close to another existing market. He may regulate the sales and the conduct of stall-keepers provided his conduct does not disturb public tranquillity or he does not commit an offence punishable by law. In Raj Kumar Chuckerbutty v. The Empcror 11 C. W. N. 28 (1906), the Court held that the proprietors of a market in this country have the right to prevent itinerant stall-keepers but not permanent stall-keepers from selling any articles which the proprietors may choose to prevent the sale of Permanent stall-keepers acquire a right to occupy land as tenure-holders. They are not mere licensees like itinerant stall-keepers The latter are entirely under the control of the owner of the land and the market. The law does not limit the right of the owner so far as mere licensees are concerned. 6. The accused as representatives of the owners could prevent the sale of foreign goods and the complainants were not, therefore, justified in law in disobeying the orders of the accused and in exposing for sale prohibited articles. We need hardly say that an ijaradar occupies the same position as the proprietor himself, the proprietor having alienated his right to present possession in favour of the ijaradar. 7. But the ijaradar and his men were not justified in using force. They might have the right to prevent the sale of certain kinds of things but not by the use of force or by causing hurt to persons who came to sell those goods; neither had they the right to commit mischief by throwing things exposed for sale into water or burning them. Even, if the right to regulate sales exists, its enforcement by the use of force is prohibited by law. The instinct of every civilised Government is opposed to a subject taking the law in his own hand. Any person aggrieved by the act or omission of another person must have recourse to the constituted authorities for redress of wrongs done to him, or to prevent a wrong if he has time to go to the authorities to prevent it. The instinct of every civilised Government is opposed to a subject taking the law in his own hand. Any person aggrieved by the act or omission of another person must have recourse to the constituted authorities for redress of wrongs done to him, or to prevent a wrong if he has time to go to the authorities to prevent it. A subject taking the law in his own hand is punishable. 8. It appears to us that as the Petitioners and their men attempted to prevent the sale of the articles exposed for sale by the complainants and as they used force there was a mutual fight. Each party attacked the other and such is practically the case of both sides. But, the Petitioners were 'not justified in using force and causing hurt to the complainants. They exceeded their right under the law and are punishable, but the punishment must be commensurate to the peculiar nature of the offences. They acted within their right to a certain extent. They could not also be bound down to keep the peace because an order under sec. 106, C. Cr. P., would practically prevent them from exercising their legal rights. We understand from the learned Counsel who appears In support of the rule that the Petitioners have already undergone imprisonment for a certain term and we must also consider the harassment of the trial that has already taken place. The injuries caused to the complainants are not severe. The hurts caused were simple. We are, therefore, of opinion that we should not direct the retrial of the Petitioners. Our order accordingly is that this rule be made absolute. The fines, if paid, will be refunded.