Judgement Appeal from the above Court (May 29, 1903), affirming a decree, of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur. The suit was brought in 1899 by Ajudhia Singh, afterwards represented by his sons, and Khanjan Singh, as heirs of Kalka Bakhsh, for possession with mesne profits of the property in suit. Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 72 ( 1906- 1907) Deputy Commissioner of Kheri V. Khanjan Singh 7 The material allegations in the plaint were that Kalka Bakhsh was the last male owner of the property in dispute, and that, some time prior to 1868, he died, leaving a widow named Man Kunwar, who got possession of his estate; that on December 22, 1868, Man Kunwar and her husbands mother, named Shiam Kunwar, executed a sale deed of the villages in suit in favour of Raja Anrudh Singh, the consideration for which was— (a) Rs. 12,718-5-9 principal and interest on account of a fourth share out of the amount due under a decree dated July 12, 1861; (b) Rs. 7280 in cash. Man Kunwar died on May 31, 1894, and thereupon plaintiff No. 1, as the nearest reversioner of her husband, and plaintiff No. 2, who lived with him as members of a joint Hindu family, became the proprietors and entitled to possession of the villages in suit. It was also alleged that on the death of Raja Anrudh Singh the property in dispute came into the possession of his heir, and was placed under the management of the Court of Wards, and on August 26, 1898, the Court of Wards sold all the villages in suit (with one exception, Majhgawan) to Jowahir Singh, the second defendant, who obtained possession of them. The defendants pleaded (inter alia) that in December, 1869, the said Ajudhia Singh and others filed a suit for pre-emption against Raja Anrudh Singh in respect of the property now in suit; that they did not then dispute the validity of the sale deed dated December 22, 1868, and were therefore now estopped from denying its validity, both under s. 115 of Act I. of 1872 and s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Courts below decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. They decided that there was no estoppel in consequence of the said suit for pre-emption, and that the suit was not barred by limitation, the cause of action having arisen on the death of Man Kunwar. The Courts below decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. They decided that there was no estoppel in consequence of the said suit for pre-emption, and that the suit was not barred by limitation, the cause of action having arisen on the death of Man Kunwar. On the merits as to whether the said sale was binding on the reversioners or not, they decided—first, as to the sum of Rs. 7280 alleged to have been paid in cash, that this amount was not paid in fact, much less that it was borrowed for any legal necessity; secondly, as to interest on the amount of the decree dated July 12, 1861, that no interest was payable thereunder; thirdly, as to principal amount, viz., Rs. 7080-3-0 due by Kalka Bakhsh under the decree, that Man Kunwar was under a legal obligation to pay this debt, even though barred by limitation. They also decided that Jowahir Singh was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the plaintiffs claim ; and that, even if he were, he had no better title than Raja Anrudh Singh. In the result they decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the villages in suit, together with mesne profits, subject to a liability to pay Rs. 7080; and, as the amount of the mesne profits exceeded the said sum, they set off the one amount against the other, and made a decree for possession of the said villages and the payment of the balance of the mesne profits only. Cohen, K.C, and Ross, for the appellant, contended that the respondents had failed to prove that they were the nearest reversioners in respect of Kalka Bakhshs estate, and consequently were not entitled to sue see Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 871, ss. 646, 647; 6th ed. p. 847. The interest allowed to Raja Anrudh Singh was part of the consideration for the sale deed, inasmuch as it was due and claimable at the time of its execution. The sale was accepted and admitted in the suit for pre-emption, and therefore the respondents, having once affirmed it, were now estopped from disputing its validity on the ground of absence of necessity, and it was unnecessary for the appellant to prove the existence of debts and the alleged necessity. The sale was not void, but at most voidable until affirmed. The sale was not void, but at most voidable until affirmed. Reference was made to Isri Dutt Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain (( 1883) L. R. 10 Ind. Ap. 150.); Raja Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke. (( 1897) L. R. 24 Ind. Ap. 164.) It was also contended that the Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 72 ( 1906- 1907) Deputy Commissioner of Kheri V. Khanjan Singh decision in the pre-emption suit was res judicata as to the validity of the sale under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, since its invalidity could have been raised and decided therein. De Gruyther, for the respondents other than the purchaser, contended that there were concurrent findings that Ajodhia Singh was next heir to Kalka Bakhsh at the death of his widow, and as such entitled to sue; also that there was no legal necessity for the sale of December, 1868. The decision in the suit for pre-emption created no estoppel, for it related to a different issue, to which any contention as to the title to the estate after the widows death would have been irrelevant. Cohen, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. The case out of which this appeal arises relates to an alienation by a Hindu widow of property which had belonged to her husband. The properties in dispute formed a part of the estate of Kalka Bakhsh, who died in or before 1868, without male issue, leaving as his heir his widow Man Kunwar, who took as such heir the estate of a Hindu widow. During the lifetime of Kalka Bakhsh, on July 12, 1861, a decree based upon a mortgage was passed against Kalka Bakhsh and others, in favour of Raja Anrudh Singh, for a sum of Rs. 28,320-12, principal and interest, payable in two instalments, interest subsequent to the decree being disallowed, Kalka Bakhshs share of liability under this decree became ascertained at Rs. 7080. Proceedings were subsequently taken to execute the decree, and on October 22, 1866, the then Deputy Commissioner of Kheri, before whom the execution was in progress, made a decree or order allowing in favour of the judgment creditor, what the decree had not given him, interest subsequent to decree at the rate of 2 percent, per mensem from the due dates of the several instalments. But after some intermediate proceedings, on September 15, 1869, that decree or order was set aside by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, on the ground that the Court executing a decree has no power to alter or add to it. In the interval between the making of the decree or order of October 22, 1866, and its reversal on September 15, 1869, the sale deed now in question was executed. It was dated December 22, 1868. It was executed by the widow Man Kunwar and by her late husbands mother. It was in favour of the same Raja Anrudh Singh, who had obtained the decree of July 12, 1861. The consideration alleged was made up of three parts—first, the Rs. 7080 due under the decree of July 12, 1861; secondly, interest on that sum subsequent to the date of the decree; thirdly, a fresh advance said to have been made in cash of Rs. 7280. Man Kunwar died on May 31, 1894, whereupon the estate of her husband passed to his then next male heir, Ajudhia Singh. And on February 21, 1899, Ajudhia Singh (with another who need not be further noticed) instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur. The defendants were, first, the Deputy Commissioner of Kheri, as Manager for the Court of Wards in charge of the estate which had been that of Raja Anrudh Singh; and, secondly, Thakur Jawahir Singh, a purchaser from the Court of Wards of the greater part of the property in dispute. The claim was to recover the property as from the death of Man Kunwar with mesne profits. Law Rep. 34 Ind. App. 72 ( 1906- 1907) Deputy Commissioner of Kheri V. Khanjan Singh 9 Various defences to the suit were raised, but only two were .urged on the argument of the appeal before their Lordships—first, that the sale in question was justified by necessity, and on this ground was effectual to pass the whole interest of Man Kunwars husband in the property, not merely her widows estate ; secondly, that the suit was barred by s. 13, Explanation II., of the Civil Procedure Code. The Subordinate Judge made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for possession and mesne profits. He allowed the defendants credit in account for Rs. The Subordinate Judge made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for possession and mesne profits. He allowed the defendants credit in account for Rs. 7080, the amount due under the decree of July 12, 1861, but disallowed the other two portions of the alleged consideration for the sale. He decided against the defen dants with regard to the suggested bar by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Judicial Commissioners of Oudh, on appeal, agreed with the Subordinate Judge and affirmed his decree. That is the decision now appealed against by the first defendant, the Deputy Commissioner of Kheri. With regard, in the first place, to the defence of necessity, it is not disputed that such necessity existed in respect of the first item of consideration, Rs. 7080, the amount due under the decree of July 12, 1861, and for this amount the appellant has received credit. As to the third item of consideration, the alleged fresh advance of Rs. 7280, both Courts in India have found that there was no evidence of necessity for such an advance, if it ever was made ; and their Lordships agree. The argument really turned upon the second item, the interest after decree upon the decree of July 12, 1861. The contention was that, inasmuch as the decree or order of October 22, 1866, granting interest on the amount decreed in 1861 was in force when the conveyance in question was executed, the doctrine of necessity extended to the interest. It is not necessary to inquire what the result would have been if some outsider had advanced money to the widow in order to protect the estate against a claim by Raja Anrudh Singh to realize the interest awarded to him by the decree or order of October 22, 1866. The question that does arise is, whether those who claim under the Raja, and whose position is no higher than his, are entitled to base a claim to the property in question upon a decree or order, originally made in the Rajas favour, but subsequently set aside. Their Lordships agree with the Courts in India that the claim of the appellant on this ground cannot be supported. The contention based upon s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code arises out of the following circumstances. Their Lordships agree with the Courts in India that the claim of the appellant on this ground cannot be supported. The contention based upon s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code arises out of the following circumstances. After the sale by Man Kunwar to Raja Anrudh Singh, Ajudhia Singh, on December 23, 1869, brought a suit against the Raja and others, in which the plaintiff claimed a right of pre-emption. The suit was dismissed on the ground that no right of pre-emption was proved. It is now contended that the ground of claim in the present suit is a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack in that suit. Their Lordships agree with the Courts in India in thinking that what was in question in that former suit was the right of pre-emption in respect of what Man Kunwar had power to convey and did convey, that is, her widows interest, and that the introduction of any question as to the effect of the conveyance upon the reversion would have been incongruous to the matter of the suit. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs.