JUDGMENT 1. The present rule is directed against an order passed on the 13th of July 1907 by the Subordinate Judge of Patna under the provisions of sec 380, C. P. C, requiring the present Petitioner to furnish security to the extent of Rs. 800 within a month for the payment of any costs incurred or likely to be incurred by the Defendant In the suit which has been instituted by the Petitioner. It appears that the Petitioner who is a woman instituted a suit against the opposite party claiming to be entitled as his wife to a certain amount of money as dower, and that when she instituted the suit she put in an application for permission to be allowed to bring the suit as a pauper. An enquiry was, in consequence, made into that application with the result that an order was finally passed under the provisions of sec. 410, C. P. C, granting the application and permitting her to prosecute the suit as a pauper. After that application had been granted, the application which led to the order which is the subject of the present rule was put in by the Defendant, the opposite party, asking the Court to require the Petitioner under the provisions of sec. 380 to furnish security for costs. That application was supported by an affidavit which contains certain allegations to the effect that the woman was a person of immoral character, that she never was the wife of the Defendant and that she was supported in the case by two touts of the Patna Bar. In reply to that affidavit the Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit denying the truth of the allegations made in the Defendant's affidavit and stating that she was not in a position to give security for the costs in the suit. The Subordinate Judge on a consideration of these two affidavits has recorded the following order :-" Having carefully considered all the circumstances presented to me I think I ought to exercise discretion in favour of the Defendant. It is therefore ordered that the Plaintiff do furnish security to the extent of Rs. 800 within a month. The Subordinate Judge on a consideration of these two affidavits has recorded the following order :-" Having carefully considered all the circumstances presented to me I think I ought to exercise discretion in favour of the Defendant. It is therefore ordered that the Plaintiff do furnish security to the extent of Rs. 800 within a month. In default the suit will be dismissed with costs, " After that order had been passed the Petitioner applied to this Court and obtained a rule calling on the opposite party to show cause why that order should not be Be set aside. 2. In support of the application it has been contended, and we think fairly contended that the effect of the order passed by the Subordinate Judge under the provisions of sec. 380, C. P. C, is to render nugatory the order passed under the provisions of sec. 410 of the Code. 3. The learned vakil who has appeared in support of the application has invited our attention to the case of Nusserooddeen Biswas v. Ujjul Biswas 17 W. R. 68 (1871), and has pointed out that a similar view was taken by the learned Judges who tried that case, though that case was (to a certain extent) not quite on all fours with the present. In that case the order under sec. 380 had been passed with reference to an Appellant who had been allowed to appeal as a pauper. And the learned Judges say in effect that to allow an order for security to be passed on such an Appellant, would be practically to render nugatory the order passed allowing him to appeal as a pauper, and they go on to add that in their opinion the provisions of the section of the Code then in force which corresponds with sec. 380 of the present Code were so inconsistent with the provisions of the Code dealing with suits and appeals by paupers as to, in their opinion, support the view that the provisions of 88C. 380 were not applicable to suits or appeals brought by paupers. It has been argued on the basis of this decision that in the present case the Subordinate Judge in passing the order demanding security from the Petitioner either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. 4. It has been argued on the basis of this decision that in the present case the Subordinate Judge in passing the order demanding security from the Petitioner either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. 4. In support of the order it has been argued that the Subordinate Judge was not prevented by the fact that the Petitioner had been permitted to sue as a pauper from requiring security from her under the provisions of sec. 380, and the learned vakil has gone so far as to suggest that as the order for security is one within the discretion of the Subordinate Judge we as a Court of revision ought not to interfere with it under the provisions of sec. 622, C. P. 0. In our opinion this contention cannot prevail. The provisions of sec 622 certainly give to this Court full powers to interfere if we are satisfied that the lower Court has either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. In this case we think that the view which this Court took in the case on which the learned vakil for the Petitioner relies is one which we should adopt and that the provisions of sec 380 cannot be taken to be applicable to the case of a person to whom permission has been granted under the provisions of sec. 410 to sue as a pauper. We think therefore that the Subordinate Judge, in passing the orders which he passed under see 380, C. P. C, and which bad the effect of rendering nugatory the jurisdiction which he had exercised under the provisions of sec. 410 of the Code, acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity and that his order under sec. 380 of the CPC must be set aside. In the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has refrained from giving his reasons for passing the order under sec 380, but after reading the two affidavits we think that the materials before him were not sufficient to justify that order. We, therefore, direct that the rule be made absolute and that the order passed under sec 380 requiring the Petitioner to furnish the security be set aside. We, therefore, direct that the rule be made absolute and that the order passed under sec 380 requiring the Petitioner to furnish the security be set aside. The Petitioner will recover costs of this proceeding from the opposite party. We fix the hearing fee at two gold mohurs.