JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The only question we have to deal with on this appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The facts of the case, so far as are material, are as follows : It appears that in the year 1896, the sons of one Chuni Lall Sen instituted a suit in this Court, being Suit No. 882 of 1896 against, amongst others, the present Appellants or their predecessors-in-title and the present Respondents or their predecessors-in-title; and the object of that suit was to have their shares ascertained in certain property, for possession, an account and incidental relief. The present Appellants are the sons and heirs of one Moni Madhab Sen, who was an original Defendant in that suit, but died during its pendency, and the present Appellants were brought on the record as party Defendants in the place of their deceased father. In that suit, an Issue was raised as between themselves and the sons of Bani Madhub Sen, who were the really contesting Defendants in that suit and who are the Respondents on the present appeal, as to whether the sons and heirs of Moni Madhub Sen were entitled to a 1/3 share in the premises scheduled to the plaint in that suit; and they supported the case of the Plaintiffs. It would appear from para. 17 of the written statement in the present suit that this issue was actually invited by and raised at the instance of the heirs and representatives of Bani Madhub Sen, the present Respondents. The position of the present Appellants in the previous suit was the same as that of the Plaintiffs in that suit. In that suit the present Appellants and their mother, Sreemutty Munjuri Dasi, were declared entitled to a 1/3 share in the scheduled property and entitled to obtain possession of the share to which they were held to be so entitled. That suit was a long and expensive one, and was fought out with the result I have stated; the Plaintiffs in that suit being declared entitled to 5/6 of the scheduled properties. That suit was a long and expensive one, and was fought out with the result I have stated; the Plaintiffs in that suit being declared entitled to 5/6 of the scheduled properties. By the decree in that suit which is dated the 20th of April 1903, it was expressly declared that the present Appellants were jointly entitled to one-third part or share of the property in dispute and the present Respondents were to deliver to them "quie possession of the shares of the said premises to which they have been declared entitled as aforesaid." No doubt, in strictness the present Appellants ought to have been transferred from the category of Defendants and joined as co-Plaintiffs. But, as now appears, the issue I have referred to, as to the rights of the present Appellants to a 1/3 share of the scheduled property, was at the invitation of the present Respondents decided in that suit. The present Respondents or their predecessors-in-title appealed against that judgment, and on the 22nd of February 1904 the Appellate Court confirmed the decree in the main but set aside the decree so far as it related to the present Appellants. Whether the Appellate Court would have arrived at that conclusion if it had then known, as this Court now knows, that the question as to the right to the one-third share was raised and decided in the previous suit at the instance of the present Respondents or their predecessors-in-title, is, to say the least, (I say so because I was a party to the judgment) probably open to doubt. But no doubt the decree was reversed and we must deal with the matter on the footing of that reversal. In this state of circumstances, the learned Judge in the Court of first instance held that the suit was barred : and the Plaintiffs in the present suit have appealed. Their case is that their rights must be taken to have been suspended between the 20th of April 1903, the date of the decree in the first suit, and the 22nd of February 1904, the date of the reversal of that decree, and it is conceded that if this period be excluded on the ground that their right were so suspended, the present suit is within time. It is also contended that sec. 14 of the Limitation Act covers the present case. It is also contended that sec. 14 of the Limitation Act covers the present case. As to the latter point we feel grave doubt whether the case falls within that section, but it is unnecessary to decide that point, as we think the present Appellants are entitled to succeed upon the other point. It is clear that under the decree of the 20th of April 1903, the present Appellants with others were declared entitled to 1/3rd share in the property and that the present Respondents were ordered to deliver up quiet possession to them of this share. It is perfectly true that that decree was passed in a suit which qud the position of parties may be said not to have been properly framed. No doubt if the attention of the Court, when it passed that decree, had been called to this, it would, in the circumstances, have transferred the present Appellants from the category of Defendants into that of co Plaintiffs. It seems to us, however, that this was a decree which, so long as it stood undischarged, was susceptible of execution at the hands of the present Appellants, and whilst that decree existed, it was not open to them in the circumstances to institute a fresh suit for the attainment of the very object which had been successfully attained by them in the previous suit. We think, therefore, in these circumstances that the right of the Plaintiffs to bring an action to recover the property was suspended between the 20th of April 1903 and the 22nd of February 1904, and that the case falls within the principle laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the cases of Mussamat Ranee Surnomoyee v. Soshee Mukhee Burmonia 12 M. I. A. 244 (1868) and of Pran Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Rookea Begum 7 M. I. A. 357 (1859). It is conceded that at the time of the institution of the first suit, the Plaintiffs' claim was not barred. 2. In this connection the language of Lord Eldon in Pulteney v. Warren 6 Vesey 92 (1801), has some application: "If there be a principle, upon which Courts of Justice ought to act without scruple, it is this; to relieve parties against) that injustice occasioned by its own acts or oversights at the instance of the party, against whom the relief is sought. That proposition is broadly laid down in some of the cases." This view was approved of by the House of Lords in the East Indian Company v. Campion 11 Bligh 187 (1837). For these reasons, we are unable to concur in the view taken by the learned Judge in the Court of first instance. The appeal must be allowed with coats both here and in the Court below and the case must be remitted to be tried out on the merits if, after the contest which took place in the previous suit, the present Respondents think that there are still any merits to be discussed.