Judgement Appeal by special leave from a decree of the Judicial Commissioners Court (July 30, 1904), reversing a decree of the Civil Judge of Narsinghpur (November 4, 1903). The appellants had, on September 18, 1896, under the provisions of ss. 86 and 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, obtained from the Civil Court of Jubbulpore a conditional decree of fore-closure against the respondent, which is as follows— " It is hereby ordered that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of Rs. 20,457.4 for principal and interest on the mortgage mentioned in the plaint, and in the further sum of Rs. l 106.10 for costs, and that upon the defendant paying to the plaintiffs or into Court the amount so due with future interest at 7 per cent. per month from the date of suit, viz., July 22, 1896, on or before the 18th day of March, 1897, the plaintiffs shall deliver up to the defendant, or to such person as he appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, and shall transfer the property to the defendant free from all incumbrances created by the plaintiffs or any person claiming under him or under whom he claims, and shall if necessary put the defendant in possession of the property, but that if the payment is not made on or before the said 18th day of March, 1897, the 06 Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 28 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Gokuldas V. Seth Ghasiram 107 mortgaged property as detailed below, or a sufficient part thereof, shall be sold, and the proceeds of the sale (after paying thereout the expenses of the sale) paid into Court, and applied in payment of what is due to the plaintiffs, and the balance, if any, paid to the defendant or other persons entitled to receive the same. If the decree is not satisfied from the sale proceeds, the balance will be recoverable from the defendants person and other property." This decree was made absolute on June 25, 1898, and on July 13 was transferred to the Civil Judge of Narsinghpur for execution. The transferring order calculated interest as due to the date thereof, and recited the amount as Rs. 18,322, after deducting Rs. 5000 paid. The transferring order calculated interest as due to the date thereof, and recited the amount as Rs. 18,322, after deducting Rs. 5000 paid. On September 21, 1898, the appellants applied for execution, calculating interest to date, and on April 6, 1901, repeated this procedure, the amount then claimed being increased to Rs.20,719. On August 24, 1903, the respondent for the first time objected that the appellants had wrongfully calculated future interest on the decretal amount to date of execution, and submitted that the said decree on a right construction thereof did not carry interest beyond March 18, 1897, the date fixed for redemption, and admitting as due Rs. 11,581.14. Three issues were framed by the Civil Judge of Narsinghpur 1. (a) What is meant by the expression "future interest"? (b) Cannot plaintiffs get interest beyond March 18, 1897 ? 1. 2. Is defendant debarred from raising his plea now ? 2. 3. What is still due to plaintiffs under the decree ? The Civil Judge held that " defendants contention that future interest should be allowed up to March 18, 1897, only, is groundless." He disallowed the objection with costs. "Future interest," he said, " clearly means interest payable after the decree. The decree passed under s. 88, Transfer of Property Act, is the real decree in the case. It clearly awards future interest from the date of the suit. It does not say that this future interest is to be paid up to date fixed for payment of the decretal amount, i.e., March 18, 1897, or up to realization, but as laid down by the Full Bench ruling, Allahabad High Court, in Bakar Sajjad v. Udit Narain Singh, I. L. R. 21 Allah. p. 361, and by their Lordships of the Privy Council, in L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 179, and L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 35, there is nothing either in the decree or in the law which would prevent the decree-holder from getting interest at 7 per cent. per mensem from the date of the suit to the date of realization. Upon principle, apart from authority, statutory or otherwise, it is difficult to see why the mortgagee should not have interest on his money so long as the debt remains unpaid." In appeal this ruling was reversed. per mensem from the date of the suit to the date of realization. Upon principle, apart from authority, statutory or otherwise, it is difficult to see why the mortgagee should not have interest on his money so long as the debt remains unpaid." In appeal this ruling was reversed. The judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioner stated that the power of the Court to grant interest for the period subsequent to the date fixed by it for the extension of the mortgagors right of redemption was concluded by the decision in Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Rani Kanno Del (( 1900) 28 Ind. Ap. 35.), and proceeded "But, having regard to the language of their Lordships judgment therein, it seems clear that the ordinary power given by ss. 86 and 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is a power to make an account up to the date to be fixed for payment ,and that the continuation of interest beyond that date is obtained by an exercise of a special power dehors the enactment and inherent in the Court for the due administration of justice; a power derived from a long course of practice which has not, apparently, been upset or discouraged by the Legislature, and which it is equitable to maintain. It therefore seems to me that the proper way to interpret a sale decree of the kind now in question, is to read it as it stands, without any implication in favour of interest being allowed after the last redemption date. That is to say that, unless there are express words granting such interest, the Court must be interpreted as having limited itself to the apparent power given by statute in ss. 86 and 88 of the Transfer of Property Act." 06 Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 28 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Gokuldas V. Seth Ghasiram 108 The Court then held that there was no ambiguity in the decree whatever, and that upon its proper construction no interest after March 18, 1897, runs on the decretal sum or any part thereof. " It is immaterial that the judge might have decreed otherwise had he foreseen the delay in realization. It is equally immaterial that executing Courts and the plaintiffs have hitherto misconstrued the decree. " It is immaterial that the judge might have decreed otherwise had he foreseen the delay in realization. It is equally immaterial that executing Courts and the plaintiffs have hitherto misconstrued the decree. The decree must be construed according to its language, and if the plaintiffs legal adviser« did not detect the defect in it and foresee the loss it was likely to cause, that is no reason why some other and more equitable interpretation should be put on it. The order of the Lower Court appealed against is reversed, and execution of the decree must proceed upon the construction of it which is laid down in this judgment, namely, that no interest accrues on any part of the decretal sum after the 18th day of March, 1897." C. W. Arathoon, for the appellants, contended that the Judicial Commissioners Court had misapplied the judgment in Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Rani Kano Dei (l), which was in reality in appellants favour. There was no reason in law or equity why the mortgagee should not have interest till his debt was satisfied, or why it should cease to run after the mortgagor had failed to redeem on the date fixed by the decree. The judgment of the First Court was correct see Sundar Koer v. Sham Krishen. (( 1906) L. R. 34 Ind. Ap. 9.) The respondent did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. Their Lordships have examined the decisions of this Board relied upon by the appellants—Maharajah of Bharatpur v. Rani Kanno Dei (28 Ind. Ap. 35.) ; Sundar Koer v. Sham Krishen (( 1906) L. R. 34 Ind. Ap. 9.)—and find that they fully sustain the contention of the appellants. They will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be allowed, the judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioner reversed with costs, and the order of the Civil Judge restored. The respondent will pay the costs of the appeal.