JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule to show cause why the decree of the lower Court dismissing the applicant's claim for interest should not be set aside. The applicant sued on a hatchitta which runs as follows: Sd. Gajaruddi Biswas, Jiarat Biswas, all of Pootimari Ex. A. Sd. 14-3-07. Account Enatullah Biswas of Jeolmari. The year 1312, B.S. Interest on this amount at the rate of one anna per month per rupee. CREDIT. DEBIT. 25th Aghran, Rs. 68. 20th Poua. Through self, Cash Rs. 68. Through Jiarat, 8th Magh. Rs. 19-12-6 Through Jiarat 22-0-0 Rs. 2-3-6 22-0-0 I. Sd. 23-1-07. 2. The Munsif disallowed the claim for interest notwithstanding the words "Interest on this amount at the rate of one anna per month per rupee." in the heading of the hatchitta because, he said, " there is no distinct promise to pay interest. The word 'dibo' (I will give) in the interest clause has not been inserted. In the absence of the word dibo, there can be no stipulation, and so no decree for interest can be given." He therefore gave a decree for the principal only. 3. The applicant now contends that the word "dibo" or a promise to pay must be held to be implied. 4. The Munsif in showing cause relies on the case of Udit Upadhya v. Bhauani Din ILR 27 All. 84 (1904) and distinguishes the case from that of Luxumi Bai v. Ganesh Raghu Nath ILR 25 Bom. 373 (1900). 5. In our opinion the case of Udit Upadhya v. Bhawani Din ILR 27 All. 84 (1904) has not been correctly decided. The document on which the applicant has sued comes within the rule laid down in Mulchand Lala v. Kashibullah Biswas 11 C.W.N. 1120 (1907) decided by the Court on the 30th ultimo in which it was held that a similar document was an agreement or memorandum of agreement and therefore subject to a stamp duty of 8 annas. Before we can admit this hatchitta in evidence we must impound it, and levy the deficit stamp duty and penalty. 6. The pleader for the applicant urges that the document is not an agreement or memorandum of agreement but a mere hatchitta. He relies on the cases of Koonjo Mohun Doss v. Krishna Chandra Saha 25 W.R. 361 (1876) and Brojendra Kumar v. Brohmomoyi Chaudhurani ILR 4 Cal. 6. The pleader for the applicant urges that the document is not an agreement or memorandum of agreement but a mere hatchitta. He relies on the cases of Koonjo Mohun Doss v. Krishna Chandra Saha 25 W.R. 361 (1876) and Brojendra Kumar v. Brohmomoyi Chaudhurani ILR 4 Cal. 885 (1878) and on the provisions of sec. 23 of Act II of 1899. 7. But it appears to us that the hatchittas referred to in these two cases were mere hatchittas or acknowledgments of debt and nothing more. The claims in these two suits were for principal and interest, but it does not appear to us that in the hatchittas themselves there was an agreement to pay interest at any particular rate, as in the hatchitta now sued on, in which on the applicant's own showing there is. 8. The meaning of the provisions of sec. 23 of the Act is explained in the case of Sambhu Chandra Bepari v. Krishna Churn Bepari ILR 26 Cal. 179 (1898) which shows that when there is a loan of say Rs. 100, the stamp duty is to be charged on that sum, though the loan may be subject to interest, but when the loan is for Rs. 100, but to be repaid with interest of Rs. 100 within a certain period, then the stamp duty is to be charged on the sum of Rs. 200. 9. The fact appears to be that creditors in the district of Murshidabad, taking advantage of the rulings that hatchittas are subject to a stamp duty of only one anna, or no duty at all, are now seeking to convert them into memorandum of agreements, by inserting stipulations for the payment of interest, penalties and so forth, while at the same time stamping them with a stamp duty of only one anna. We consider that the hatchitta sued on in this case is a memorandum of agreement, subject to a stamp duty of eight annas. It is stamped with a one anna stamp only. We accordingly impound it. The deficit stamp duty of 7 annas and penalty of five rupees must be paid within a fortnight. Till paid, we cannot receive the document in evidence. After the lapse of a fortnight, we shall proceed according to the provisions of sec. 38 of the Act.