JUDGMENT 1. The questions for our determination In the matter of this rule are, first, whether the Petitioners constituted an unlawful assembly within the meaning of sec 141, I.P.C, and, secondly, whether the complainant, being a District Board Road Sircar, is a public servant in respect of whom the offence under sec. 186, I.P.C., has been committed. The facts shortly are these:--There was a wooden bridge across a khal which, being in a state of disrepair, it, was decided to replace by means of a road with pipes passing underneath for the flow of water. The bed of the khal belongs to the Petitioners and others, and they objected to the laying of the pipes on the ground that it would obstruct the flow of water in the khal. They accordingly removed the pipes placed there. 2. On these facts, the Petitioners have been convicted under secs. 143 and 186, I.P.C. In his explanation the Magistrate urges that the assemblage was illegal under sec. 141, cl. (5), I.P.C. But the Petitioners were simply asserting their right bond fide and preventing any unlawful Interference with the khal. They cannot be regarded as members of an unlawful assembly. The mere use of criminal force or show of criminal force by any person to take possession of any property is not sufficient to bring the case within the clause unless some criminal Intent is proved against the persons so using force or show of force. In the present case it does not appear that any unnecessary force was used to remove the pipes, which the Petitioners were entitled to do, as the District Board had only the right to bridge the khal by means of a superstructure. 3. Then on the second question, we entertain no doubt, In the absence of any express authority on the point, that a Local Board Road Sircar is not a public servant within the meaning of sec. 21, I.P.C. The Magistrate has cited cl. 10 of that section; but it cannot be said that a si(sic) car, who merely supervises road work, and, in this case, the construction of a culvert, is a public servant and that his duty is to take, receive, keep or expend any property, &c., &c., according to the definition given in the 10th clause of the section. 10 of that section; but it cannot be said that a si(sic) car, who merely supervises road work, and, in this case, the construction of a culvert, is a public servant and that his duty is to take, receive, keep or expend any property, &c., &c., according to the definition given in the 10th clause of the section. In analogous decision it has been held that such officers are not public servants; but the only case to which our attention has been called is that of Regina v. Ramajirav 12 Bom. H.C.R. 1 (1875). That case is not on all fours with the present one, and we have to decide, on the language of the section, whether a road sircar is a public servant. In our opinion, he is not. The rule must, therefore, be made absolute. The fines if levied will be refunded to the Petitioners.