JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal arises out of certain proceedings under Act I of 1894. Certain lands situated in two villages, namely, Betbaria and Belagachi, were acquired for a public purpose. The persons interested were the members of the first, second, third and fourth parties; and they all appeared personally or by agents before the Lund Acquisition Deputy Collector who made the apportionment of the compensation money among the parties. This was objected to only by party No. 1, who are the Respondents in the present appeal. From the reference to the District Judge made on the 28th March 1903, it appears that it was made on a petition by party No. 1 and that the dispute then was that the claimants, first party, denied the claim of Sudhir Lal Roy Chowdhuri, party No. 2, who alleged that he had a share of 17 gundas and odd in the acquired land in village Betbaria. When the case came before the District Judge, Govinda Kumar Roy Chowdhury and others, the present Appellants (viz., the third party) and Kedar Nath Roy Chowdhuri (the fourth party) applied to the District Court on the 24th June 1903, and 8th July 1903, respectively, to be made parties, and the District Judge acceded to their request. But it is clear that the real matter that was referred to the District Judge was the dispute between the parties Nos. 1 and 2 that is, with regard to the compensation allowed to party No. 2 by the Deputy Collector. 2. The objection to the apportionment was made under sec. 18 of Act I of 1894; and under sec. 21 of the Act the scope of the inquiry has to be restricted to the consideration of the interests of persons affected by the objection. 3. It will appear from the land acquisition proceeding under sec 11 of Act I of 1904 that Sudhir Lal Roy Chowdhuri was made a member of the first party to which Debendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury and others, the Respondents, belonged, which party according to the Collectors' order was awarded a certain portion of the compensation money. 4. Disputes appear to have arisen amongst the members of the party which was headed by Debendra Kumar and they seem to have been to the effect that Debendra Kumar and others disputed the claim set up by Sudhir Lal on the ground mentioned in the written statements. 4. Disputes appear to have arisen amongst the members of the party which was headed by Debendra Kumar and they seem to have been to the effect that Debendra Kumar and others disputed the claim set up by Sudhir Lal on the ground mentioned in the written statements. 5. From the above it is clear that the dispute as to the apportionment was exclusively among the members of Debendra's party, with which the members of the other parties had nothing to do. We have already observed that the reference was made on the objection of Debendra and others against the apportionment in favour of Sudhir Lal. 6. We think that under the above circumstances the learned Judge ought not to have allowed the third and fourth parties to be made parties in the case and that his action has led to nothing but complications and confusion. On the authority of the case of Abu Bakar v. Peary Mohun Mookherjee ILR 34 Cal 451 (1907), it is clear that according to the terms of the sections of Pan III of the Act, it was not open to the learned Judge to go into the question raised by parties who had never made objection or applied for the reference. 7. The present case related entirely to the dispute between Debendra and others and Sudhir Lal. The latter's claim to compensation, however, according to the finding of the learned Judge is barred by limitation. He has not appealed against the judgment of the lower Court and in these circumstances, this appeal ought, to fail on this ground alone. But we think that even on the merits of the case this appeal ought to be dismissed. 8. The Respondents claim compensation as proprietors of their respective shares, while the other parties allege that the lands for which compensation has been awarded are debutter properties dedicated to the worship of Anandamoyee Thakurani and Thakurs Radhakanta and Govindji. There is no dispute as to the amount of the compensation money awarded. The dispute is only as to whether the properties are debutter or secular. 9. There is no dispute as to the amount of the compensation money awarded. The dispute is only as to whether the properties are debutter or secular. 9. The first party allege that these properties are not debutter and that they were granted in the name of the idols as a benami transaction to one of the ancestors of the family of the claimants; in the alternative the Respondents corn-tend that if the properties were originally debutter, yet by consensus of the family they have ceased to be BO. Lastly, they allege that the idol Anandamoyee, having been broken many years ago, has ceased to be a juridical person capable of holding property. 10. The second and third parties deny the breakage but the fourth party admits it. 11. The learned Judge has by the order appealed against apportioned the disputed portion of the compensation money among the members of the first party with the exception of that portion which represents the share of Girish Chandra, a member of the first party, as he alleges the property to be debutter. The learned Judge in consequence has ordered the portion representing Girish Chandra's share to be invested. He has further held that the claim of Sudhir Lal is barred. 12. The present appeal is on behalf of the third party who have taken 41 grounds in their memorandum of appeal. The arguments before us, however, have been confined to the following points, namely :-- 1. Whether the idol Anandamoyee is a juridical person. 2. Whether the disputed properties are debutter or secular. 3. Whether the properties, if they were originally debutter, have ceased to be so. 13. The lower Court has found that these properties were at one time debutter and remained so till 1832. It has further held that the lease and release of these properties by Rajballav, a common ancestor, in 1835, gave another character to these properties : and that after Rajballav's death there was a reconveyance and an English mortgage in 1867 regarding these properties, and that all the descendants of Rajballav living at the time were parties to these transactions. It has further held that the lease and release of these properties by Rajballav, a common ancestor, in 1835, gave another character to these properties : and that after Rajballav's death there was a reconveyance and an English mortgage in 1867 regarding these properties, and that all the descendants of Rajballav living at the time were parties to these transactions. These descendants appear to have split up the ancetral debts and divided them according to their respective shares; and hence on the above grounds the lower Court has held that by the consensus of all the members of this family, the properties have been converted into secular properties. In Babu Golap Chandra Shastri's Treatise on Hindu Law (p. 440), it is said that "the endowments may either be public or private. In the former the public is interested and in the latter certain definite persons only are Interested. When the property is dedicated to charitable, educational or religious uses for the benefit of an indeterminate body of persons the endowment is a public one; and when property is set apart for the worship of a deity of a particular family in which no outsider is interested, the endowment is a private one. The distinction between private and public endowment is an important one for 'in the case of a family idol the consensus of the whole family might give the estate another direction [Konwar Doorga Nath v. Ram Chandra ILR 2 Cal. 351 (1876)].' Mr. Mayne is of the same opinion (vide secs. 437, 438, Hindu Law and Usage, 7th edition). 14. In accordance with the law laid down in the abovenamed works on Hindu law, these properties can become secular by consensus of the whole family, if the dedication was to the worship of the family idol. From Sudhir Lal's written statements it is an admitted fact that the goddess Anandamoyee is an ancestral family goddess. The third party also in their written statements admit that Anandamoyee Thakurani, Radhakanta Jew and Govinda Dev Thakurs are their ancestral family deities and they were established by their ancestors. From the evidence it appears that the idol's shrine is situated within the heart of the Roy Chowdhuris family dwelling house. The third party also in their written statements admit that Anandamoyee Thakurani, Radhakanta Jew and Govinda Dev Thakurs are their ancestral family deities and they were established by their ancestors. From the evidence it appears that the idol's shrine is situated within the heart of the Roy Chowdhuris family dwelling house. From the above statements and facts it is clear that these idols cannot be public idols, and hence in accordance with the authorities cited, the properties, even if at one time debutter, could be converted into secular properties. 15. From the various exhibits on the record it is evident that the members of this family have been treating these properties as secular properties which could be sold, mortgaged, leased or bequeathed. The Appellants' reply is that though it is a fact that the members of the family have in many instances sold, mortgaged and leased these properties or disposed of them by Will, yet these allenations had never been in favour of any stranger and that it is legal for one shebait to convey his share in the shebaiti right to another shebait. 16. We find from Babu Golap Chandra Shastri's Treatise on Hindu Law (p. 446) that "the office of shebaiti right is not saleable, Narasima v. Anantha ILR 4 Mad, 391 (1881), Rangasami v. Ranga ILR 16 Mad. 146 (1892)." It has been held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Raja Vurmah Valia v. Ravi Vurmah Mutha L.R. 4 I.A. 76 (1876), that an assignment of the right of management is beyond the legal competence of a trustee under the common law of India and the usage of the foundation, and that the assignment of a trusteeship for the pecuniary advantage of the trustee could not be validated by any proof of custom. In the case of Gnana Sambanda Pundara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram L.R. 27 I.A. 69 (1899), it was held that the sale of the right of management and of the endowed property was null and void in the absence of a custom allowing it. In the case of Sri Raman Lalji Maharaj v. Sri Gopal I L.R. 19 All. 428 (1897), it was held that the right of management is not divisible where there are more trustees than one inasmuch as they hold as joint tenants. 17. In the case of Sri Raman Lalji Maharaj v. Sri Gopal I L.R. 19 All. 428 (1897), it was held that the right of management is not divisible where there are more trustees than one inasmuch as they hold as joint tenants. 17. Babu Golap Chandra Shastri has in his abovementioned work (p. 447) laid down a rule of law on the authority of Mancharam v. Pransankar ILR 6 Bom. 298 (1882) that the shebaiti right may be transferred to a co-shebait or to one who is next in succession. But we prefer to follow the authority of this Court in the case of Prasanna Kumar Adhicary v. Saroda Prosanna Adhicary ILR 22 Cal. 989 (1895), where it was held that even a shebait could not grant a mourasi mokurari lease of any portion of a debutter property to a co-shebait and the same is null and void. 18. We find that on the 11th May 1888 (Ex. F) Govinda Kumar Roy Chowdhury executed a registered kobala In favour of Muktakeshi Dasi. It appears from this document that this so-called debutter property was sold by one member of the family to another to pay off the vendor's ancestral debt and to meet the expenses of his daughter's marriage. Ex. F (1) is also a registered kobala from one member of the family to another, dated 14th January 1884. From this document we find that the amount of money to be spent for the worship of the deities has been left entirely to the discretion of the vendee. The above two documents show conduct on the part of some of the members of this family, which is Inconsistent with the property being debutter. 19. There are on the record many other documents showing transactions of a nature indicating the properties to be anything but debutter. The conduct of the members of this family clearly proves that, even if the properties were at one time debutter, they have by common consent been converted them into secular properties. 20. It is contended on behalf of the Appellants that the fact of the release of the lands by the Government on the ground of their being debutter is proof positive of the nature of the properties being debutter. 20. It is contended on behalf of the Appellants that the fact of the release of the lands by the Government on the ground of their being debutter is proof positive of the nature of the properties being debutter. But it has been distinctly held in the case of Nemaye Churn Pooteetundee v. Jogendra Nath Bannerjee 21 W.R. 365 (1874), that the mere fact of the land having been released by Government on the ground of its having been appropriated to the services of an idol does not impose on it the character of a religious endowment, so as to exempt it permanently from being attached and sold in satisfaction of decrees against a person who may hold it. We therefore find, following the authority quoted above, that the release by Government is not conclusive evidence of the property being debutter. 21. On a review of the whole case, we think that in dealing with the question as to whether the properties in dispute were really debutter or only nominally so, the manner in which the dedicated properties have been held and enjoyed is the most important point for our consideration and a consideration of this leads us irresistibly to the conclusion that the property is only nominally debutter but not really so. 22. It is admitted that Debendra Kumar and others, members of the first party, are shebaits even now. That being so, the member of the first party who are the Respondents in this appeal are entitled to receive from Government their proportionate share of the compensation money which is in dispute. They have been in possession of those shares and it is immaterial for the purposes of the present case whether they are in possession as shebaits or as proprietors. If after taking out the money, they mispend it their conduct may be the subject of another Suit. 23. We do not think it necessary to enter into a discussion of the question as to whether the idol Anandamoyee owing to its having been broken, is capable of holding property or not. For the above reasons we hold that the present appeal falls completely both on law and the facts. We therefore dismiss it with costs.