JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit by one Radhika Mohun Roy to recover from the estate of his deceased brother, Dakshina Mohun Roy, who died on the 6th June 1901, the sum of Rs. 13,000 and interest. The Dafendant in the suit was Mr. Bonnerjee, who is a member of the Bar and the Official Receiver of this Court, and who was appointed administrator pendente lite to the estate of Dakshina. The case of the Plaintiff is that on the 2nd of May 1901 Radhika lent his brother Dakshina, who was speculating at the time in Government paper a Government note for Rs. 10,000 his case being that Dakshina required this note in order that he might deposit it with his bankers as cover for any differences in his speculations in such paper. The rest of the claim is made up of the following alleged loans:-on the 15th of May 1901, Rs. 1,500; on the 19th of May 1901, Rs. 200; on the 5th of June, Rs. 1,000; on the 6th of June 1901, Rs. 200; and on the 8th of June 1901, Rs. 100. The Plaintiff says that Rs. 1,000 was advanced for the purpose of paying off the doctors who had attended Dakshina during his last illness. 2. The case of the Defendant is that at the time of the institution of the suit he was no longer administrator pendente lite and he, at the instance of the widow of Dakshina, submits as a matter of law whether the suit is maintainable as against him. It is, however, conceded that after Mr. Bonnerjee ceased to be administrator pendente lite he continued to hold and deal with the property precisely in the same way as he did prior to the date when his appointment as administrator pendente lite came to an end. Mr. Bonnerjee has not appealed but the appeal has been conducted by the person beneficially interested In the estate, who in the presence of the Plaintiff was substituted as Appellant by an order of this Court. His case on the merits is that, as this is a claim against a dead man's estate, it must be most strictly proved by the Plaintiff, and that, as the Plaintiff is apparently not a very reputable gentleman, the Court cannot act upon his story without adequate corroboration. His case on the merits is that, as this is a claim against a dead man's estate, it must be most strictly proved by the Plaintiff, and that, as the Plaintiff is apparently not a very reputable gentleman, the Court cannot act upon his story without adequate corroboration. It appears in these circumstances that an application was made to the Court of first instance to allow the plaint to be amended by adding an alternative claim against Mr. Bonnerjee as a quari executor de son tort; and that application was granted by the Court of first instance. But so far as the record shows the amendment never seems to have been made. This would appear to indicate some carelessness on the part of those who wave responsible in the matter. 3. It would be, perhaps, convenient before dealing with the merits, to deal with the question of whether Mr. Bonnerjee can be sued as a quasi executor de son tort. 4. The contention of the Appellants is that as the Indian Succession Act does not apply to Hindus, and the sections of that Act dealing with the question of an executor de son tort have not been incorporated into the Hindu Wills Act, the fact of their no, having been so incorporated indicates that the principle was not to apply to the estate of Hindus: Mr. Justice Phear in Jogender Narain v. Emily Temple Ind. Jur. 2 N. S., p. 235 (1867) held,-I need not repeat the passage cited by Mr. Justice Bodilly,-that a creditor here as in England, might sue a person who is dealing with the assets of the deceased: and I find in the case of Magaluri Garudiah v. Narayana Rungiah I. L. R. 3 Mad. 359 (1881) the following passage at page 363 :-The question as to whether or not there has been misjoinder depends on the answer to the question whether or not the Appellants have so conducted themselves in respect of the property of the deceased, that a creditor is entitled to sue them as quasi representatives of the deceased. It is a common feature of. Hindu and English law that persons who take the property of the deceased person subject themselves to liability for the debts of the deceased. It is a common feature of. Hindu and English law that persons who take the property of the deceased person subject themselves to liability for the debts of the deceased. A person who intermeddles with the estate of a deceased person is known to English law as an executor de son tort, and in that character an action will lie against him for a debt due by the deceased, and where there are several co-obligors he may be sued as a codebtor." One of the Judges who was a party to that decision was a Hindu Judge of great experience, and he says :-" It Is a common feature of Hindu and English law that persons who take the property of the deceased person subject themselves to liability for the debts of the deceased." That case was decided in the year 1881, and so far as I am aware the principle involved in that decision has not been subsequently challenged. 5. I, therefore, agree with the Judge in the Court of first instance that the suit can properly proceed against Mr. Bannerjee. 6. I now pass to the merits and I will deal with each item separately. 7. As regards the claim for Rs. 10,000, is there sufficient corroboration of the Plaintiff's story 1 I agree with the Court of first instance that there is, Before the 2nd of May of 1901 there had been transactions between the brothers of a character practically similar to that now under discussion: and the story of the Plaintiff gains very substantial support from the Government promissory note itself. The promissory note shows that it was undoubtedly the property of Radhika, that it was endorsed over to his brother Dakashina; and the Bankers' Book shows that it was on the 2nd of May 1901 paid by Dakshina into his loan account at the Bank. Dakshina was only credited in that account with Rs. 1,000 in respect of the Rs. 10,000 Government note; the balance was apparently held by the Bank as cover for the speculation in Government paper in which Dakshina was then concerned. The suggestion that the transaction was an out and out sale by Radhika to Dakshina seems to me to be one that is not supported by the evidence in the case. 10,000 Government note; the balance was apparently held by the Bank as cover for the speculation in Government paper in which Dakshina was then concerned. The suggestion that the transaction was an out and out sale by Radhika to Dakshina seems to me to be one that is not supported by the evidence in the case. We have further the feature that this claim was treated by the then administrator pendente lite as a debt due from the estate :- In annexure B of Mr. Beeby's affidavit of valuation (he was then administrator pendend lite) Radhika appears as a creditor of the estate to that extent. Upon this question of fact I agree with the view taken by the Court of first instance that the Plaintiff has proved his case as regards the Rs. 10,000. I now pass to the other items. 8. I will deal first with the alleged loan of Rs. 1,000 on the 5th of June 1901. The Plaintiff's case is that this sum was advanced to pay the doctor's fees. It is a feature of this part of the case that presumably the doctors have been paid, for they have made no claim against this estate. The question then is who paid them? It seems pretty clear that at this time there was no money in Dakshina's house, and as the doctors appear to have been paid, if the Plaintiff did not advance the Rs. 1,000 to pay them, it is difficult to see where the money came from. We think there Is sufficient corroboration of the Plaintiff's story in respect of this claim for Rs. 1,000; at any rate, there is not sufficient to warrant us In saying that the conclusion of the learned Judge was wrong on this point. 9. I now pass to the sum of Rs 1,500 which is alleged to have been advanced on the 15th of May 1901. The evidence of corroboration does not appear to us to be sufficient. According to the Plaintiff he drew a cheque for this sum payable to one Sarat Chaudra Bhatta-cherjee. The Plaintiff was asked why this cheque was not drawn in favour of his brother Dakshina. The suggestion is, as the Plaintiff says, "My brother wanted cash from me. The evidence of corroboration does not appear to us to be sufficient. According to the Plaintiff he drew a cheque for this sum payable to one Sarat Chaudra Bhatta-cherjee. The Plaintiff was asked why this cheque was not drawn in favour of his brother Dakshina. The suggestion is, as the Plaintiff says, "My brother wanted cash from me. He asked me to get it cashed." That cheque is not put in nor is Radhika's pass book : and except the oral statements of the Plaintiff and one Annada Charan Shomaddar who was Dakshina's amlah, both of whom are witnesses who were discredited by the Court of first instance, there is nothing to shew that this money ever reached Dakshina. Reliance has been placed upon the evidence of Prosonna Coomar Boy. But his evidence comes to nothing more than this, that he heard a conversation at some Railway Station, between the two brothers in which Dakshina asked Radhika for a loan of Rs. 1,500. He says he did not see the money paid by Radhika, but that Dakshina told Annada to go and get it. I do not think that is a sufficient corroboration to substantiate the claim against a dead man's estate, the more so as the Court of first instance does not treat either the Plaintiff or Annada as reliable witnesses. We, therefore, think, that the claim for this sum of Bs. 1,500 ought not to be allowed. 10. As regards the alleged loan of Bs. 200 on the 19th of May 1901, it is not suggested that there is any corroboration whatever. We, therefore, cannot allow it. 11. As regards the sums of Rs. 200 and Bs. 100 alleged to have been advanced on the 6h and 8th June 1901, for funeral expenses, except the fact that at the instance of the Plaintiff these sums were entered by Annada Shomaddar in the household books of Dakshina there is really no corroboration. 12. As the Judge in the Court of first instance says that he cannot act on the Plaintiff's evidence without corroboration and that Annada Shomaddar gave his evidence In a most unsatisfactory manner and as regards a portion of it was undoubtedly lying, I do not think that these claims should have been admitted. They must be disallowed. 13. There Is only one other small point. It was suggested that as these monies, other than the Bs. They must be disallowed. 13. There Is only one other small point. It was suggested that as these monies, other than the Bs. 10,000 were advanced in Calcutta the Alipore Court had jurisdiction to deal with the case. I need not say anything about this as Mr. Garth in reply, conceded that there is nothing in it. 14. The appeal, therefore, falls as regards the claim for Bs. 10,000 and Bs. 1,000 and succeeds as regards the balance of Bs. 2,000. There will be, therefore, a decree for Bs. 11,000 with proportionate interest. As each party has partially succeeded there will be proportionate costs of this appeal.